State v. YoungState v. Young
The state‘s amended information charged defendant Young with manslaughter arising out of the negligent, careless, and reckless operation of a tractor trailer which resulted in the death of Lillie Speed Neal in January 1977. The charge was filed under
[T]he killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree.
On this appeal the state contends the trial court erred in dismissing the amended information because defendant was effectively charged with manslaughter under
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of
chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, shall be deemed manslaughter and shall constitute a felony of the second degree.
It is a general principle of statutory construction that statutes on the same subject should be harmonized when possible, but that a statute dealing specifically with a subject takes precedence over another statute covering the same subject in general terms. Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959); Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). A related principle is that an earlier penal statute must yield to a later one dealing with the same subject and providing a different penalty. 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 23.26 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1972). See Adams v. Culver, supra.
In Adams a defendant sought habeas corpus to overturn his conviction under
Assuming, arguendo, that this is a “lewd or lascivious act” clearly within the intendment of
§ 800.04 , cf. Boles v. State, 1946, 158 Fla. 220, 27 So.2d 293, the fact remains that the exhibition of a lewd and pornographic picture has been specially and explicitly dealt with by Subsections (1) and (2) of§ 847.01 , supra. It follows that ... the specific statute, alone, is applicable to the offense charged against petitioner [defendant].
Turning to the instant case, it becomes apparent that the vehicular homicide statute is the only statute under which defendant can be prosecuted. Though the general manslaughter statute has in the past been construed to include the negligent operation of an automobile resulting in death, the vehicular homicide statute, enacted subsequently to the manslaughter statute, deals specifically with this situation. Moreover, the legislature has prescribed different penalties for the two offenses. Manslaughter is a second-degree felony with a maximum penalty of fifteen years in prison or a $10,000 fine, or both.
Although this point is of first impression in Florida, other jurisdictions have resolved the issue. In Atchley v. State, 473 P.2d 286 (Okl.Cr. 1970), the defendant was convicted of manslaughter as a result of an automobile accident. On appeal the issue was whether the general manslaughter statute was superseded by the state‘s subsequently enacted vehicular homicide statute. As now in Florida, the Oklahoma vehicular homicide statute provided a lesser penalty than did the general manslaughter statute. The court of criminal appeals held the vehicular homicide statute supplanted the manslaughter statute in cases where death resulted from negligent operation of a vehicle. Other jurisdictions are generally in agreement. See, e.g., State v. Hagge, 224 N.W.2d 560 (N.D. 1974); State v. Collins, 55 Wash.2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960); State v. Biddle, 6 Terry 244, 45 Del. 244, 71 A.2d 273 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer Del. 1950).
One factor which may have led to enactment of vehicular homicide statutes was the reluctance of juries to return verdicts of guilt against defendants charged with manslaughter arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Legislatures in many states, including Florida, recognized this and enacted specific vehicular homicide statutes with somewhat lesser penalties. Since our legislature has determined a specific category of offense for vehicular homicide, we think this determination must govern and the state should be precluded from exercising prosecutorial discretion to charge a defendant under the general manslaughter statute.
We note in passing that this case is distinguishable from the recent supreme court decision in Fayerweather v. State, 332 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1976). There it was held that conduct violative of both the State Credit Card Crime Act (specifically
Affirmed.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
SCHEB, Judge.
On Petition for Rehearing the state argues that our main opinion is incorrect. The state contends that vehicular homicide as proscribed by
The state‘s argument is directed to the concept of lesser included offenses categorically explained in the classic case of Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1968). Under Brown, a category 3 offense is a lesser crime necessarily included in the greater crime of which the defendant stands accused, viz., “the burden of proof of the major crime cannot be discharged without proving the lesser crime as an essential link in the chain of evidence.” 206 So.2d at 382. Conversely, the major crime requires the proof of some element or elements in addition to those necessary to prove the lesser crime.
In a prosecution for manslaughter under
The vehicular homicide statute was originally enacted as Chapter 74-383, Section 16, Laws of Florida. Prior to its enactment, prosecution of those negligently causing the death of another by operation of a motor vehicle was possible only under the manslaughter statute. Therefore, the courts of Florida were called upon on numerous occasions to further define and elaborate on the meaning of “culpable negligence” in the manslaughter statute as related to the operation of a motor vehicle. As far back as 1926, when automobiles were beginning to become common on our streets, the Supreme Court of Florida in Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 221-22, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926), said that culpable negligence meant negligence “of `a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons.‘” Over the years the courts of this state have continued to define culpable negligence within the context of manslaughter resulting from operation of a motor vehicle as conduct evincing a reckless disregard for human life. See, e.g., Fulton v. State, 108 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1959); Miller v. State, 75 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1954); Phillips v. State, 289 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); McCullers v. State, 206 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Jackson v. State, 100 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958).
We must presume the legislature had knowledge of these court interpretations when it enacted the vehicular homicide statute in 1974. In so doing, the legislature used language in the new statute which effectively encompasses the judicial definition of culpable negligence in the manslaughter statute. Thus it appears the standard of proof under the manslaughter statute was carried over into the vehicular homicide statute. By its new enactment the legislature apparently intended to punish those negligently causing the death of another by operation of a motor vehicle less severely than those doing so otherwise. Our speculation as to why the legislature decided to do this is included in the main opinion.
[A] thorough examination of the two statutes in question reveal that the crime element established by the latter statute [
47 O.S. § 11-903 , Reckless disregard for the safety of others] and the elements of manslaughter second degree [O.S. § 716 , Culpable Negligence] disclose that the substance of the crime in each case is the operation of an automobile with reckless disregard for the safety of others, thereby causing the death of another. Thus, we find two statutes providing for the punishment of identical acts... .
473 P.2d at 289. As noted in our main opinion, we find the Oklahoma court‘s reasoning highly persuasive in view of the similarity in language of the statutes of both states. See also State v. Biddle, 6 Terry 244, 45 Del. 244, 71 A.2d 273 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1950).
Despite the semantic differences between our two Florida statutes, we find no articulable difference in the elements of proof required to establish guilt of the crimes therein proscribed. Accordingly, we reject the state‘s argument in its Petition for Rehearing. We think that in enacting
We have examined the other contentions by the state in its Petition for Rehearing and find them to be without merit. As herein amplified, we adhere to our main opinion.
Recognizing the significance of our decision, we grant the state‘s motion to certify the question involved in this case to the Supreme Court of Florida under
HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.