| Iowa | Dec 15, 1873
In fact, the appearing and pleading voluntarily to an indictment constitutes of itself, it seems to us, a waiver of arraignment. The arraignment is for the benefit of the defendant. This is implied in the provision that he may waive it. If it was for the benefit of the State it could not be waived by the defendant. We have seen that the defendant cannot object to the misnomer if he was- arraigned. Can he do so if he waived arraignment ? By his waiver of arraignment he must be in precisely the same position as though he had been arraigned, and had answered that he was indicted by his right name. Otherwise he may waive arraignment, and after such waiver be in better condition than if he had been arraigned.
In other words, he may forego.a provision which is for his benefit; and by that mere fact be placed in a better position than if he had availed himself of it. This cannot be consistently with the position that the thing waived is beneficial.
In fact this case is not at all in principle distinguishable from The State v. White, 32 Iowa, 17" court="Iowa" date_filed="1871-06-24" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/state-v-white-7094934?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7094934">32 Iowa, 17. In that case the question of misnomer was presented for the first time in a motion in arrest of judgment, whilst here it is raised by demurrer.
But a motion in arrest of judgment must be granted upon any ground which would have been cause of demurrer. Rev., § 4856. So that, if the misnomer in that case was not a good ground for sustaining the motion in arrest of judgment, it
II. It is claimed that the indictment does not charge that the offense was committed in the State of Iowa.
A comparison of the indictment in question with section 4651 of the Revision shows it to be exactly like the form there prescribed. This should be enough to establish its sufficiency without further inquiry.
III. It is further urged that the court erred in rendering judgment requiring defendant to labor at $1.50 per day.
2. It is further claimed that chapter 69 of the laws of 1870 does not apply to convictions for keeping nuisances under the prohibitory liquor law. In support of this position, appellant cites sections 5110, 1564 and 4412 of the Revision. Section 5110 of the Revision provides, amongst other things, that the existing laws respecting intoxicating liquors, their sale and manufacture, shall govern the respective subjects to’which they relate, except where it is otherwise provided in this Code. Section 1564 of the Revision declares that the sale of liquor in a certain manner shall constitute a nuisance, and the defend
It cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to prescribe that, respecting these subjects no subsequent legislature should otherwise provide. And whatever they intended, it is clear that they could not restrain subsequent legislatures from dealing with these subjects as to them might seem proper. We have no doubt that chapter 69, Laws 1870, is applicable to the case under consideration.
The record discloses no error, and the judgment is
Affirmed.