State v. WoodsonState v. Woodson
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
RELEASE DATE: October 28, 2010
Aaron Woodson, pro se
Inmate # 570-137
S.O.C.F.
P. O. Box 45699
Lucasville, Ohio 45699
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Matthew E. Meyer
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ANN DYKE, J.:
{¶ 1} On July 1, 2010, the applicant, Aaron Woodson, pursuant to
{¶ 2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1990), 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 768.
{¶ 3} In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial scrutiny of an attorney‘s work must be highly deferential. The Court noted that it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his lawyer after conviction and that it would be all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in hindsight, to conclude that a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.‘” Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
{¶ 4} Specifically, in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate advocate‘s prerogative to decide strategy and tactics by selecting what he thinks are the most promising arguments out of all possible contentions. The court noted,
{¶ 5} Moreover, even if a petitioner establishes that an error by his lawyer was professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, the petitioner must further establish prejudice: but for the unreasonable error there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different. A court need not determine whether counsel‘s performance was deficient before examining prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of alleged deficiencies.
{¶ 6} In the present case, Woodson‘s arguments on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are not well taken. First,
{¶ 7} Woodson‘s other argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective for not trying to sever the aggravated murder charge from the carrying-a-concealed weapon charge. The evidence at trial showed that during the early morning hours of July 12, 2008, there was a small gathering of people on the back porch of an apartment in the Garden Valley Estates. The victim was killed by a gunshot at close range to the side of his head. Although no one saw the shooting, three individuals testified that Woodson was next to the victim just before the shooting. One witness testified that right after the shooting, he saw Woodson walking away with a gun in his hand. Woodson‘s cousin testified that just before the shooting, Woodson was the only person next to the victim. The police never retrieved the bullet, but they did discover a .22 caliber casing in the
{¶ 8} Woodson argues that trying the two counts together was prejudicial to him, because the evidence of the gun, which was not definitively linked to the murder, would inflame the minds of the jury that he was a bad man who would be inclined to murder people.
{¶ 9} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, stated the governing principles for joinder of charges. Under
{¶ 10} In the instant case, defense counsel, in the exercise of professional judgment, could reasonably conclude that the evidence of each crime was simple and direct and, thus, the trial court would not abuse its discretion by allowing joinder. The evidence for the concealed weapon charge was very simple and direct; the police found the firearm in Woodson‘s back pocket when they arrested him. For the murder charge, the victim was shot at close range, and three people testified that Woodson was the person next to the victim just before the shooting. One of the witnesses saw Woodson walking away with a gun.
{¶ 11} Moreover, one of the cases Woodson cites in support, State v. Robinson (C.A. 2, 1977), 560 F.2d 507, undermines his position. In that case, a witness testified that Robinson carried a .38 caliber revolver or a gun that looked like a .38 caliber revolver during the subject robbery. When Robinson was arrested ten weeks later, he possessed a .38 caliber revolver. The circuit court of appeals ruled that his possession of the firearm ten weeks later was admissible evidence.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, this court denies the application to reopen.
ANN DYKE, PRESIDING JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., and
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR