State v. WoodallState v. Woodall
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. Appellee Roger Wayne Woodall was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued on February 24, 1997, based on fourteen affidavits accusing him of obtaining controlled substances by forging prescriptiоns. On February 25, 1998, an indictment was returned by the Grand Jury of the First Judicial District of Harrison County. Woodall was indicted on five counts of knowingly and intentionally acquiring or obtaining possession of а controlled substance by passing a forged prescription to a practitioner. The incidents which formed the basis of the indictment occurred on the following datеs: August 18, 1995; August 25, 1995; September 1, 1995; September 8, 1995; and September 16, 1995.
¶ 2. Woodall then filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Woodall argued that since the indictment was filed ovеr two years after the crimes were allegedly committed, the action was barred. The trial court granted Woodall‘s motion finding, “the prosecution against the defendant ... was commenced by the filing of the indictment which occurred more than two (2) years from the date of the alleged offenses” The trial court also held the crimes chаrged did not fall within the exceptions to the statute of limitations. From the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, the State appeals assigning the following as еrror:
I. WHETHER PROSECUTION IS COMMENCED WITHIN THE MEANING OF MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 BY THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7.
II. WHETHER THE CHARGES IN THIS CASE UNDER MISS CODE ANN. § 41-29-144 ARE EXCEPTTED FROM THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5.
III. WHETHER THE OTHER ITEMS CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL COURT‘S ORDER ARE RELATED TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RATHER THAN THE ISSUES OF SPEEDY TRIAL OR DUE PROCESS.
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER PROSECUTION IS COMMENCED WITHIN THE MEANING OF MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 BY THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7.
¶ 3. Woodall alleges the state did not commence prosecution against him within the two-year time period required by then applicable
A person shall not bе prosecuted for any offense, with the exception of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, robbery, larceny, rape, embezzlement, obtaining money or property under false pretenses, felonious abuse or battery of a child as described in Section 97-5-39, touching or handling a child for lustful purposes as described in Section 97-5-23, sexual battery of a child as described in Section 97-3-95(c) or exploitation of children as described in Section 97-5-33, unless the prosecution for such offense be commenced within two (2) years next after the commission thereof, but nothing contained in this section shall bar any prosecution against any person who shall abscond or flee from justice, or shall absent himself from this state or out of the jurisdiction of the court, or so conduct himself that he cannot be found by the officers of the law, or that рrocess cannot be served upon him.
. . . .
A prosecution may be сommenced, within the meaning of section 99-1-5 by the issuance of a warrant, or by binding over or recognizing the offender to compel his appearance to answer the offense, as well as by indictment or affidavit.
¶ 5. Woodall cites authority to bolster the trial court‘s finding. He notes that the Mississippi Constitution mandates: “No person shаll, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information....”
¶ 6. He also notes that “prior to prosecution” of a felony, an indictment must be returned. Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1364 (Miss.1998). See also Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197, 1999 (Miss.1990); Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1989).
¶ 7. The State, to the contrary, notes two cases specifically addressing when the prosecution of felonies commences. This Court held that in a case of kidnаpping and murder, prosecution had already commenced when the accused had been arrested but not indicted. Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 722 (Miss.1984). When a couple was accused of аrson, this Court found prosecution had commenced when they had been arrested, charged, and informed about release on bond but not indicted. Page v. State, 495 So.2d 436, 439 (Miss.1986). We held, ”
¶ 8. While it is true that an indictment is required to prosecute one charged with a felony, our case law suggests and our statute mandates that the process of prosecution commences prior to indictment. This is true whether the prosecution involves a felony or a misdemeanor although this Court‘s attempt to stress the imрortance of an indictment may have left some of the terminology ambiguous or seemingly contradictory.
¶ 9. Woodall was arrested pursuant to arrest warrant issued on February 24, 1997, less than two years after the alleged incidents of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly found the State was barrеd from prosecuting Woodall. Because of this error, this Court must reverse the judgment below, reinstate the indictment, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. WHETHER THE CHARGES IN THIS CASE UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-144 ARE EXCEPTED FROM THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5.
¶ 10. As the action is not barred according to the statute of limitations, this assignment of error is moot.
III. WHETHER THE OTHER ITEMS CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL COURT‘S ORDER ARE RELATED TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RATHER THAN THE ISSUES OF SPEEDY TRIAL OR DUE PROCESS.
¶ 11. Woodall contends his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. However, he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. We have held that even when it appears that the speedy trial statute was violated, if it was not raisеd in the
CONCLUSION
¶ 12. The issuance of an arrеst warrant signals the commencement of prosecution.
¶ 13. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Harrison County Circuit Court, we reinstate the indictment, and we remand this case fоr further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 14. REVERSED AND REMANDED; INDICTMENT REINSTATED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS, SMITH, WALLER AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR.
McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J.
McRAE, Justice, dissenting:
¶ 15. The trial court was right as it dismissed the charges because the State failed to indict the defendant within 2 years of the chargеd offense. The statute of limitations bars prosecution. I dissent. This is a felony case. Our Mississippi Constitution plainly provides that:
No person shall, for any indictable offense, bе proceeded against criminally by information, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the military when in actual service, or by leave of the сourt for misdemeanor in office or where a defendant represented by counsel by sworn statement waives indictment; but the legislature, in cases not punishable by death оr by imprisonment in the penitentiary, may dispense with the inquest of the grand jury, and may authorize prosecutions before justice court judges, or such other inferior court or cоurts as may be established, and the proceedings in such cases shall be regulated by law.
SULLIVAN, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.