*1 complaint review. The right motion for new trial asserted as it affects his fair to a grounds as one of its the trial nothing prejudicial trial. find We giving "erred in jury instructions number given. 1 instruction as There is no merit through argument which instructions did not em- his that he is entitled to a new body applicable the law to this case and trial because of it. clearly jury prejudiced misled III. Finding error, reversible no af-we
defendant.” is what defendant must firm of the trial court. rely on here. Affirmed. objection
Such a blanket without specifying the nature claimed de presents
fects for no issue us to consider. postpone
While making
objections filing until motion for new 787.3(5),
trial under (7), section he is not thereby duty relieved of the to state what STATE of Iowa, Appellee, complains purpose he of. The of this rule is, course, permit court, the trial whether the matter called to its attention William A. WRIGHT, Appellant. when the are instructions submitted or No. 54604. conviction,
motion any to correct Supreme Court of Iowa. mistake and to cure the matter without the necessity appeal. always of an We have 15, 1972. Nov. held this to be the case. State Vande water, 203 Iowa 212 N.W.
341 (1927) (grounds ain motion for new enough
trial must be specificity stated with permit the trial “an opportunity
rule or correct the error which is now
argued Williams, in this court”) State v.
115 Iowa 88 N.W. 195 (1901)
(a objection catch-all to 15 instructions in general
a motion for new trial too to be
considered.)
Rule Procedure, Rules Civil
requiring objections to instructions set grounds complaint
out the governs
criminal cases as well as civil. Section
780.35, Code; Schmidt, supra,
259 Iowa at N.W.2d 631. Ex
cept making that the objec time for such enlarged 787.3,
tions is by section this con applies
dition whether instructions are
challenged by motion new trial or
objections during made trial. Defendant
made no comply effort with this rule. obligation
Because of imposed us Code, we
have nevertheless considered defendant’s *2 defendant,
guilty. Upon inquiry of prosecuting attorney counsel and was a ne- was told defendant’s gotiated plea. then de- The court advised possible penalty fendant of the maximum and, upon conviction of the crime for the purpose making constitutionally re- *3 quired determination that guil- defendant’s ty plea truly voluntary, in- court terrogated defendant in accordance with guidelines Sisco, set forth 542, (Iowa 169N.W.2d 1969). 547-552 guilty plea accepted pro- and time for nouncing p. sentence was set for 4 m. the day. same However, sentencing instead of defend- time, ant at that judge the trial “deter- * * * investigation mined that a fuller required in order to determine the [was] proper sentence herein and that execution judgment of should be with- held and granted to defendant Platt, H. Kinion and Cedar provisions Paul C. accordance with the of section John appellant. Rapids, for 247.20.” Turner, Gen., Atty. Raymond Richard C. He then ordered the “time of sentence Sullins, Gen., Atty. Michael 1, 1970, Asst. S. herein” W. be continued until March County McCauley, Atty., appellee. for “pending and that sentence herein” defend- placed probation.
ant be on April 1969,the court ordered defend- pay ant to for each week the benefit $65 MASON, Justice. of his wife and minor children as a con- probation. dition of his Wright appeals judg- A. from William pronounced approxi- and sentence ment 4, 1969, August changed the court mately placed months after he was on sentencing date of from March 1970 to probation following plea guilty. a 15, 1969, August since defendant failed to appeal presents question of the au- support make the payments. language thority proceed- trial courts appears in the court’s order: “[T]ime ings to defer of sentence and sentence was continued to March place a defendant convicted verdict * * paroled with Defendant *, pending guilty plea on sentence.” county attorney’s a in- October Neither lawyer defendant nor ap- his formation was filed charging Wright with peared August on pur- for the adultery contrary the crime of to section pose and the court on Au- Wright, rep- The Code. October gust 16 authorized the issuance of a war- counsel, appeared resented arraign- for rant for defendant’s arrest. ment entered a guilty of not charge. February defendant October appeared defendant with counsel, again appeared with withdrew his attorney judge before same trial of not a entered paroled who had being him. After advised necessary reasonably presentence a rea- time no lawful there was inquiry that investigation concern- imposed investigation or not should why son already suspension time, ing at that upon the permit pronounced; this section does Wright be confined “to then sentenced proba- place defendant on of not Penitentiary for a term the State him, tion, having first sentenced without years.” more than three investigation “an and then authorize de- error assignment his one I. respect pro- of sentence and suspension “pro- erred in fendant contends thus He asserts the court vio- bation.” * * * against nouncing [de- lated section 247.20. first on October fendant] court vio- 1969, pur- also maintains the February Defendant sentencing him on out, supra. set He ar- section 789.2 247.20 lated provisions suant to gues although the' order *, sentenc- reason that said *4 1969, purported to set the time of sentenc- by court procedures the ing and utilized 1970, 1, ing judgment for March and chapter of provisions violated the 789 ** * superseded by it was was not done because [The Code].” probation in granting the defendant court Code, 247.20, provides in Section The setting and terms and conditions later part: thereof. by court. The trial court “Probation Defendant insists court failed any person before which been con- any legal him ask whether there was * * * crime, may by any victed of why judgment should cause not have been entry at time sentence record of after 6, February pronounced against on him pronounced imprisonment, is but before 1969, placed probation when he was on grant probation and sentence 789.6, required section The Code. This during person good said behavior. right provides a defendant with the authority by said shall have record purpose of Its elicit facts allocution. entry any withhold judg- execution of which would constitute reason for with ment time shall be or sentence for such Mehuys, holding sentence. State v. 172 reasonably necessary investigation for an 131, (Iowa 1969). N.W.2d 135 suspension respect to of and probation. Defendant’s contentions Code, provides in Section provisions chapter court violated the 789 part: are tenuous in the facts. view of What delay imposi court did fact was to “Judgment of for. conviction—time any place tion of sentence and Upon guilty, guilty, a verdict of on sec probation pending sentence. Since or a a special judg- verdict which pertain only to the tions 789.2 and 789.6 rendered, be ment conviction must procedures pronotmeing to be followed a pronouncing court must fix time sentence, need the trial court judgment, which must be at least three complied provisions not have with these days rendered, if after the verdict is placed when it ordered defendant be * * *; long court remains in session so February 6, on order probation 1969. That pronounced in no can it case pronouncement judg a did not constitute less than hours the verdict is six aptly by the ment and sentence. As noted rendered, there- defendant consent unless placing probation on is not one to.” any a way declaration of sentence or argues Defendant that section only judgment. 247.20 Defendant was not sentenced authorizes trial court to withhold plead ex- for the crime to which he had period 7, ecution of the for a until October 1970.
76 in ef- that he was argument not an inherent solely
Defendant’s
but exists
pro-
may
virtue
fect sentenced
statute and
exercised
only
when
court en-
against him
in accordance therewith);
nounced
State v.
1969,
6,
Meter,
re-
422,
Van
Ariz.App.
tered
order of
7
its
P.2d
440
7, 1970,
(in
for the crime
64
sentenced October
accord with earlier
statement);
Fayad
Court,
Superior
merit.
adultery without
v.
Cal.App.2d
153
(authority
power of the court to argument execution of The State’s frankly sentences statute points and admits that defines research two in time is without judg- filed and before the term which “at time of” the words merit. We construe pronounced appear ment was does not “simultaneously rather with” meaning a from the record. In the absence of support our “prior As con than to.” showing that such term was held we will words see quoted struction of the Stella presume that entered at judgment was Corp. Graham-Paige (S.D.N.Y.), v. Motors the next term after and continu- 957, 960, district where the F.Supp. ance.” provision of interpreting a court was Exchange Act of 1934.
Securities Ray In during defendant was convicted January However, term of 1877. left for considera- There is thus IV. court did render judgment upon not the trial court’s consequence of tion the August verdict until the term of the same 247.20, The comply with section failure to “ * * * year. The court stated: Code. insisted that render court could not the trial urges that since Defendant term, judgment after the but our attention of sentence suspended pronouncement is called to no or decision statute authority, it was without statutory without supports position. no We discover unauthorized or- jurisdiction to revoke the error, judgment and the must be affirmed.” 7, 1970. impose October der and help- do not consider the cited cases 92; We N.E. People Penn, v. 302 Ill. problem. ful to a solution of the 426, 143 N.E. Warner v. 194 Ind. 288; (Mo.App.), 297 Parte Brown Ex There can be no doubt a State, 24 Okl.Cr. 445; S.W. Collins judicial power pro to defer the support by defendant P. cited nouncement purpose for the contention, indefinite of his involve hearing determining motions for cited cases postponement of sentence. new arrest of or for under in the case do not aid defendant since necessary such reasonable time as imposition of sentence consideration complete investigation of the accused’s day indefinitely cer- but to a not deferred record, family life facts and other bear tain, March ing upon his likelihood of reformation in to State v. refers State just order determine a appropriate Ray, Stevens, 47 Iowa State procedure sentence. deprive Such does not was not Iowa wherein jurisdiction impose the court of to later following immediately pronounced a verdict a valid sentence where a definite time has guilty. been fixed for imposition of sentence. Otherwise, within the defendant entered Stevens *7 pronouncement to defer the of sen re guilty on last of the term and da}'- tence after in the conviction absence of continued, quested which that the cause be statutory authority. request granted. Because the record was any objection did not to the continu show February The order of void was presumed did ance the court that six hours attempted insofar it place to defendant plea filing of the intervene between probation imposition on without of term; adjournment and the final sentence. therefore, statute under the terms of the failing pro the trial did not err in to However, pronouncement where of sen- nounce at the term at which the time, suspended tence has been for a fixed plea lapse regard was filed. to the With here, the case remains on the court pro of 17 was months before sentence disposed by judgment. docket until of final nounced, the court observed: of the district court continued Jurisdiction disposed until a term of court was held over the case and defendant “Whether by imposition plea guilty after which of of of a valid sentence. that at considered in this should not Defendant’s contention be the for advisory occasion opinion questions is without merit. division on which do not need to be answered in this case. emphasize that the wish to con- V. We judicial clusion the trial court was without II. The majority opinion effect of power to defer of sentence and on sentence. What trial court deferral of defendant, place who had been convicted did in this case needs to be viewed plea probation, is based guilty, a of on perspective. sought give to defendant statutory authority on absence of the benefit of what has been described as a legislature. only can from the We come shown, “deferred sentence.” As will be legislature call the attention of the to dispositional this carryover is a alternative jurisdictions, number of both state and century English from seventeenth common federal, grant- which have enacted statutes only way law when the for a court to ing judicial power. such courts injustice relieve from to was to refuse adjudicate guilt. in appropri- Sentence The case is therefore cases, plea ate guilty, of is deferred specified period, usually a condi- Affirmed. tion probation. defendant submit to de- If probation fendant conforms terms to the of permitted he is guilty withdraw his McCORMICK, except All concur Justices expiration at its and ask that the case HARRIS, JJ., who REYNOLDSON justice. be dismissed in the interests of specially. concur sentencing option widely employed This judges. Iowa trial See 57 Iowa L.Rev. McCORMICK, spe- (concurring Justice Analogous procedure 612. is used in . cially) juvenile permit Iowa courts a child to only I in the result. concur stigma receive court services without the delinquency adjudication. opinion. scope majority I. only urged proposition defendant procedure accomplishes two salu- is that trial court exhausted its tary purposes. a It serves as means of dis- jurisdiction by entry its felony charging a first offender without a probation that he could not be order so extenuating record where cir- there are Strangely, “resentenced” October cumstances, and it is a vehicle for obtain- although claiming probation en- order probation supervision ing proper without guilty tered a sentence after his imposing penitentiary first sentence. sentence, precluding defendant later asks case, defendant, In this State remedy. a “new trial” as his represented by all material times able coun- only court to sentence is involved sel, plea bargain. Upon reached a defend- insofar as challenges trial court’s agreed ant’s the State impose probation prior judg- request concur in defendant’s as to sen- ment. The case could and be dis- should made, ap- tence. From the scant record posed by simply noting, majority as the pears request must have been does, that an order is not a deferred All we *8 judgment. validity Its could not affect va- subject is when have this record on the lidity of later entered. When February plea entered the premise fundamental is accepted, dis- 9, 1969: cussion of Code and 247.20 trial court’s power to defer sentence is unnecessary County At- TeKippe to “Mr. [Assistant appeal. decision of the Honor, I is believe the ma- : torney] Your this matter jority is mistaken in reaching coming regarding a those issues. before the court appeal patently change plea without merit and I believe. significant plea? clearer and more that what negotiated It’s a “The court: February said. Trial court’s order Honor, the Yes, Your TeKippe: “Mr. 1969, obviously sen- was intended to defer County has Iowa, Dubuque, State step pursuing tence as one the deferred attorney defendant’s the with conferred procedure. Usually trial courts and concur plea possible about periods, ranging select shorter from six recommendation. in the
probably year. apparently is months to one subject upon theory a fit based correct, well, is that Very “The court: dispositional this be alternative will Klauer? Mr. to he should able demonstrate whether attorney]: “Mr. Klauer [defendant’s penalty relatively receive the in a law’s Honor, time we will Yes, at this and Your present short time. In the trial court’s case plead guilty. plea change our sentencing order fixed after 13 months Nevertheless, guilty. majority negotiated plea? this a court: Is “The thereby juris- found it did not lose its Yes, Your Honor. “Mr. Klauer: diction to sentence defendant then or on 7, 1970, actually October when sentence was you discussed And have “The court: pronounced. A. the defendant William this Wright? though language majority Even in the opinion purports limit a trial court’s to Yes, sir. Klauer: “Mr. power sentencing to defer even to with the And is he familiar “The court: date, definite was not effec- that limitation through ? you going were negotiations tive to void what was done here. It also majority significant seems that the did not Honor, Yes, and he Your Klauer: “Mr. necessary ques- find it to consider the so probation understands forth. tion of in order to reach its result. waiver supplied.) (Emphasis Therefore, majority I do not think acknowledged shows defendant The record opinion necessarily forestalls this case bargain and comprehension of his alternative. future use of voluntary guilty. plea of entered a that he so, trial court to Although not bound do agreement for obviously acquiesced in the authority to im- Statutory III. defer complaint ever No
deferred sentence. majority’s po- position sentence. his by defendant until October voiced contradictory in Divisions II and sition comply upon failure to it concludes Iowa In Division II IV. with the terms of the to defer inherent courts have no sentence deferral order. sentence, so authority to do imposition of and, unfortunately, Iowa statutory, must probably Trial courts and bar should IV, In Division appropriate has no statute. give more heed the result this case do courts however, it concludes Iowa trial majority than reached. The how was of sentence have impose discusses the court’s purpose hearing and determin- “for the finds under 247.20 and Code § in arrest trial or motions for new ing However, right impose proba- none. time as or for such reasonable is not tion without a defendant’s consent investi- necessary complete sentencing option, essential to use of this family record, gation the accused’s his nor was it essential in this case. likeli- bearing other facts life and in order to determine reformation hood of question A more crucial is raised stat- just appropriate sentence.” No majority’s trial court’s treatment of a cited, majority utory authority postpone authority to sentences. Here Thus, in has “no doubt” again has done seems to me exists. what the court *9 opinion majority pronouncing in imposing the same announces sen * * * precept tence, then its Iowa trial er violates reversible constitutes power inherent to defer ror.”) courts have no
imposition of sentence. Statutory authority deferring for sen-
Actually,
statutory authority
789.2,
in
granted by
there is
tence is
The Code.
§
789.2,
Code, by
legislature
statutory authority
The
There is
for the
also
§
policy
expressed
concerning
steps
using
its
time of sen
additional
in
sen-
the deferred
prescribes
option
tence.
It
a minimum but no tence
The
previously
described.
them,
majority
they
maximum time. Trial courts are
its
does not discuss
part
employment
disposi-
terms mandated to defer
are
of sen
Authority
with-
period
tence for the minimum
and im
tional
for
alternative.
plicitly permitted
proper
guilty
in the
exercise drawal of
with court
judicial prerogative
permission
to determine
in
The
“At
when
Code:
§
People
any
may
should
judgment,
be later fixed. Cf.
time before
Harrison,
Cal.App.3d
permit
guilty
Cal.
withdrawn
be
* *
Rptr.
(“A delayed
Finally,
legislature
in 795.5
(1970)
judg
§
ment
will not be reversed when no
to dismiss
miscar
cloaked trial courts with
‘
court,
riage
justice
occurs.”)
any stage: “The
a criminal case at
upon
application of
its own motion or the
majority
judicially
The
amended the
county attorney,
in
the furtherance
doing
statute.
many
so it leaves
un-
any
justice,
order the dismissal
questions.
example,
answered
For
does it
pending
prosecution
mean that
jurisdiction
a trial court loses
(Emphasis
anomalous to
supplied.)
It is
so,
passage
sentence mere
If
time?
suggest
statutory
courts have
what about situations where
any stage
at
but none
prosecution
to end a
deferred because the accused has abscond-
stage
at
each
will
to fix the time which
be
ed? Or because he is incarcerated
for
reached.
time somewhere else?
is ill
Or because he
?
requests
Or where he
acquiesces
statutory
in the
have clear
Iowa trial courts
delay?
prosecution
Or when the
requests
imposition of sen-
deferring
for
delay?
where,
here,
Or
following through
most of the
tence and for
delay is the result
plea bargain
of a
pursuing
? Above
this sen-
steps
other
involved
all, what is
delay”
“reasonable
?
tencing alternative.
significant
that sentencing power
imposi-
Inherent
IV.
did
expire
not
in this
although
case
exer
if
no
Even
there were
tion
sentence.
twenty
cised
months
after defendant’s
imposi-
statutory authority
deferring
despite
originally post
an order
Iowa,
there would
tion of sentence
poning its exercise for 13 months. We
principle
power to do so.
inherent
found
jurisdiction
no loss of
in State v.
Forsyth
People
explained
ex rel.
Stevens,
g2 refused jurisdictions have by any higher Some facts
reviewable
are
exercised,
recognize
Many of their decisions
it.
power, as thus
court. The
dealing
indefinite
distinguishable as
with
by Lord Hale:
language
in this
described
suspension of sentence or with the distinct
before
reprieves
judge
‘Sometimes
suspension of execution rather than
issue of
is not satisfied
he
as where
judgment,
imposition
recognized
of sentence. We
verdict,
un-
the evidence is
insufficient,
power to
the distinction and the inherent
certain,
indictment
or the
in
State v.
clergy; also
within
or doubtful whether
Voss,
(1890)
45
80 Iowa
N.W. 898
circum-
extenuating
when favorable
court,
(“The
case, may
in
proper
arrest
are con-
youths
appear, and when
stances
justice
to attain the ends of
And these
their
victed of
first offense.
* * *»)
granted or
reprieves
arbitrary
delivery,
justices
gaol
taken off
analytical
Extensive
discussion of
adjourned or
although their sessions
power
imposi-
inherent
courts to defer
this,
finished;
by reason of common
ultimately discharge
tion of sentence and
58,
Hale,
p.
2
C. c.
usage.’
P.
a defendant
is found in a number of cases
right,
power belonged, of common
Forsyth.
parte
addition to
Ex
See
authority to
every tribunal
invested with
States,
72,
27,
242
61
United
U.S.
37 S.Ct.
1
case.
execution in
award
(finding
129
inherent
(1916)
L.Ed.
no
617,
Chit.Cr.Law,
(1st Ed.)
758. With-
suspend
in federal district courts to
to collate all
the au-
attempting
out
Bateh,
execution of sentence); State v.
110
subject,
is sufficient
thorities on the
it
826,
(Fla.1958),
So.2d 7
den. 361
cert.
U.S.
say
(1959);
80
4
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 69
Gazda
writers
law is asserted
common
State,
v.
244
454
So.2d
(Fla.App.1970);
on criminal
acknowledged
Wentworth,
Marks v.
N.E.
199 Mass.
85
jurisprudence, by
practice
uniform
Osborne,
(1908);
81
v.
Gehrmann
79 N.J.
courts,
adjudged
and numerous
cases.
Eq.
424 (1911).
82 A.
recent cases
Few
(Citations)
(Emphasis supplied.)
concept
long
discuss the
because
been
previously
codified in all of the states where
Hale,
Matthew
whose statement
Sir
recognized
practice
at common law. The
quoted,
was Lord Chief Justice
is also authorized
statute in all of the
King’s Bench from
until his death
1671
represented by
states
majority’s
cita-
years
Many jurisdictions
five
later.
have
tions.
recognized
power.
this
inherent
See
Patrick,
People v.
118 Cal.
Colorado — Colo.Rev.Stat. Montana — Mont.Rev.Code 95-2206 § § (1963); (1947); Connecticut — Conn. Stat. 53a-28 Gen. Nebraska — Neb.Rev.Stat. 29-2261- § §§ 2264 (Supp.1969); (Supp.1971); Ann. tit. 11 Delaware — Del.Code 4332 Nevada — Nev.Rev.Stat. 176.225 (1967); § § 1968); (Supp. Hampshire New § — N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. (1968); 504.1 Florida — Fla.Stat.Ann. 948.01(3) § (1944), amended (Supp.1972); as New Jersey 2A, tit. 168-1 § — N.J.S.A. (1971); Georgia Probation Statewide — Ch. Act, Ga.Laws, 609-612; Session, 1972 New Mexico — N.M.Stat.Ann. 40A-29- §§ 15 to (1953); 40A-29-23 Hawaii — Hawaii Rev.Stat. 711-77 § (1959); New York — N.Y.Penal (Mc Law 60.10 § Kinney’s Consol.Laws, Idaho — Idaho Code as (1947), 1967), 19-2601 as C. § amended (Supp.1972); amended (Supp.1971); North Carolina — N.C.Gen.Stat. 15-197 Illinois — Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 117-1 et § §§ (1965); seq. (1964), ; as amended (Supp.1972) North (Burns Indiana — Ind.Stat.Ann. 9-2209 Dakota — N.D.C.C.A. 12-53-13 § § 1956), (1960), as (Supp.1971); as amended amended (Supp.1972), IC 35-7-1-1. § Ohio — Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 2951.02 § (Baldwin 1971); (Supp. Kansas — Kan.Stat.Ann. 21-4603 § 1970); Oklahoma — Okl.Stat.Ann. tit. 991c § (1958), as amended (Supp.1972); Kentucky Ky.Rev.Stat. 439.260 § — Oregon (1971); 137.010 § — Or.Rev.Stat. (1962); Pennsylvania tit. § — Penn.Crim.Proc. Crim. Louisiana — L.S.A.Rev.Stat. Code of (Purdon ; 1051 1964) (West Proc. Art. 893 as amended 1967), Rhode Island — R.I.Gen.Laws 12-19-19 § (Supp.1972) (1969); Maine — Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. § South Carolina — S.C.Code 55-591 § (1964), (Supp.1972); amended (1962); Maryland Art. § — Md.Ann.Code S.D.Comp.Laws South 23-57- § Dakota — (1957), as amended (Supp.1972); 4 (1967), as amended (Supp.1972); Mass.Ann.Laws, Ch. Massachusetts — Texas — Tex. Const.Ann. Art. 4 11A § (1968), as amended (Supp.1971); § (Vernon 1955) Tex.Stat.Ann. Code Michigan Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 771.- 1966), (Vernon Crim.Proc. Art. 42.12 § — 1 (1968); as amended (Supp.1971); experience and that of 47 has our own Ann. 77-35-17 Code § Utah — Utah appropriate legis- guide other states to it to (1953); spelling out detail how and lation tit. § Vermont — Vt.Stat.Ann. utilize trial courts should what situations (Supp.1972); as amended (1958), impose probation before Authority to it. specifically given. sentence can also be (1950); Virginia 53-272 — Va.Code adequate system Iowa now has Ann. 9. Washington §§ — Wash.Rev.Code Statutory implement a beneficent ideal. amended (1961), 9.95.210 *12 bring system. better revision could (Supp.1971); 62-12-3 Virginia § West — W.Va.Code HARRIS, JJ., join REYNOLDSON (Supp.1972); as amended (1966), special in concurrence. 57.04(1) § Wisconsin — Wis.Stat.Ann. Supp.1972); (West 7-315, 7- Stat.
Wyoming Wyoming §§ — (Supp.1971). as amended (1959), provide them do not
Although a few of vacating conviction
a mechanism for used, these approaches are different Appellee, Iowa, STATE of universal the almost statutes illustrate legislative acceptance of deferred Appellant. FETTERS, Francis D. dispositional alternative. procedure as a not au- Only Tennessee have Alabama and No. 55091. been Many statutes have thorized it. Supreme Court Iowa. early part of the
on the books since the 15, 1972. Nov. century, a new indicating this is far from phenomenon. Further, language fre-
quently virtually used codification principle espoused by
of the common law See, years ago. example,
Lord Hale 300 statute, Michigan substantially the same passed
since first “ * * * utilized appears where it
satisfaction of the court that the likely again engage
is not in an offensive
or criminal course of conduct and that the
public good require does not that the de- imposed penalty fendant shall suffer the * ^
law previously demonstrated,
As I do not legislation
think additional to au- essential
thorize dispositions, deferred sentence
certainly it would be desirable in order to
refine, standardize, expand practice legislature already
now followed. The
incorporated concept into 409 of 64 G.A., 148,involving ch. first offenders con- possession
victed of of a controlled sub-
stance.