474 N.E.2d 354 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1984
Defendants-appellants, Therron Woerner and Ralph J. Dupler, entered no contest pleas to violations of R.C.
Defendants have asserted the following assignments of error:
"I. Section
"II. Section
"III. Section
"IV. Section
R.C.
"(A) No person shall operate any vehicle, * * * within this state if * * *:
"* * *
"(3) The person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath;"
Defendants contend that R.C.
The test for determining whether a provision of a criminal statute is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
While it is true that most people will be unaware of the exact point in their alcohol consumption when the test results will reach the statutory standard, that alone does not render R.C.
R.C.
We agree with the Utah Supreme Court which, in rejecting a void for vagueness attack on a similar statute, stated:
"* * * We can see no reason why a person of ordinary intelligence would have any difficulty in understanding that if he has drunk anything containing alcohol, and particularly any substantial amount thereof, he should not attempt to drive or take control of a motor vehicle." Greaves v. State (Utah 1974),
Appellants' first assignment of error is overruled.
Appellants secondly argue that R.C.
Appellants' second assignment of error is overruled.
Appellants thirdly assert that R.C.
The fallacy in this argument is that the breath-alcohol content prescribed by R.C.
Appellants' third assignment of error is overruled.
Appellants finally contend that *62
R.C.
The General Assembly has the constitutional authority to define offenses and presumably could prohibit the operation of motor vehicles when a motorist has consumed any alcohol. Although individual reaction to drinking a specified amount of alcohol may vary, the General Assembly has, after appropriate legislative hearings and presumably based upon scientific evidence, decided that there is universal impairment of motorists at or above the prescribed level. The fact that some persons may be more impaired at that level than others and still receive the same penalty does not render the statute constitutionally invalid.
Appellants' fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Appellants' assignments of error are overruled and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
STRAUSBAUGH and WHITESIDE, JJ., concur.