State v. YorkState v. York
Rendered on the 25th day of November, 2009.
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SCOTT SCHOCKLING, Atty. Reg. #0062949, Champaign County Prosecutor‘s Office, 200 N. Main Street, Courthouse, Urbana, Ohio 430078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
MICHAEL T. COLUMBUS, Atty. Reg. #0076799, 2100 First National Plaza, 130 West Second Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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FAIN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Danielle Mae York appeals from her conviction and sentence, following a guilty plea, upon one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth degree felony, and one count of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, in violation of
{¶ 2} York was sentenced to imprisonment for one year for Possession of Cocaine, and five years for Aggravated Vehicular Assault, the maximum terms of imprisonment for these offenses. The sentences imposed were ordered to be served concurrently.
{¶ 3} York‘s assigned counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, indicating that he has not been able to find any potential assignment of error having arguable merit. After having independently reviewed the record, as required by Anders, neither have we. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. We note that the State did not elect to file a brief.
I
{¶ 4} In August 2008, Danielle York was indicted on one count of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, one count of Vehicular Assault, and three counts of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol or a Drug of Abuse. These charges arose from an automobile accident that occurred in January 2008, when York operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of cocaine, and caused serious physical harm to Denny Howell.
{¶ 5} At the time of the accident, Mr. Howell and his daughter, Julie, were en route to the airport. Mr. Howell was a former superintendent of schools and an active member of his community. Mr. Howell suffered a severe brain injury as a
{¶ 6} The indictment involving the accident was filed as Champaign County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2008 CR 207, and the case was subsequently consolidated with another charge filed against York in Champaign County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2008 CR 142, for Possession of Cocaine. After being fully advised of her rights, York pled guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine in Case No. 2008 CR 142, and one count of Aggravated Vehicular Assault in Case No. 2008 CR 207. The remaining charges were then dismissed. York was sentenced to one year in prison for Possession of Cocaine, and five years in prison for Aggravated Vehicular Assault. She was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $380,000. York now appeals from her conviction and sentence.
II
{¶ 7} York‘s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, indicating that he has not been able to find any potential assignment of error having arguable merit. By entry of this court, York was advised of this fact, and was given sixty days within which to file her own, pro se appellate brief. She has not done so.
{¶ 9} York‘s attorney suggests that the trial court‘s colloquy with York fell below standards required by
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{¶ 11} “A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
{¶ 12} We have previously noted that:
{¶ 13} ” ’
{¶ 14} York failed to raise this issue at sentencing, and she did not present any evidence to the trial court about similar offenders and their sentences. The argument, is therefore, waived.
{¶ 15} Furthermore, even if York had raised this issue in the trial court, it would have no arguable merit. The trial court sentenced York to the maximum sentences on each count, but elected not to impose the sentences consecutively.
{¶ 16} The final issue is whether trial counsel acted ineffectively by failing to object to York‘s sentence. York‘s counsel suggests that the failure to object adversely affected York‘s right to due process. Counsel does not indicate how York‘s rights may have been impacted. We find that upon considering this potential assignment of error specifically, it has no arguable merit.
{¶ 17} “In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel‘s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Stevens, Montgomery App. No. 19572, 2003-Ohio-6249, at ¶33, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142.
{¶ 18} “Entry of a voluntary guilty plea waives ineffective assistance of counsel claims except to the extent that counsel‘s performance causes the waiver of Defendant‘s trial rights and the entry of his plea to be less than knowing and voluntary.” State v. Kidd, Clark App. No., 2004-Ohio-6784, at ¶16 (citation omitted).
{¶ 19} We have already concluded that York‘s argument about the voluntariness of her plea has no arguable merit. All other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been waived. Id. Furthermore, even if the sentencing argument had not been waived, it would have no arguable merit. As we noted, the sentence was within the trial court‘s discretion, given the serious harm caused to the Howell family.
III
{¶ 21} This court agreeing with assigned appellate counsel that there are no potential assignments of error having arguable merit, and that this appeal is wholly frivolous, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
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BROGAN and GRADY, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Scott D. Schockling
Michael T. Columbus
Danielle Mae York #W073-902
Hon. Roger B. Wilson