37 N.J.L. 184 | N.J. | 1874
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The indictment placed before ■this court on the motion certified for our advisory opinion, is ■.founded on an alleged conspiracy to defraud and cheat the ■city of Newark, in its corporate capacity. This combination is laid in general terms, without specification of the means by which the cheat was to be accomplished. The question has, in various cases, been discussed, whether this form of pleading is sufficient. There are decisions that deny its fitness when applied to cases in which the object of the conspiracy is not in itself of an indictable nature, and on this account it was.formerly much controverted, whether such a method of
It is also proper here to make this additional observation. If the doctrine above recognized should be repudiated, and the principle should be adopted that this generality of allegation is proper only when the end of the conspiracy is an indictable offence; nevertheless, such a principle would not invalidate the indictment now considered. The reason is, that the project charged upon these conspirators is, pet' se, a crime. The intended victim of this concerted fraud is a municipal corporation; an artificial body contrived for the administration of local government, and is the representative, in important respects, of the civil interests of a large body of persons. A concerted plan to cheat such ail institution must, upon obvious principles, be a public offence of a penal character. There are many acts and things which become punishable on the ground that they affect injuriously the rights of many, which are not so when they thus affect the rights of only one or a few. A nuisance is an illustration of this principle. .Such a wrong, originating in a private trespass, as it expands
This result is obviously decisive of all the objections taken on the argument against this pleading. Those objections, other than the one just disposed of, were raised up by counsel on the hypothesis that the nature and entire scope of the conspiracy were to be ascertained from the overt acts charged. Thus it was insisted that the charge that the defendant, Young, refused and neglected to inform his associates of the true value of the land taken for the street, was not criminal and cannot form the foundation for an indictment. It was even contended that such reticence was entirely justifiable.
The self evident answer to this argument is, that even if the premises assumed, are incontrovertible, they cannot have the affect attributed to them. The fallacy of the reasoning arises from the assumption that the means thus stated to have been employed in the execution of the conspiracy, are all the means in contemplation of law, which were used. But this is not an admissible conclusion, for all the pleader, by force of the crimes act, is required to do, is to set forth <e some act ” done to effect the object of such conspiracy. Such overt act may or may not be in itself criminal. The conspiracy is the crime, and the overt act bringing it within the requirement of the statute, may be a very insignificant affair. A completed crime is shown on the record before us by the averment of a criminal conspiracy, and the averment of the doing of any thing, no matter what, in furtherance of it, yielding therefore the premises claimed, the crime in this case is well charged.
But these premises, I think it is very clear, are not to be conceded. The overt acts charged are of a nature highly criminal. To regard them in any other light is, it seems to me, to put away from us the ordinary standards of morality. Stripped of its technical and superfluous language, the charge
Regarding the case in either aspect, the indictment is-sufficient, and the Oyer and Terminer should be so advised,-