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State v. Wright
969 A.2d 827
Conn. App. Ct.
2009
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*1 appeal; rights that the defendant failed to notice on Appellate transcript provided portion missing; defendant failed to brief that the prosecutorial every separate alleged misconduct. act of attorneys where have failed ... In contrast to cases procedure have incurred rules of or to follow basic judgments failure to attend court hear- for their default implicate ings, that is such claims do not conduct these attorney’s departure gross of care from an standard layperson.” neglect obvious even to a that the would be plaintiffs that the did, as the trial court conclude, We required expert negligence allegation of the defendant’s testimony judge, fact, as the trier of to assist the applicable determining standard of care and both the respect defendant’s actions with the evaluation of the properly concluded that to that standard. The court testimony expert legal requiring general in a rule applied malpractice and that the absence action malprac- plaintiffs legal testimony, claims of such proven trial. contract could not be at tice and breach of judgment is affirmed. opinion judges other concurred. In this v. NICKETAWRIGHT STATEOF CONNECTICUT 28498) (AC DiPentima, Dupont, Js. McLacMan *2 officially released Argued May 19, October Cramer, appellant Richard S. for the (defendant). attorney, Mullins, deputy assistant state’s RaheemL. Murphy, J. state’s whom, brief, with on the Scott appellee for the attorney, (state).

Opinion appeals Nicketa DUPONT, defendant, Wright, J. The conviction, jury rendered after a judgment from the degree crimes: sexual assault the first trial, of three sexual (a) (1); in violation of General Statutes 53a-70 § in violation of General degree assault in the second injury to a child 53a-71 and risk of (a) (1); Statutes § *3 of General Statutes 53-21 On (a) (2).1 § in violation improp- the defendant claims that the trial court appeal, in the erly refused to disclose information contained inspection its in camera victim’s Juvenile Court file after him his to con- and, therefore, right of the file denied sixth front and to cross-examine witnesses under the to the United States constitution2 and his amendment exculpatory evidence under process due to obtain right States consti- the fourteenth amendment United requests tution.3 The defendant that this court review the victim’s Juvenile Court file to determine whether properly the trial court concluded that it did not contain exculpatory and, disagree information if we with the conclusion, court’s that we remand the case for a new trial and issue an order the file to him. We releasing the trial court. affirm the of judgment years The was sentenced to a total effective term of thirteen years parole. imprisonment special followed seven provides in The sixth amendment to the United States constitution rele prosecutions, epjoy part: the accused shall vant “In all criminal against him . . . .” ... to be confronted with the witnesses provides The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution part: any abridge shall make or enforce law which shall in relevant “No State States; any privileges shall or immunities of citizens of the United nor liberty deprive any person life, property, process or without due State . . . .” of law jury reasonably following could have found the four- September 19, 2005, victim,

facts. On who was years old, teen her mother on living with the second two-family floor of in New Britain. morn- house That work, after mother left the victim missed ing, her subsequently stay her bus to school and decided to home. man proceeded Lee, She to call a named whom she had through telephone line, met chat and invited him house. The impression to her victim was under the eighteen years that Lee was old lived Hartford. spoken She had never seen him but had to him approxi- mately ten over telephone. times

Shortly thereafter, Lee at arrived her house with two other males—the who defendant, identified himself as Duane, another male, who identified himself as Ryan. The four together, watched a movie which during the victim and Lee went her into bedroom. Lee kissed the victim her neck, on her in the biting process, and touched her buttocks. He tried to convince her to have further sexual him, contact with but the victim refused, him to let her telling go, which he did. The rejoined two the defendant and Ryan, who were still watching the movie in the room. living The defendant then told the *4 victim he wanted to to her, they talk and both went into her bedroom. bedroom, Once inside her the pushed the victim her onto bed and off took pants her put underwear. He then a condom on and proceeded to have sexual with victim, intercourse the despite asking stop. her him Approximately three later, minutes the defendant his put on, clothes back and he and the victim returned room. living

Lee then took the victim back into her bedroom and attempted to have sexual contact with her for a second by time opening her his legs with hands. The victim rebuffed Lee’s advances, prompted which the three men to leave the victim’s house. five Within minutes of their the victim departure, left home her and went across house. The victim told her neighbor’s the street her raped. neighbor had called that she been neighbor immediately left work and mother, the who victim’s Hospital. New Britain At took victim to General the staff Alexander, an room hospital, emergency the Ann kit victim, using the a sexual assault nurse, examined She bite course of the examination. observed the side of the victim’s neck. marks on left the examination was unable to determine from She sexually the victim had been assaulted.4 whether hospital, the victim Upon home from returning New Ratajczak, an officer with the spoke with Marcin Ratajczak how she police department. Britain She told by know Lee and related the sexual assault came to a black described the defendant as the defendant. She accent, weighing six feet tall and male with a Jamaican Lee as a blue wearing She described pounds. Ratajczak with Lee’s tele provided shirt and MECCA5 Ratajczak performed listing number. reverse phone number, produced telephone for the which inquiry Street, Hartford. Sargeant address of where located a Ratajczak residence, went to the he Lloyd Aldridge, himself as Sr. man who identified Ratajczak Lee was his and that told son Aldridge Lloyd Jr. Lee subse- Aldridge, Lee’s real name Ratajczak immediately came of the house. quently out description matched the clothing noticed that Lee’s as was a blue MECCA victim, wearing he given but was unable at Ratajczak shirt. then arrested Lee that time to locate defendant. assault days after the sexual alleged

Two to three Steele, Lee, and the arrest of Michael of the victim police department, was with New Britain detective *5 4 victim this in in which the is Alexander testified that is common cases perpetrator and used a condom. an adolescent the 5 clothing. is a brand of MECCA

453 On assigned finding the task of the defendant. October 11, 2005, that real he discovered the defendant’s name department A motor Wright. was Nicketa of vehicles that lived at record check revealed the defendant Hartford, in located in Sargeant Street which was the multifamily in same house which Lee lived. Steele then

compiled a array that included the defen- photographic dant’s and asked the victim to come to photograph the police station to view it. The victim immediately, and with the certainty, identified defendant as the man who sexually had her. assaulted

Subsequently, on December Matthew Kelly, an officer with the New Britain police department, arrested the defendant with the connection sexual of During process, Kelly assault the victim. the booking learned that the twenty-four years defendant was of six age,6 feet, tall, pounds one inch weighed 170 with spoke a Jamaican accent.

On day portion the first of the evidentiary of the defendant’s trial, court, D’Addabbo, J., the informed defense counsel the subpoena state had issued a for victim’s Juvenile Court file so that the court could review it in camera to determine whether it con- any exculpatory tained Judge information.7 D’Addabbo further stated to defense counsel the Juvenile Court, Quinn, J., had held a hearing earlier that morning on the quash victim’s motion to subpoena8 state’s and, at the of conclusion had issued hearing, for order of the file release to the trial court for an September 30, and, therefore, The defendant’s birth date on the day twenty-three assault, years age. he was (b), juvenile § Pursuant to General Statutes 46b-124 all of cases records juvenile matters, matters are “confidential and the use of the court open inspection any party only upon or . . . disclosure third order Superior . . . .” present hearing record reveals that defense counsel was not at the Judge represented by guardian Quinn. before The victim ad litem at hearing. *6 screening review,

in all mental health camera absent repre- then assessment information.9 state and Judge her to D’Addabbo that the victim and sented attorney, an no mother, consultation with had after performing objection the court in camera to file. victim’s confidential Juvenile Court the Judge D’Addabbo announced recess, After a short file, he had reviewed the victim’s Juvenile Court that exculpatory it as found that contained no redacted, and explained Judge that he had D’Addabbo information. past at in the and that he looked reviewed similar files eye “anything could affect file with an toward that the attorney, needs of the defense the cross-examination ability perceive, including to recol- witness] a to [of veracity.” testify, Judge tell D’Ad- lect, truth, to dabbo, therefore, did not disclose the contents parties had the file sealed and marked file to the appellate such review, to the extent that there was for par- appellate Judge D’Addabbonext asked the review. they say anything. Defense counsel ties if wanted to “Nothing Judge replied: D’Ad- add, Your Honor.” Any right. “All defense counsel: dabbo further asked point?” requests you have at this Defense counsel that replied: in the Your Honor.” The court then swore “No, evidentiary portion jury trial. commenced the testified, had the victim and two other witnesses After parties met in chambers discuss the court and requested the mental health information and The Juvenile Court redacted indicating probation place a office services note in file Q) provides generically § General Statutes 46b-124 what had been removed. part: concerning “[A]ny is obtained in information child relevant any screening during . . . shall health or assessment of such child mental solely purposes planning and shall otherwise be be used and treatment entity providing retained in the files of the such services confidential and performing screening, . or evaluation. . . Such informa or such assessment any subject subpoena process not or other court for use tion shall be any purpose.” Presumably, proceeding the Juvenile Court other or for other compliance with all health assessment information in excluded mental this statute. juvenile juvenile

the victim’s status as a probation represented matter. The state to the court that it had advised defense counsel during jury selection that the victim probation was on and had informed defense *7 counsel of the general probation. nature of the Defense counsel agreed that the substance information was given you’re to him. The court then stated: “And so it, aware of then. You made some tactical decisions during the cross-examination concerning informa- tion.” replied: Defense counsel correct, yes.” “That’s

I The defendant claims that the court denied him his sixth right amendment to confrontation and fourteenth amendment exculpatory evidence when it refused to disclose the information contained in the victim’s Juvenile Court file after the court’s in camera inspection. A close review of the defendant’s brief and oral argument to this court, however, reveals that he also claims that the improperly Juvenile Court redacted the victim’s mental health screening and assessment information from the victim’s Juvenile file, thereby excluding it from the trial court’s in camera review.10 We will dispose first of this second claim.

The argues state that this “wholly claim is unreview- able” because the object defendant did not to Judge Quinn’s order removing the mental health information and did request not that Judge D’Addabbo review that information or that it be part made of the record for appellate review. We agree. Although the record reveals that defense counsel was not present at the hearing front of Judge Quinn, Judge D’Addabbo made counsel aware, on record, that the had hearing place taken Quinn and that at the hearing, had Judge issued an order that included the any redaction of information regarding victim’s mental health. The defendant, 10See footnote 9.

therefore, put notice of the Juvenile Court’s on it object but failed to point at that in time order attempts now to raise appeal from it. appeal order in his Juvenile Court’s relating claim The Juvenile Court’s judgment. from the trial court’s victim’s mental health records order to exclude the wholly unrelated to juvenile file, however, from her any Thus, the trial court. we will not consider action of that the victim’s the merits of the defendant’s claim improperly record was excluded from mental health victim’s Juvenile Court file.11 primary claim, namely, With to the defendant’s regard his when it rights that the court violated *8 victim’s Juvenile Court file as refused to disclose the redacted, state, brief, argues the in its that this claim at preserved it was not trial is unreviewable because request and the did not this court review defendant unpreserved pursuant Golding, claim to State v. his The 233, 239-40, Conn. 567 A.2d 823 state (1989).12 213 that even if this court finds the defen- further argues reviewable, properly trial claim to be the court dant’s attempted We note even if we to reach the merits of the defendant’s that claim, so as record not contain an we would be unable to do the does appears It Juvenile Court file. that General unredacted version victim’s prevented (j) the from § Statutes 46b-124 would have Juvenile Court releas court, ing trial this and the victim’s mental health information to the court or statutory requirements compliance Court was in within the that Juvenile by prevented trial review when it court’s of the information redaction. propriety footnote Because we will not review the Juvenile See 9. appeal it, possible from we will not discuss a conflict Court’s order absent right exculpatory between this statute and the defendant’s information by We note that this statute has been amended Public and confrontation. 08-86, 4, 1, § 2008. Acts No. effective October Golding brief, state, in its The did not cite in his brief. The defendant Golding entitled to review referenced to claim that not by Golding, specifically request citing he not nor did because did specifically prongs argument, its brief. At both he address four his oral specific request lack the state addressed whether the of a the defendant and Golding precluded brief our review. for review under in the defendant’s exculpatory that contained infor- concluded the file no agree mation.13We with the state that the defendant’s unpreserved object to claim is due to his failure to ruling. We conclude, however, the trial court’s Golding, pursuant claim is reviewable despite specifically his failure to in his invoke request by this for review court. appellate general

As a do rule, courts not review Evans, claims not raised at trial level. In State v. (1973), 327 A.2d 576 our however, Supreme unpreserved established review “ ‘exceptional claims that constituted circumstances’ recognized may . . . .” The court “two situations that ‘exceptional newly constitute such circumstances’ will raised claims can and be considered this court. right is . . first . where new not readily foreseeable has arisen between the time of trial appeal. ‘exceptional . . . The second circum- may adequately supports stance’ arise where the record clearly litigant deprived a claim that a has been of a (Cita- fundamental constitutional a fair trial.” tion Id., 70. interpreting

The cases decided after Evans, and rein- terpreting precepts, always its were not consistent with each other and our Court, caused *9 guidelines designed to “articulate facilitate to a less application present burdensome, more uniform involvingalleged Evans standard in future cases consti- tutional violations are the raised for first on time appeal.” Golding, supra, Relying State v. 213Conn. 239. methodology on the v. Whistnant, of State (1980), 576, 427 A.2d 414 the court held that “a defen- prevail dant can on a of claim constitutional error not

preserved only following at trial if all of the conditions really way knowing The state concedes that it has no this because it has not viewed the of the sealed contents file. adequate alleged (1) the is to review the

are met: record magni- (2) the claim is of error; claim of constitutional right; (3) alleging a tude violation of fundamental the clearly alleged violation exists and the constitutional (4) clearly deprived if trial; a fair and analysis, subject has failed to to harmless error the state alleged harmlessness of the constitutional demonstrate beyond (Emphasis a in violation reasonable doubt.” supra, Golding, original.) 239-40. State v. require

Golding to is misconstrued the satisfac- often to tion of each of these four conditions obtain Golding provides language Instead, the this court. a four must be met for defendant to that all conditions prevail preserved a claim of constitutional error not on ability claim, at trial. This court’s to review prevail ability claim, on are two his concepts. entirely “[t]he clear Case law is different Golding] [prongs first involve determination two . . two . reviewable; of whether the claim the second may whether the defendant involve a determination of quotation prevail.” (Internal v. marks State 799A.2d 1034 As Whitford, Golding, the defendant Court stated responsibility providing a that is record “bears adequate “demonstrating for review of his claim” and of a fundamental that his claim is indeed a violation thereby satisfying right,” first prongs.” supra, 213 Conn. 240. State second appellate so, “[an court] do will Should the defendant [the claim] and arrive at a conclusion as [then] review clearly alleged constitutional violation to whether clearly deprived a fair . . . the defendant of exists and was able demon- trial,” and decide whether the state thereby satisfying harmlessness, the third and strate prongs.14Id., Thus, 241. the court in fourth ability entangled appellate itself in this case has court’s state unpreserved appellate determination, with an after review an claim court’s *10 state, review, prevail. that the defendant should or should not its by refusing “erred this court ultimately held a con- proffered she claim since review the defendant’s adequate clearly and the record stitutional claim Id., claim.” 238. to review that both this cases, that in a number of We recognize of an have denied review Supreme and the court ground claim on the unpreserved alleged by citing review request failed to that the defendant have this con- years, In recent cases refined Golding. affirmatively request as failure cept the defendant’s can be Golding. These cases appellate citing review 171, 801 A.2d Ramos, 261 Conn. traced to State of In defendant a number claims Ramos, brought Id., Court. 159. appeal in his direct claims were The court determined that two those claims, unpreserved. Id., 165, 171.As to the first of those defendant, that the having sought the court held Golding prongs, under satisfied the first two having not satisfy prong failed to the third “because he [had] that the constitutional violation alleged demonstrated Id., claim, exists.” 165. As to the second the court deter mined that it could not review that claim because the request Golding Id., had failed to review. manner in explicit 171. The court was not as to the brief, argues is not because he first that the defendant entitled to review immediately request Golding. argues did not review under The state then alleged that the the defendant that his claim is of constitutional fact that satisfy Golding magnitude failure to does not because the defendant’s Golding inadequately prongs address the renders his claim briefed four and, review, therefore, Again, abandoned. our case law is clear that to obtain provide adequate a defendant must record and assert a claim “of constitu magnitude alleging right. tional of a fundamental . . .” State v. violation Golding, supra, inadequate briefing actually Accordingly, 239-40. alleged that the constitu relates to whether the defendant has established clearly clearly deprived trial, tional existed and him of a fair violation prong satisfaction of the third which concerns whether the prevail, can review. defendant can not whether the defendant obtain

460 request Golding which the defendant had failed to properly. Instead, party Id. it stated: “A is obli- affirmatively request . . . review under gated [the Golding Id. doctrine].” in v. following Waz,

Ramos cited the statement State 365, 371 n.11, (1997), support 240 Conn. 692 A.2d 1217 necessity request: of the claimed for an affirmative unpreserved who seek consideration of “[Defendants appeal] claims . . . bear the burden constitutional [on to such review under establishing of their entitlement in Golding.” previously enumerated As guidelines noted, precise guidelines Golding, under the of a defen claim, i.e., review, dant who seeks consideration of his only adequate proffer an record and a provide need magnitude alleging claim “of constitutional the violation supra, of a fundamental . . . .” State v. Golding, interpret 239-40. We do not and its 213 Conn. Ramos specific Golding by as a mention of progeny15 requiring name, effectively would add a to its prong which fifth only justification requirement test.16 “The for the specifically Golding a defendant cite in its brief is that appellate an court should be clear on the level of review appropriate a defendant seeks because is not “[i]t requested.” in a level of review that is not engage (Inter quotation nal marks Ghant v. Commissioner Correction, 1, 17, 255 Conn. 761 A.2d 740 (2000). of 15See, Bowman, 809, 815, e.g., (2008); v. A.2d State 289 Conn. 960 1027 Correction, 53, 60, Johnson v. Commissioner 288 Conn. 951 A.2d 520 Reid, 764, 781, (2008); (2006); v. State 277 Conn. 894 A.2d 963 State Commins, (2005); Faison, 276 Conn. 886 A.2d 824 State v. 112 App. 373, 381, 860, denied, 903, 962 A.2d cert. 291 Conn. 967 A.2d 646, (2009); DeVivo, App. 641, State v. 106 Conn. 942 A.2d 1066 Melody L., 131, Although Court in In 290 Conn. re respondent (2009), specifically Golding A.2d 81 noted that the failed to meet unpreserved claim, in her brief when it declined to review her specific Golding be the court did not state that review could obtained Golding. court, therefore, mention of left available other means for party establishing to meet its burden of that he or she is entitled to Golding review. predecessor, and its prominence Golding, Given the jurispru- Evans, our supra, State v. to conclude that even dence, however, it is difficult appellate specific mention without request fail to realize that a court would *12 a brief, when being review is made by estab- explores Golding methodology defendant adequate there is an record for review lishing that is of constitu- a claim that proffering discussing magnitude.17 tional Golding rationale of Evans and is that fundamen importance such that rights

tal constitutional are of appellate alleged courts should review claims of consti fails to take tutional violations even when exception an to the violation at the trial court alleged Golding level. Evans and are intended to deal with “substance, Gooch, not labels.” State 18, 438 Gooch, A.2d 867 In Evans was character (1982). by Parskey a “trial bypass,” ized Justice as court one, opposed “appellate a narrow as to an although Champs-Elysees.” bypass, however, Id. A narrow is not necessarily sign it, a street with a neon on emblazoning "Golding Moreover, the words Review.” after elimina by Supreme tion our Court in Golding hurdle of preserve” “failure to constitutional claims at the trial level, appellate court so that review could be obtained unpreserved claims, for some constitutional it is not for us logical hurdle, namely, to establish another necessity very case gives the mention of that defendant the to obtain review of the claim he or preserve she failed to at trial. only appellate decisions, are but Not and Evans fixtures

they articles, have also been discussed in numerous law review treatises andjournals. See, Sellers, v. Golding: Standard,” e.g., A S. “State Standardless (1991); Ranucci, Unexceptional 65 Conn. B.J. 245 J. “State v. Evans: The Exception,” 61 Conn. B.J. 359 in a defendant’s require

To a ritualistic incantation by a cita- brief of the four followed prongs by volume, to the case name and would do tion of the case. It is our belief injustice principles more public judicial proceedings confidence in undermined, rather than if we review likely gained, to be Appellate Court and a claim authorized pen” a “deaf decisions, turning instead of name of the case the defen- entitling claim because the in his or her brief. In dant to such review was omitted judicial as promotes economy, our addition, holding corpus habeas provides it a lessened need for future appellate ineffective assistance of petitions allege appellate review of an counsel for failure to obtain claim because counsel unpreserved in a brief. Golding specifically failed to cite *13 position is reinforced the fact that This court’s Supreme both this court and our instances, a number of constitu unpreserved alleged Court have reviewed an request failure to despite claim the defendant’s tional Alvarez, v. 216 Conn. Golding a review. In both State Moye, v. 301, 315-16, 579 A.2d 515 and State (1990), Supreme 89, 97-98, 214 570 A.2d 209 our (1990), Conn. an presumed seeking that the defendant was Court of review because he asserted a claim Evans-Golding trial, at that he did not raise magnitude constitutional proceed analyze then to the claim the court to allowing in State Golding. also, of This court prongs under 617-18, 98, 658 A.2d App. 589, v. 37 Conn. Rodriguez, 916, 661 A.2d 97 stated: denied, (1995), cert. under . . . “Presumably, the defendant seeks review case, cited that . . . he has not Golding although unpreserved claim of consti which allows review of an claim is under certain conditions. The tutional error of but prongs under the first two reviewable the defendant’s claim to be the actual review shows meritless.”

463 the Waz, our Court in case Furthermore, Supreme relies, addressed the on which Ramos claim, despite the defen unpreserved the guide make reference to express dant’s to an failure supra, Waz, State v. 240 Golding. lines specified itself, In Conn. n.11. Ramos 371 by the interests instances, stated: “In certain dictated may, exercise our inherent justice, sponte, we sua claim unpreserved to an supervisory power review the Golding has raised under appropriately not been Ramos, supra, v. 261 plain or error doctrines.” State n.16; (plain see Book error Conn. 172 Practice 60-5 § 618 Jones, 613, n.5, see also State v. Conn. review); Ct. denied, 868, 164, cert. 552 U.S. 128 S. A.2d Moreover, Roy, 169 L. 2d 112 in State Ed. A.2d 566 a unanimous (1995), Supreme Court, decision, in a curiam held that a per guidelines Golding need not invoke the defendant insufficiency to of an of the get unpreserved is an evidence claim because essential due “[i]t process by the guaranteed [fourteenth [a]mendment shall onus person no be made suffer the except upon proof criminal conviction sufficient . . . .” quotation Id., marks 212-13. (Internal

In conclusion, mandatory we do not make it although for a review of cite obtain unpreserved deprivation claim of a constitutional at trial, require present we do that a defendant record *14 affirmatively for adequare review “[demon- that his claim is indeed a violation of a fundamen- strate] Golding, supra, tal State v. right.”18 constitutional present case, In the has pro- 240. adequate vided sufficiently a record and has demonstrated, by authority, discussion relevant improperly his claim that the court refused disclose 18“Patently unpreserved that are at trial nonconstitutional claims do not special simply they warrant consideration because bear a constitutional Golding, supra, label.” v. Conn. 240. State

the information contained in the victim’s Juvenile Court implicates file his sixth amendment to confront right witnesses and his fourteenth process amendment due right exculpatory evidence, to obtain both of which are of constitutional magnitude. Therefore, he has met the requirements for review as set out in Golding, even he failed though by to cite the case name in his brief.

II concluded that the Having unpreserved claims reviewable, are we next determine whether a clearly clearly violation exists and deprived the defendant of a fair trial, such that he should prevail.19 The defendant first claims that the court’s refusal to him access to the grant victim’s Juvenile Court file violated his sixth amendment right confrontation. He argues that when the state’s case on rests the victim’s testimony and when the defense amounts to an attack on the victim’s credibility, the defendant is entitled to exculpatory access information in the victim’s Juvenile possible Court file for use cross-examination. “A criminal defendant has a constitutional cross-examine the state’s witnesses, may which include or them impeaching discrediting to reveal attempting jury biases, prejudices witnesses’ or ulterior motives, or facts on bearing the witnesses’ reliability, or credibility, perception.” sense of (Internal quotation marks Webb, App. State 75 Conn. agree We do not with the state that the defendant’s claims are briefed inadequately and, therefore, always abandoned. See footnote 14. As is true cases, only adequately defendant, in all issues can be reviewed if briefed. The however, developed argument set forth as to the existence of the constitu they deprived tional violations and the manner in which him of a fair trial. The mere omission of a reference to does not render his claims inadequately Furthermore, specifically briefed. as stated in it is harmlessness; Golding, supra,

the state’s burden to demonstrate State v. 241; therefore, incorporate the defendant’s failure to a harm analysis inadequate lessness also does not render his brief for review of his claims. *15 919, 263 Conn. 822 A.2d 122, denied, cert.

817 A.2d exists between a Thus, conflict (2003). “[a] public policy the interest confrontation and right to confidentiality records.” the of certain preserving omitted.) State McKier quotation marks (Internal denied, nan, 1198, 851 A.2d cert. App. 31, 84 Conn. instances, some 915, 859 A.2d 573 “[I]n way . . . to a give records must privileged otherwise to reveal to right criminal defendant’s constitutional about witness’ mental condition that jury the facts a . credibility. witness’ . .

may reasonably that affect not, does right The defendant’s of cross-examination in impeach him discredit and what however, allow to extent, way, might ever and to the defendant whatever . witnesses right wish. . . to cross-examine does [T]he require power pretrial the disclosure not include the to might any in and all information that be useful contra . . testimony. . dicting unfavorable specific proce- “Our Court has set forth a to dure accommodate the tension between the defen- dant’s constitutional of cross-examination and the right privacy interest of a in her witness confidential records. If, purposes cross-examination, for the a defendant privileged believes that certain records would disclose probative ability information of witness’ to especially correctly he comprehend, truth, may, know or relate the jury’s presence, attempt prelimi- out of make a the to nary ground there is reasonable showing produce believe the records would failure the . likely impeach . .20If impair his the witness. successfully in the trial court’s judgment makes obtain showing, this the state must then court to permission inspect witness’ for the records A an in camera. witness’ refusal to consent to such subpoenaed file, victim’s Because the state Juvenile Court defen present showing. make dant case did not have to such a

camera inspection entitles the defendant to have the testimony witness’ stricken. . . .

“Upon the records in inspecting camera, the trial court must determine whether espe- records are cially probative of the capacity witness’ to relate the truth or to observe, recollect and narrate relevant occur- rences. ... If the court determines that the records probative, are the state must obtain the witness’ further waiver of his privilege concerning portions relevant of the records for release defendant, or have the testimony witness’ stricken. If the court discovers no probative and impeaching material, the entire record of the must be proceeding preserved sealed and possible appellate review. . . .

“Our standard of review of a challenge to a court’s refusal to disclose privileged records is whether there was an abuse of discretion. . . . Discretion means a legal discretion, to be in conformity exercised with the spirit of law and in a manner to subserve and not impede or defeat the ends of justice. substantial . . . It goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion . . . means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds. ... In whether the determining trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every presumption reasonable in favor of the correct- ness of its action. . . . Access to confidential records should be left to the discretion of the trial court which is better able to assess probative value of such evidence particular as it relates to the case before it . . . and to weigh that value against the interest confidentiality of the records. ... On appeal, this court has responsibility its own in conducting inspection camera of the sealed records to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to release those records to the defendant.” (Citations omit- ted; emphasis in original; quotation internal marks omit- ted.) Webb, State v. supra, App. 456-58. Juvenile the victim’s carefully examined We have not abuse the trial court did file and conclude that file to the to disclose the when it refused its discretion that the its determination on the basis of defendant probative not contain evidence file did impeach- or relevant to her capacity testimonial victim’s failed that the Therefore, we conclude ment. not he has the third because satisfy prong *17 violation that the alleged demonstrated supra, Conn. 239-40. See State v. 213 exists. Ill that the denial of access The defendant next claims process Juvenile Court file violated his due the victim’s Maryland, v. exculpatory Brady material under S. L. Ed. 83, 1194, U.S. 83 Ct. 10 2d 215 373 a slight that “there is argues suggestion [from meaning- juvenile probationary victim’s status] in those exculpatory ful and information available records.”21 sealed v. 373 U.S.

Brady Maryland, supra, 83, involves duty prosecution disclose evi- exculpatory process to the vio- Typically, dence defendant. due “[a] only if Brady prosecution lation occurs under favorable withholds material evidence to a defendant.” Harris, 751, 762, v. 631 309 (1993). State 227 Conn. A.2d 97, 2392, v. 427 U.S. S. Ct. Agurs, 106, United States 96 however, specifically approves L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), 49 procedure of determi- making the court camera Therefore, although holding nation. heart of case Brady prosecution’s suppression in the is the v. Conn. A.2d evidence; Bember, State 183 439 21 juvenile may placed § Statutes that a be on General 46b-120 indicates probation reasons law. The other than violations federal or state include, to, municipal reasons but are not limited violations or local away ordinances, running home, and from unexcused absences from school regulations. rules defiance of school and

468 (1981); here the although state had no access suppressed records and thus could not have them, we must assume that “if the trial discovers, court the course of an in camera inspection, evidence which is exculpatory ... in the Brady Agurs senses, it duty would have a similar of disclosure to the defense.” State v. quotation Storlazzi, (Internal marks 191 Conn. 453, 461, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). Consequently, an in performing inspection, camera the trial “[a]fter required only court is to release information that Leduc, defense.” State material and favorable to the App. 233, 249, Conn. 670 A.2d appeal on (1996), remand, after App. 744, 690 A.2d 1390, cert. denied, 695 A.2d 541 (1997).

“Favorable evidence is that evidence . . . which have might jury led the to entertain a reasonable doubt about . . . . . . guilt and this doubt must be one that did not otherwise exist. ... On hand, the other evi- *18 dence is only material if there is a probability reasonable that, had the evidence been disclosed defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A probability probability reasonable is a sufficient undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 3375, S. Ct. 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 . . . .” (1985) (Citations omitted; quota- internal State v. tion marks Leduc, supra, 40 Conn. omitted.) App. 249-50. “If the information discovered during in inspection probably camera would have the changed outcome of trial the defendant must be a new given [a] trial . . . .” (Internal quotation marks Id., 250.

“It is true that depends entirely a conviction [w]hen upon testimony the of certain witnesses . . . informa tion credibility their affecting material in the constitu tional they sense since if are not believed a reasonable doubt of guilt would be created.” (Internal quotation Storlazzi, State v. marks omitted.) supra, 191 Conn. 462. viewed file, Court Juvenile of the victim’s review Our fails to transcript, entire trial with the conjunction file left undisclosed in the anything us that convince credi- the victim’s affected would have by the trial court doubt of a reasonable have created bility or would fail did not therefore, court, The trial guilt. undermine material as to so any evidence to disclose v. See State of the trial. outcome in the confidence we conclude Accordingly, 763. Harris, supra, that the abuse its discretion did not that the court Gold- prong third satisfy has failed defendant alleged that the not demonstrated he has ing because Golding, v. See State violation exists. Conn. 239-40. supra, 213 is affirmed. judgment concurred. McLACHLAN,J., opinion

In this my col- I with J., agree DiPENTIMA, concurring. defendant, Nicketa conviction of the that the leagues how- respectfully disagree, affirmed. I should be Wright, has briefed adequately ever, that this court should of whether question threshold Golding, pursuant to State his claims I concur Accordingly, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 majority. judgment “It is well estab recently stated: Our prevail seek to parties affirmatively lished . . . that establishing and bear the burden under unpre review of their *19 appellate they are entitled In re added.) claims.” (Emphasis served constitutional More A.2d 81 L., 131, 154, 962 (2009). 290 Conn. Melody the “failure has observed that over, repeatedly this court to an Golding amounts four prongs to address the quota . . . .” (Internal of the issue inadequate briefing 798, App. 82 Conn. Bourguignon, v. marks.) tion State 106 DeVivo, also State v. A.2d 1031 see 801, (2004); 847 App. 641, 647, 942 A.2d 1066 v. (2008); State P., App. 462, 474, 541, David 70 Conn. 800 A.2d cert. denied, 907, 262 Conn. 810 A.2d 275 (2002). persuaded by majority’s

I am that there reasoning necessity no for a talismanic incantation1 of the Gold- ing citation or the rote recitation of its four I prongs. appellate that to demonstrate that agree review of an unpreserved claim of a constitutional deprivation is required a defendant is warranted, employ the meth- Golding by adequate odology providing record for review and that a constitutional alleging violation occurred at the trial court. To accomplish this, a defen- present dant must this court with a coherent, logical prec- for review with authoritative argument citations to I depart majority edent. from the in its conclusion that requirement. the defendant has satisfied that latter appellate brief forth a sets claim of a consti- fails, however, tutional violation. It to address his enti- tlement to much review, adequacy less the of the record. result, reluctantly depart opinion As a I from the majority and conclude that the defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue of he whether is entitled to Golding review. respectfully

I concur. significance “Connecticut courts have refused to attach talismanic presence particular phrases. See, e.g., State v. or absence of words or Robinson, 711, 731, (1993) (failure 227 Conn. 631 A.2d 288 to use talismanic necessary determination); State v. words does not indicate failure to make Onofrio, 23, 45, (1979) ([tjhere 179 Conn. 425 A.2d 560 is no talismanic spoken by dying ritual of words that must be declarant to render statements Peters, admissible); App. 141, 146, (the State v. 89 Conn. 872 A.2d 532 fact specific psychiatric that the court did not use the words disabilities does plain doctrine), denied, not warrant reversal under the error cert. 274 Conn. Peters, 918, App. 823, State v. (2005); 805, 879 A.2d 895 40 Conn. 673 A.2d (jury improper charge words), not for failure to recite talismanic cert. denied, 925, quotation (1996).” (Internal 237 Conn. 677 A.2d 949 marks Edwards, App. 565, n.6, 1008, State 100 Conn. 578-79 918 A.2d denied, cert. 926 A.2d

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Wright
Court Name: Connecticut Appellate Court
Date Published: May 19, 2009
Citation: 969 A.2d 827
Docket Number: AC 28498
Court Abbreviation: Conn. App. Ct.
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