STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. TONYA L. WOLFE, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Nos. 17 BE 0044 and 17 BE 0045
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BELMONT COUNTY
December 10, 2018
2018-Ohio-5461
BEFORE: Kathleen Bartlett, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges.
Criminal Appeal from the Belmont County Court, Western Division, Case Nos. 17 TRC 02760-01 and 17 CRB 742W
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Atty. Helen Yonak, 147 West Main Street, St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950, for Appellee and
Atty. Wesley Johnston, P.O. Box 6041, Youngtown, Ohio 44501, for Appellant.
Dated: December 10, 2018
{¶1} Appellant Tonya L. Wolfe entered guilty pleas and was convicted and sentenced by the Belmont County Court, Western Division, for one сount of endangering children (operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs with a child under the age of eighteen in the vehicle), in violation of
{¶2} In this consolidated appeal, Appellant challenges both sentences, which she contends were imposed without regard to
{¶3} In her sole assignment of error, Appellant asserts:
The trial court erred when it sentenced Appellant without considering the purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing contained in
R.C. 2929.21 and the sentencing factors listed inR.C. 2929.22 .
{¶4} On September 20, 2017, Appellant was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as well as driving with a suspended licеnse, endangering children,
{¶5} At the plea/sentencing hearing on October 24, 2017, Appellant waived arraignment on the child endangerment charge and the trial court made the following findings with respect to the probation violation:
The other case that I called is an ended case from 2016. It was a child endangerment charge, 2929.22(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable by up to six-month jail sentence and/or $1,000 fine. Now, in that case
* * *
Here it is. August 30, 2016. This Court terminated [Appellant] from the diversion program one year later on August 29, 2017. On that date, sentenced [Appellant] to 90 days in jail with all suspended. [Appellant] placed on probation for a three-year period of time, pay a fine of $50 plus cost of $135, have no violations of State of Ohio, and continue counseling through Hillcrest and not to drive at anytime [sic] with a minor in the motor vehicle. That was August 27, 2017.
The OVI occurred on September 20, 2017, and the child endangerment on the same date.
(10/24/17 Hearing Tr., 4).
{¶6} At the hearing, Appellant‘s counsel explained that her plea to the OVI
{¶7} The overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are to punish the offender and to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others.
{¶8} Appellant relies on
A sentence imposed for a misdemeanor or minor misdemeanor violation of the Revised Code * * * shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purpоses of misdemeanor sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders.
{¶9} In determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor,
{¶10} The court may also consider any other relevant factors.
{¶11} An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s sentence on a misdemeanor violation under an abuse of discretion standard.
{¶12} “When a misdemeanor sentence is within the statutory range, a reviewing court will presume that the trial judge followed the standards in
{¶13} Here, the trial court sentenced Aрpellant to 180 days in jail for each first-degree misdemeanor, with the sentences to run concurrently. The maximum sentence for a first-degree misdemeanor is 180 days.
{¶14} Further, there were several aggravating factors present to justify the imposition of maximum sentences. Appellant had a history of persistent criminal activity and her charactеr and condition revealed a substantial risk that she would commit another offense. See
{¶15} Likewise, Appellant‘s history, character, and condition revealed a substantiаl risk that she would be a danger to others, particularly her daughter, who was the victim in the child endangerment conviction. Her conduct had also been characterized by a pattern of repetitive and/or compulsive behavior with heedless indifference to others. See
{¶16} The trial court underscored that, as a part of her probation from the previous vehicular child endangerment сonviction, which was imposed less than a month prior to criminal conduct that gave rise to the convictions at issue here, Appellant was specifically prohibited from driving a vehicle with a minor child. At the plea/sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
There are people that drink every day and don‘t get into a car, and they‘re alcoholics. They need the exact same thing, but at least they dоn‘t get in a car and they don‘t do it with their child in the car. That‘s why you got this sentence. It‘s not the drinking. It‘s what you do while you drink.
(Hearing Tr. 10).
{¶17} Because the facts in this case demonstrate the existence of numerous aggravating factors аnd no mitigating factors, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing maximum concurrent sentences in this case. As a consequence, we find that Appellant‘s sole assignment of error has no merit. Acсordingly, the docket and journal entries of the trial court are affirmed.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.