72 Iowa 627 | Iowa | 1887
The deceased and defendant lived on adjoining
farms. Previous to the occurrence in question, they had had difficulty, and on one occasion they engaged in a personal conflict, in which defendant was worsted. On the occasion in question, deceased was riding on the highway near defendant’s house, when defendant accosted him, and asked him for a receipt for certain money which he had previously paid him as road taxes, the deceased being the supervisor of highways in that district. A quarrel arose between them, in which each applied insulting and opprobrious epithets to the other. Defendant seized a piece of plank, and, as the prosecution claimed, assaulted Moist with it. But defendant’s claim is that he used the weapon in defending himself from an assault by Moist. Moist also seized tiie plank, and the parties struggled for the possession of it. . Defendant directed his wife, who was present, to go to the house and bring his revolver to him, but she refused to do so. One Shrader, an employe of defendant, was present at the time, and he went to the house and got the revolver, and handed it to defendant. Moist, in the mean time, had let go of the plank. After he received the revolver, defendant fired one shot from it, which struck Moist, inflicting a wound from which he died in a few minutes. It was urged in defense (1) that defendant acted in self-defense; and (2) that at the time of the killing he was insane, and not criminally responsible for# the act.
III. The state was permitted, against defendant’s objection, to introduce in evidence the jacket and shirt worn by the deceased at the time of the shooting. It is insisted that there was no controversy as to the fact of the killing, and that the only effect of exhibiting to the jury the clothing worn by the deceased, and which was stained with his blood, was to arouse their prejudice. It may be true that but little question was made on the trial as to the fact of the killing; still the burden was on the state to prove that fact. Defendant’s plea of “not guilty” put in issue every allegation of the indictment, and, if the prosecutor had failed to prove the killing, defendant would have been entitled to an acquittal. As the prosecutor was required to prove that fact, he had the right to introduce any competent evidence which tended to prove it. • The clothing showed the location of the wound, and its consequent fatal character. It was therefore competent evidence of the fact.
IY. A physician, who had had fifteen years’ experience in the treatment of insane patients, was examined as a wit-l16313 011 behalf of defendant. The effort was to establish by the testimony of this and other medi0al witnesses that the profession recognizes the existence in some cases of a form of mania which attacks the patient instantly, but which is temporary and transitory in its nature. The witness testified that “ there are cases where an individual hitherto perfectly sane, and in the full possession of his intellect, is suddenly seized with the most anxious and painful emotions,.and with a homicidal impulse as inexplicable to himself as to others. This form of insanity many times is of brief duration, and probably the more sudden the attack the shorter the duration.” He was then asked the following question : “ Have you read the article by Dr. Oastleman, in the American Journal of Insanity, in which the author says : ‘ Mania,. — ■ instantaneous, temporary, fleeting, — -a disease which breaks out suddenly like the sudden loss of sense by some physical disease ; the subject
VI. Defendant introduced in evidence Maudsley’s work on Mental Diseases, and read portions it to the jury. Some portions of the work which defendant offered to read were excluded by the court. They all relate to the question of the responsibility of an insane person for
The rule which requires that the attention of the witness shall be first called to the alleged contradictory statement,
X. The court refused to give an instruction asked by defendant’s counsel on the law of self-defense. The correctness of the instruction may be conceded, and it * *s no* liecessaiTto set it out in this opinion. The court, however, on its own motion, gave an instruction expressing with sufficient clearness the same doc
Other matters have been discussed by counsel, but the questions raised are not of controlling influence in the case, nor are they of general importance to the profession.
We find no ground for disturbing the judgment.
AFFIRMED.