2005 Ohio 3425 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 2} The Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Woods in five separate cases involving a multitude of offenses. The trial court assigned two separate attorneys to defend Woods. On September 23, 2003, Woods entered into a plea agreement with the State of Ohio and was subsequently sentenced on October 21, 2003. The pleas and sentences can be summarized as follows: In CR439029, Woods pled guilty to receiving stolen property, a fourth degree felony in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On May 12, 2004, Woods filed motions to withdraw all guilty pleas pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. The trial court denied the motions in entries journalized on June 24, 2004. Woods appeals raising a single assignment of error.
{¶ 4} "The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying leave to withdraw the guilty pleas in this case without explanation or hearing where the appellant presented sufficient operative facts to demonstrate manifest injustice resulting from the plea." This assignment lacks merit.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should only be granted to correct manifest injustice. Statev. Xie (1992),
{¶ 6} "What constitutes an abuse of discretion with respect to denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea necessarily is variable with the facts and circumstances involved." State v. Walton (1981),
{¶ 7} Here, Woods argues that manifest injustice exists because in exchange for pleading guilty one of his attorneys told him that he would be sentenced to a range of three years. Woods admits that this attorney disclosed to him that no agreed sentence had been stipulated. However, Woods stated that without this attorney's suggestion, he would have insisted upon a trial. In support of Woods' allegations, he provided an affidavit from his mother and a letter from both of his attorneys.
{¶ 8} This does not rise to the level of manifest injustice. This Court has clearly established that a mistaken belief as to the consequences of the plea is insufficient to withdraw such a plea. Statev. Sabatino (1995),
"It seems that a defendant who has a change of heart regarding his guilty plea should not be permitted to withdraw the plea just because he is made aware that an unexpected sentence is going to be imposed. Otherwise, defense counsel merely has to allege that the defendant's plea was induced by some underlying `mistaken belief'. . . . and the plea would be vacated."
{¶ 9} Therefore, Wood's alleged reliance on his counsel's sentencing prediction of three years is not sufficient to constitute a manifest injustice.
{¶ 10} Woods further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a hearing on his Crim.R. 32.1 motion and in failing to issue an explanation for the denial of his motion. "It is well established that post-conviction relief petitions are subject to dismissal without a hearing if the petition and supporting evidentiary documents do not contain sufficient operative facts which, if true, would establish substantive grounds for relief." State v. Apanovitch (1996),
{¶ 11} The trial court was also not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court and courts of this state, "have consistently rejected attempts to impose such a requirement on Crim.R. 32.1 motions. Findings and conclusions are usually required by rule or statute, and no such authority is applicable here." State v. McNeal,
Cuyahoga App. No. 82793, at paragraph five, 2004-Ohio-50. See also Statev. Smith (1977),
{¶ 12} Finally, though it is not contended that the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C), Woods nonetheless argues that his plea was not knowingly made because "he was never informed that any factors which would allow the sentences to run consecutively would have to be found by a jury if he elected to go to trial." This argument is based on the cases of Blakely v. Washington, and Apprendi v. NewJersey (2000),
{¶ 13} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Woods to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dyke, P.J., And Rocco, J., Concur