State v. WoodardState v. Woodard
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Bishop
The deceased was the wife of the defendant. The State relied for a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, and one of the circumstances was that defendant held a policy of insurance on the life wife. It was conceded that a policy had heen payable to defendant as beneficiary, and that such policy was in his possession at the time of the death of his wife. A. B. Shrimplin, agent of the insurance company, as a witness for the State, testified to the issuance of the policy, and the giving of a premium note in consideration thereof, and that subsequent to the death of Mrs. Woodard he returned such premium note to defendant, and took up the policy. Without objection the witness further stated that as far as he knew the policy was in force from the time of its issuance until it was taken up. On cross-examination the witness was asked if at some time he had not been notified by his company that the policy was void. To this an objection was interposed and sustained, and the ruling is assigned as error. As the ruling was put upon the express ground that the question was not limited to the time before the death of Mrs. Woodard we think there was no error. If the subject-matter was of any materiality whatsoever, it was of no moment to inquire what attitude the company assumed after the death of the insured; and, following the ruling, counsel did not see fit to limit his question to conform thereto.
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*679
*680The thirteenth instruction was addressed to the subject of motive and therein it was.said: “ If the jury find that the life of the deceased was insured and payable to the defendant, Charles Woodard, and that the said defendant believed the said policy of insurance was valid and in force at the time the crime is charged to have been committed, or even if the said alleged policy of insurance was void and of no force and effect, yet if you find that the defendant thought and believed that said policy of insurance on the life of his wife was in force and valid and payable to him, then such finding by you may be considered as tending to establish a motive.” The instruction is complained of as error upon two grounds: (1) The evidence shows conclusively that the policy of insurance on the life of Mrs. Woodward was not in force, and hence the subject-matter thereof was improperly submitted for the consideration of the jury. (2) The instruction improperly submitted to the jury the question of the legal effect of the conditional delivery of the policy to defendant and his wife and their „ retention thereof.
That the first ground of contention is untenable becomes apparent upon a moment’s reflection. It was in no sense material to the issue to prove that the policy was a valid and subsisting obligation on the part of the insurer at the date of death. The subject of such policy became important only as related to the question of motive. To establish motive it was not required that the fact or state of facts involved should be proven. Belief on the part of defendant in the existence of such fact was alone essential. If therefore the defendant believed that the policy on the life of his wife was in force it was sufficient for the purposes of the case What we have already said respecting the state of the record is sufficient to make it clear that the question’ of the belief of defendant respecting the validity of the policy was an open one and hence proper to be submitted to the jury. It may be added that the portion of the instruction quoted above was followed by the statement that if *681defendant did not believe tbe policy to be in force and the jury so found then the existence of such policy could not be considered as having any bearing on the question of motive Considering that by the initial phrase of the instruction as quoted, the question of the validity of the policy was submitted to the jury for a finding, and we think it may have been so understood, still we are united in the opinion that no prejudice could have resulted therefrom to the defendant. As we have seen, it was immaterial whether or not the policy issued and which was in the hands of defendant was a valid obligation. It was enough that the defendant believed or did not believe it to be valid. Conceding then, as we may, that the question of validity should not have been submitted, it remains true that, under the instruction as a whole, the right to consider the policy as bearing upon motive was made to turn upon the belief of defendant, and not upon the question of validity. .So considered no hardship to defendant was worked by requiring the jury to determine the question of validity before passing to the question of belief. On the contrary, the instruction may justly be regarded as unduly favorable to defendant.
Other errors assigned have been examined and found to be without merit.
The judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.