39 S.C. 151 | S.C. | 1893
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
To sustain this position, it would be necessary to assume that in no case could a defendant be convicted of murder, or even of manslaughter, unless the jury were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made the first assault or commenced the difficulty. Such an assumption is not, in my opinion, well founded. While it is quite true that in many cases the question as to who made the first assault or commenced the difficulty is a material inquiry, yet it is not so in all cases. For example, besides other illustrations which might be used, if a trivial assault is made upon one person by another, and the person so assailed draws a deadly weapon and uses it with fatal effect, there can be no doubt that he would be guilty of manslaughter, at least; and the fact that the deceased committed the first assault would be wholly insufficient to reduce the case to one of self-defence. In such a case, therefore, the question as to who committed the first assault would not be material. Hence I do not think it would be correct to say that in every case the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the first assault or commenced the difficulty, before he can be convicted of any offence; but that the true rule is that, where the question as to who commenced the difficulty is a material inquiry, it is necessary that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the aggressor before he can be convicted, just as they must be satisfied of every other material fact in the case. It seems to me that the charge of the Circuit Judge was precisely in accordance with this rule, and, therefore, not erroneous. Whether the facts of this particular case were such as to make the inquiry whether the accused was the aggressor material, was a question for the jury, which the Circuit Judge had no right to consider, and hence they were correctly instructed, that if they believed that such facts rendered it necessary to inquire who was the aggressor, then the State was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor. I think, therefore,
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed, and that the case be remanded to that court for the purpose of having a new day assigned for the execution of the sentence heretofore imposed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The appellant having been convicted of murder, now questions such conviction in the following particulars, as embodied in her grounds of appeal:
1. Because the presiding judge refused to charge, as requested, “That there must be a motive for the commission of the crime and there must be a criminal intent; it is incumbent upon the State to establish both the motive and the intent, in order to obtain a verdict.”
2. Because the presiding judge erred in charging the jury as follows: “Manslaughter is the killing of a person in sudden heat and passion upon sufficient legal provocation.”
3. Because the presiding judge erred iu charging the jury as follows: “That it is incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant here, the party on trial, who first began the assault, first started the fuss; if that is a question of fact, which it is essential that you will pass upon, certainly the State must prove that fact, as it proves all other facte, beyond a reasonable doubt.”
4. Because the presiding judge refused to charge as requested: “That when who first assailed is uncertain, the State must prove, to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, that it was the defendant.”
5. Because the presiding judge erred in charging: “I have discovered that my friend, if he had turned back to the 21st chapter of Exodus and read a little passage there, would have found that the law of God and the law of South Carolina are exactly the same. You remember, gentlemen, that it is told in the Bible that in olden times there were cities of refuge, where a man, if he slew his fellow-man, might flee, and the avenger of human blood could not take him. These
6. Because the presiding judge erred in charging: “You write your verdict, and let the consequences be where they belong.”
7. Because the presiding judge erred in intimating to the jury his opinion on the question of fact as to the guilt of the defendant.
8. Because the presiding judge erred in charging as follows: “I can tell you, though, that words are never a legal provocation.”
9. Because the presiding judge erred in charging in effect that words could not cause sudden heat and passion.
Judgment affirmed.