201 Mo. 646 | Mo. | 1907
Under an information duly verified and filed by the prosecuting attorney of Douglas county, charging the defendant with burglary and larceny and with being an habitual criminal, defendant was convicted in the circuit court of said county on the 23rd day of June, 1906, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of his natural life.
The offense was alleged to have been committed January 3,1906; the building alleged to have been burglarized was a storehouse belonging to T. N. and P. M. Smallwood, from which various articles of dry goods, shoes and jewelry, of the value of $94.45, were alleged to have been stolen by defendant.
In due time after verdict the defendant filed motions for a new trial and in arrest, which were overruled, and he appeals.
The State’s evidence tended to prove that T. N. and P. M. Smallwood were the owners of a store building situated in the town of Denlow in Douglas county, Missouri, and that on the night of the 3rd of January, 1906, the doors and windows of said building were securely fastened. The next morning they discovered that one of the windows, which had been fastened at the top with a nail, had been prized open and the window sash taken out and sot on the ground against the side of the wall. Some shoes, some men’s overshoes, two bolts of red flannel, one bolt of eider down, a hat,
While in jail, the defendant wrote the following letter:
Ava, Mo., Jan. 10,1906.
Mrs. Mattie Caudle:
Kind Friend. — I thought I would write you a few lines to let you know that I am well, truly hoping these few lines will reach their destination and find you well. Well, Mattie, you know what you said; you ought to stick to what you said; there is no chance for me; be of good cheer. "Write and tell me if you are coming down'*655 when I have my trial. Now, Mat., I will live and die for yonr sake; you ought to have stuck to what you first said, now, honey, you always told me if I got into trouble that you would spend everything you had for me. Honey, you know that my life never, never will be any pleasure if I cannot be with the one that I love. Honey, you must not write in any way about what has happened when you write, just write and tell me if you are well. Mat., they cannot hurt you in any way; I will see that they don’t hurt you in any way with the law. Now May keep says: “Yea and Nay.” If you will you can sell your land and help me out of trouble. When you answer, if you aim to do what I asked you to do, just put O. K. at the bottom of your letter, then I will know what you aim to do. Now, Mat., this letter will be registered to you without anyone knowing anything about it. Be sure to write like that you ever got a letter from me first. I don’t want them to find out that I ever slipped a letter to you. Now, Mat., if you find out anything about my case that you think would do me any good, you can write and tell me; but be sure and be careful what you write. I will not sign my name to this letter, for you will know my hand write. Now, Mat., don’t sign your name to your letter when you write, sign some other name, some young girl’s name; then we can write like we was sparking. Now, Mat., when you get this read it carefully, and if the postmaster asks you who it is from don’t tell anything about it.
Yours truly,
The State also introduced in evidence a certified copy of the record of the circuit court of Webster county, Missouri, showing that the defendant was convicted in that court of burglary and larceny on Septem-. ber 20, 1900, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for three years for the burglary and two, years for the larceny. The State also introduced in evidence a certifi
The defense was an alibi, and the defendant testified that he was in the town of Norwood on the afternoon and evening of the burglary and went home between nine and ten o ’clock; that his father and two sisters and himself occupied the same room that night; that he was not at Denlow, and knew nothing of the burglary. He admitted having possession of the stolen jewelry, but claimed that this jewelry and some razors were turned over to him by a man named Arthur Peacock, who had since died; that Mr. Peacock employed him to peddle this jewelry around the country, and had given it to him tied up> in a handkerchief, in November prior to the burglary. The defendant, however, could not remember whether he had peddled any of it or not, but claimed that he had told his sisters and father of his arrangement with Mr. Peacock. The defendant further stated that he was at the Caudle woman’s house the morning he was arrested, and saw the constable and his posse coming, and concluded that Ire had better run away. He did this, because of certain scandalous reports that had been circulated in that neighborhood regarding him and this lady. He further said he went there for the purpose of talking to her about leasing some land, and was talking to her on that subject, and also about the rumors regarding them that were afloat in the neighborhood. He said that he jumped out of a window when he saw the officers coming, and ran off, leaving his hat in the house. The defendant further admitted that he had been convicted of burglary and larceny in Webster county; that he afterwards pleaded guilty to the crime of burglary and larceny, and that he afterwards pleaded guilty to the charge of felonious as
The defendant’s sister and father testified that they were at home and occupied the same room with the defendant the night of the burglary, their mother being away, and that defendant came home between 9 and 10 o’clock, and remained home the rest of the night. His sister, Minnie, denied stating to the officers that the defendant had not been at home for two weeks.
Prank Jones and Joe Credon testified to the fact that the defendant had a trunk at the Jones house; that he kept some jewelry and a black hat there.
Mattie Caudle testified that an effort had been made to bribe her by the sheriff, he having offered her $15 to testify against the defendant, Charles Moshier and Bonnie Wyatt. She admitted that the constable took some red flannel from off the foot of her bed and from behind her bed, but claimed that her husband gave it to her, and that he brought it there Wednesday or Thursday before. She admitted, however, that she and her husband had been separated for two years. She said that those shoes were for ladies, and belonged to her, and that she got them from some man who traveled around and bought up iron and rubber; that they asked her if they could leave the shoes there, and she consented; this was along in the fall, and the shoes had been in her closet ever since. She admitted that the defendant had been to her house veryfrequentlyto see her but always in reference to leasing this land, and that he was there that day exclusively for that purpose. She said that they had been talking that morning for three-quarters of an hour before the officers came, but they did not talk on any other subject except the" subject of leasing this ground. She further testified that when they saw the officers coming, the defendant walked out the door and did not jump out of the window nor go upstairs. The overshoes, she said, she bought at Peyton’s
In rebuttal, the State proved by Jailor E slick and Joe Spurlock that the defendant, after he was placed in jail and told of the finding of the jewelry in his trunk, said that if there was any jewelry in his trunk somebody else put it in there. The State also proved by Sheriff Sanders and Deputy Sheriff Ball that the Caudle woman first stated to them that she got that flannel from- Uncle Bill Peyton, and afterwards said that defendant brought it there. The State also proved by Constable Thompson that the defendant’s sister, Minnie, stated, when the constable searched her house two days after tbe burglary, that she had not seen the defendant for two weeks.
The record discloses that on the 20th day of June, 1906, tbe defendant was brought into court, and that the sheriff returned into court a special venire of forty, from which a panel of thirty men qualified as jurors, were selected; that the respective parties made their challenges, and from this panel of thirty there were twelve jurors selected by the parties, to sit upon the trial of the cause; that said jurors were duly sworn as the law directs, and the trial proceeded with. That, thereafter, one of said jurors, W. C. Hale, was excused by the court from further service on said jury because of the sudden illness of his wife; that thereupon the court adjourned until the next morning, when it again convened, and one Harry Martin was submitted as a juror in the place of said Hale; that said Martin was duly qualified and the jury sworn as the law directs to try
As the defendant was informed against for the second offense of burglary and larceny, it is contended that, upon conviction, the punishment must be imprisonment for life, and that, hence, he was entitled to ehallenge twenty instead of twelve of the panel of thirty.
By section 1890, Revised Statutes 1899, it is provided that every person who shall be convicted of burglary in the second degree shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than three years, but no limit of imprisonment is declared. Section 2619, Revised Statutes 1899, provides that “the defendant in every indictment for a criminal offense shall be entitled to a peremptory challenge of jurors in. the following cases, as follows: First, if the offense charged is punishable with death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than for life, to the number of twenty, and no more; second, if the offense be punishable by like imprisonment, not less than a specified number of years, and no limit to the duration of such imprisonment is declared, to the number of twelve, and no more.”
If the second clause of this section of the statute is to govern, it is clear that the defendant would only have been entitled to twelve challenges, because the punishment prescribed by section 1890, supra, for burglary in the second degree is not less than three years in the penitentiary, with no limit to the duration of such imprisonment, which may be for life. But this statute is applicable only to first offenses of that character, and not to a case where the conviction is sought, as in this case, under section 2379, Revised Statutes 1899, which, because of the increase in and severity of the punishment
‘ ‘ If any person convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any attempt to commit an offense which, if perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be discharged, either upon pardon or upon compliance with the sentence, and shall subsequently be convicted of any offense committed after suchpardonordischarge he shall be punished as follows: First, if such suhse-. quent offense be snch that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for a term which under the provisions of this law might extend to imprisonment for life, then such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life; second, if such subsequent offense be snch that,- upon a first conviction, the offender would he punished by imprisonment for a limited term of years, then snch person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for the longest term prescribed upon a conviction for such first offense; third, if snch subsequent conviction be for an attempt to commit an offense which, If perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the person convicted of such subsequent offense shall he punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years.”
It is clear that if the offense of which the defendant stands convicted in this ease had been his first offense, it would, under the provisions of the law, be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than three years, and the punishment might extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, under the express provisions of the section last cited, the punishment imposed for such second offense is imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, and, consequently, the defendant
Section 2622, Revised Statutes 1899, provides: ‘ ‘ There shall be summoned' and returned in every criminal cause a number of qualified jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges, and twelve in addition; and no party shall be required to make peremptory challenges before a panel of such number of competent jurors shall be obtained. ”
As we have said, the defendant had a right to twenty challenges, but this important privilege could be waived by him if he felt so disposed. [State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224.] Had he insisted upon this right in time, and it had been denied him by the court', such refusal would have been error; but as defendant made no objection before the jury was sworn, he will be regarded as having acquiesced, and as having waived his said right. [State v. Waters, 62 Mo. 196.]
Instructions numbered two and three, claimed to have been given by the court, are criticised by defendant upon various grounds; but no instructions whatever are embraced in the bill of exceptions. There are what purport to be instructions given by the court copied into what seems to be the record proper, but it nowhere appears in the bill of exceptions that said instructions were excepted to at the time they were given. They cannot, therefore, be considered upon this appeal.
Defendant does not allege in his motion for a new trial that there was no substantial evidence to sustain the verdict; but only says that the verdict is against the evidence in the case. The evidence as shown by the record very conclusively proved defendant guilty. Besides, its weight was for the consideration of the jury, and they having found the defendant gmlty as charged, and their verdict having been approved by the trial court, said verdict will not be interfered with. [State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706; State v. Swisher, 186 Mo. 1; State v. Williams, 149 Mo. 496.]
Finding no reversible error in the record, we affirm the judgment.