State v. WoodyState v. Woody
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Howard
Minyard Lee Woody was convicted of second degree burglary and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, pursuant to
FACTS
Woody was convicted of second degree burglary in July, 1999. At sentencing, the State asserted this was Woody’s third serious offense as defined in
DISCUSSION
Woody argues that the two prior convictions should be treated as one, pursuant to
[i]n determining the number of offenses for the purpose of imposition of sentence, the court shall treat as one offense any number of offenses which have been committed at times so closely connected in point of time that they may be considered as one offense, notwithstanding under the law they constitute separate and distinct offenses.
The trial court rejected this argument, concluding section 17 — 25—45(F) contained language defining prior offenses differently for purposes of that section only, and therefore,
[f]or the purpose of determining a prior conviction under this section only, a prior conviction shall mean the defendant has been convicted of a most serious or serious offense, as may be applicable, on a separate occasion, prior to the instant adjudication.
We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation and conclude that
Criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant. The elementary and cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Therefore, in interpreting a statute, the words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to a subtle or forced construction that limits or expands the statute’s operation. Statutes, as a whole, must receive “practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of lawmakers.”
State v. Prince, 385 S.C. 466, 472, 517 S.E.2d 229, 232 (Ct.App. 1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Whiteside v. Cherokee County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 311 S.C. 335, 340, 428 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1993)).
The court should not consider the particular clause in isolation, but should read it in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law.
Prince,
335 S.C. at 472, 517 S.E.2d at 232. Statutory provisions should be read so as to be consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Id.
Furthermore, statutes that are part of the same act must be read together and sections that are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect, if reasonable.
In contrast,
Consequently, these two statutes can properly be read together and applied to Woody. The two prior armed robberies were closely connected offenses within one incident. Therefore, in determining the number of prior offenses, they must be treated as one conviction under
Woody’s conviction for second degree burglary is categorized as a “serious offense.” See
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Woody’s sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for the burglary conviction and remand for re-sentencing on that charge in accordance with this opinion.
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
CONNOR, and HUFF, JJ., concur.
Notes
. Woody was also convicted of Petit Larceny and received a consecutive ten year sentence. There is no appeal from that conviction or sentence.
.
. For the first time on appeal, and in contrast to the written brief, the State asserted in oral argument that the record does not establish with certainty that the two prior armed robberies occurred as one incident. We reject this argument, because the convictions were presented to the sentencing judge by both the State and the defense as occurring as one incident, at one location, and at one time. Two charges were brought because different victims were involved. The trial judge considered them as such, and no factual basis was proffered by the State to the contrary.