State v. WoodState v. Wood
Ravert J. Clark, for Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} This is an appeal by the State of Ohio from a trial court decision dismissing an indiсtment against a sex offender who was charged with failing to provide notice of change of address. The trial court found that the defendant had no duties under Ohio‘s current sex offender registration scheme, the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA“), because he had committed his crime prior to the effective date of the act. It also found that he had no duties under the prior version of the registration scheme, Megan‘s Law, because Megan‘s Law had been repealed by the time he was released from prison. We conclude that the trial court was right about the AWA but wrong about the offender‘s duties under Megаn‘s Law. As a result, we reverse the judgment dismissing the indictment and remand this case for further proceedings.
Background
{¶2} John Wood was convicted of rape in 1993 and sentenced to 8 to twenty-five years in prison. In 1997, the state legislature enacted Megan‘s Law, and in 2008, the legislature repealed Megan‘s Law and enaсted the AWA,
{¶3} He apparently did not keep up with his notification requirements, however, and on October 15, 2011, he was indicted for a first-degree felony fоr failing to provide notice of his change of address. Shortly thereafter, he moved to dismiss the indictment. The trial court ruled that Ohio‘s sex-offender regulations, as set forth in
Analysis
{¶4} In a single assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred in dismissing thе indictment against Mr. Wood based upon a mistaken interpretation of the status of Ohio‘s sex offender registration laws following the Ohio Supreme Court‘s dеcision in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
{¶5} In Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that the AWA “as applied to defendants who [had] committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, viоlate[d]
{¶6} The linchpin of the trial court‘s analysis as to Megan‘s Law was that Mr. Wood never accrued any duties under Megan‘s Law:
The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that, “the repeal of a statute is the abrogation or destruction of the act.” Under
Section 1.21 of the Revised Code , the repeal of a statute does nоt affect any rights or liabilities whichexist, or relieve any person from punishment for an act committed in violation of the repealed act. Therefore, while it is proper to continue to apply Megan‘s Law to offenders who were properly registered and had obligations under Mеgan‘s law prior to its repeal, it would not be proper to apply Megan‘s Law to Defendant. (Citations omitted.)
The flaw in this analysis is that Mr. Wood did aсcrue duties under Megan‘s Law. Because he was in prison when Megan‘s law was enacted, his designation as a sexually oriented offender attaсhed as a matter of law based upon his conviction for a sexually oriented offense. See State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 18; see also State v. Cooper, 1st Dist. No. C-030921, 2004-Ohio-6428, ¶ 24; In re Abney, 1st Dist. No. C-080053, 2008-Ohio-4379, ¶ 6-7. And unlike the AWA, Megan‘s Law constitutionally may be applied to offenders who committed their crimes prior to the statute‘s effective date. See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 410, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998).
{¶7} In reaching our decision today, we have the benefit of several decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court handed down after the trial court‘s decision. In State v. Brunning, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that ” ‘[w]hen а court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional, and the offending statute replaced an existing law that had been repealed in the same bill that enacted the offending statute, the repeal is also invalid unless it clearly appears that the General Assembly meant the repeal to have effect even if the offending statute had never been passed.’ ” 134 Ohio St.3d 438, 2012-Ohio-5752, 983 N.E.2d 316, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d 502, 739 N.E.2d 788 (2001), paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, “Ohio has, in effect, separate statutory schemes governing sex offenders depending on when they committed their
{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court, moreover, has rejected the theory that a gap exists for certain sex offenders, reasoning that the “General Assembly certainly did not intend for sex offenders to be relieved of obligations to nоtify authorities of a change of address when it repealed Megan‘s Law and enacted [the] AWA.” Brunning at ¶ 20-21. As a result, we must agree with the state that once the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the AWA could not be applied retroactively, Mr. Wood—by operation of law—assumed the registration requirements of a “sexually oriented offender” under Megan‘s Law. See id. at ¶ 19.
{¶9} Mr. Wood was indicted for failure to provide a written notice of a change of address at least 20 days prior to the change in violation of
{¶10} Mr. Wood‘s “conviction was predicated on a requirement that has never been declared unconstitutional and that [Mr. Wood] has never been released from obeying: the requirement of notifying the sheriff of a change of address under the Megan‘s Lаw version of
{¶11} We note, however, that in Howard, 134 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, at ¶ 21, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the version of Megan‘s Law in effect just prior to the adoption of the AWA governs the penalty for a violation of
{¶12} We sustain the state‘s sole assignment of error, reverse the trial court‘s judgment, and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and law.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
HENDON, P.J., and DINKELACKER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.