State v. WoodyState v. Woody
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Edmunds
During 1990, defendant worked for Tandy Computers and was responsible for leasing a Tandy 3000 computer and movie-rental inventory software to P&R Unlimited, Incorporated (P&R, Inc.). P&R, Inc. was formed with two shareholders, Patrick Phillips and Mark Robinson for the purpose of operating “P&R Unlimited,” a convenience store. Defendant subsequently began working elsewhere, but she continued to service the computer that P&R, Inc. had leased from Tandy. Phillips later purchased Robinson’s shares in P&R, Inc., and at trial he referred to the resulting business as a partnership.
Prior to 15 May 1994, defendant picked up the computer from Phillips’ store for service. Phillips has not since seen the computer. Phillips made several unavailing attempts to contact defendant and inquire about the computer. On one occasion when he spoke with defendant, she told him she had taken his computer to Radio Shack in Asheville; however, the records at that store did not show delivery of a computer by defendant.
On 21 April 1997, the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment against defendant for conversion by a bailee, pursuant to
Defendant was charged and tried pursuant to
Every person entrusted with any property as bailee, lessee, tenant or lodger, or with any power of attorney for the sale or transfer thereof, who fraudulently converts the same, or the proceeds thereof, to his own use, or secretes it with a fraudulent intent to convert it to his own use, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Defendant argues that the indictment in this case was fatally defective because it improperly alleged ownership of property converted. We agree. Our Supreme Court has stated, “Where an indictment charges the defendant with a crime against someone other than the actual victim, such a variance is fatal.” State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 340, 451 S.E.2d 131, 144 (1994) (citing State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741 (1967)). The Abraham Court also stated that misidentifying the victim in the indictment “required the State to prove injury to someone other than the true victim.” Id. (citing State v. Overman, 257 N.C. 464, 125 S.E.2d 920 (1962)). The Abraham Court relied in part on State v. Harper, 64 N.C. 129, 131 (1870), which stated, “[a] variance or omission in the name of the person injured, is more serious than a variance in the name of the defendant. . . .”
Where the victim is not an individual, our Supreme Court has additionally held that if there was no allegation that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property, the bill of indictment is fatally defective. See State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 658, 662, 111 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1960). In Thornton, the defendant was charged with embezzlement from “The Chuck Wagon.” In arresting judgment, our Supreme Court held that the victim’s name must be given, along with “the fact that it is a corporation . . . unless the name itself imports a corporation.” Id. at 662, 111 S.E.2d at 903 (citing Nickles v. State, 86 Ga. App. 290, 71 S.E.2d 578 (1952)); see also State v. Strange, 58 N.C. App. 756, 294 S.E.2d 403, disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 128, 297 S.E.2d 403 (1982) (holding an indictment for larceny from “Granville County Law Enforcement Association” insufficient); State v. Perkins, 57 N.C. App. 516, 291 S.E.2d 865 (1982) (indictment for larceny from “Metropolitan YMCA t/d/b/a Hayes-Taylor YMCA Branch” insufficient); State v. Ellis, 33 N.C. App. 667, 236 S.E.2d 299 (holding an indictment for embezzlement adequate by naming “Providence Finance Company,” which clearly imported a corporation), disc. review denied, 293 N.C. 255, 236 S.E.2d 708 (1977); State v. Roberts, 14 N.C. App. 648, 188 S.E.2d 610 (1972) (indictment for larceny from “Ken’s Quickie Mart” insufficient); State v. Thompson, 6 N.C. App. 64, 169 S.E.2d 241 (1969) (indictment for larceny from “Belk’s Department Store” insufficient). A variant of the same rule applies for partnerships. “If the property alleged to have been stolen . . . is the property of a partnership, or other quasi artificial person, the names of the persons composing the partnership, or quasi artificial person, should be given.” Thornton, 251 N.C. at 662, 111 S.E.2d at 903.
The State argues that in the indictment, the word “unlimited” sufficiently connotes the proper legal status of the victim. We disagree. While the abbreviation “ltd.” or the word “limited” is a proper corporate identifier,
see
An exception to the general rule may be found in
State v. Wooten,
18 N.C. App. 652, 197 S.E.2d 614,
cert. denied,
283 N.C. 758, 198 S.E.2d 728 (1973), a shoplifting case brought under
In light of this result, we need not address the other issues raised by the parties.
Judgment vacated.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge WYNN concur.