{¶ 3} After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court dismissed several counts of the indictment. On April 24, 2002, the jury found Appellant guilty of breaking and entering, a felony in the fifth degree, as contained in counts five, nine, ten, and eleven of supplement two to the indictment. The jury also found Appellant guilty оf receiving stolen property, a felony of the fourth degree, as contained in count twenty-four of supplement five to the indictmеnt. However, Appellant was found not guilty of breaking and entering as contained in counts seven, eight, and twelve of supplement two to thе indictment. The jury was deadlocked on the charges of breaking and entering and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, as contаined in counts thirteen and sixteen, respectively, of supplement two to the indictment. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to a definite term of twelve months imprisonment on each count of breaking and entering and a definite term of eighteen months imprisonment for one count of receiving stolen property. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, yielding а total of five and one-half years imprisonment. Appellant appealed the trial court's decision to this Court and this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v.Yeager, 9th Dist. Nos. 21091, 21112, 21120,
{¶ 4} While Appellant's direct appeal of his first trial was pending, a second trial was held on the chargе of intimidation of a victim or witness, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 5} While Appellant's direct appeal of his second trial was pending, Apрellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on April 7, 2003. Appellant also filed a pro se motion for a nеw trial on July 7, 2003. In an order dated September 25, 2003, the trial court denied both of Appellant's post-conviction motions, stating:
"[Appellant's] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 7, 2003, pertains to the first trial and was not timely filed within 180 days as required by R.C.
"[Appellant] requеsts that the petition also be considered as a Motion for a New Trial. Defendant argues in this motion that he has newly discovered evidеnce. This motion is outside the 120 days allowed by Crim.R. 33(B). * * * After careful consideration, the Court hereby DENIES this motion.
"The Motion for a New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence, filed July 7, 2003, contains seven claims. [Appellant] has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts underlying those claims. See Crim.R. 33(B). After careful consideration, the Court hereby DENIES this motion."
{¶ 6} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court's denial of his July 7, 2003 motion for a new trial, asserting three assignments of error. We have cоnsolidated Appellant's assignments of error to facilitate review.
{¶ 7} In Appellant's first, second, and third assignments of error, he has essentially argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for а new trial. He has further argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 8} In State v. Harmon, 9th Dist. No. 21465,
{¶ 9} In the instant matter, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on July 7, 2003, while his direct appeal from his second trial was pending before this Court and the trial court ruled on Appellant's motion. In accordance with our holding inHarmon, we find that Appellant's noticе of a direct appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider his motion for a new trial. Harmon,
Judgment vacated, and cause remanded.
Carr, P.J. and Batchelder, J. concur.
