STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Maurice WINGO, Respondent.
No. 48018.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
April 28, 1978.
William E. Falvey, Ramsey County Public Defender, St. Paul, for respondent.
KELLY, Justice.
This is a prosecutorial appeal under Rule 28, Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 28.08, the state appealed to the district court from an order of the municipal court dismissing a misdemeanor prosecution against defendant. The district court dismissed the state‘s appeal on the grounds that Rule 28 violates both art. 6, § 3, of the Minnesota Constitution, and
The procedural history1 of this appeal begins in July 1975, when defendant was charged in municipal court with disorderly conduct in violation of
This bench warrant was served on defendant at the completion of his 6-month sentence. At that time defendant restated his plea of not guilty, and on April 20, 1976, defendant moved the court for an order dismissing the prosecution on the grounds that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. On July 15, 1976, the municipal court ordered the charge dismissed.
On July 20, 1976, the state appealed pursuant to Rule 28.08, Rules of Criminal Procedure, the order of the municipal court to the district court. The matter was orally argued on June 13, 1977. On July 14, 1977, the district court dismissed the state‘s appeal. The grounds for the district court‘s action frame the issues on appeal: (1) Whether Rule 28, by enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the district court, violates the “as prescribed by law” requirement of art. 6, § 3, of the Minnesota Constitution; and, (2) whether Rule 28 abridges a substantive right in violation of
Preliminary to our discussion of the issues is a brief overview of the appellate process in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties both before and after the adoption of the criminal rules, so as to illustrate the limited nature of this appeal. Prior to the adoption of the rules, the statutes governing Hennepin and Ramsey County municipal courts permitted direct appeals to the supreme court,2 while direct appeals from other county courts were prohibited. The latter appeals had to be taken first to district court.3 See, State v. Beckman, 296 Minn. 443, 209 N.W.2d 402 (1973). Rule 28, by prohibiting direct appeals from county courts to the supreme court, aligned the procedure for Hennepin and Ramsey County municipal courts with that employed in other county courts. All prosecutorial appeals in misdemeanor cases first must be heard and decided by the district court. Rule 28.09, Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prosecutorial appeals from the district court to the supreme court can be had only through this court‘s granting application for leave to appeal. Rule 29.03, subd. 1(2), Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The adoption of the rules also affected the prosecuting authority‘s opportunity to appeal. Prior to the adoption of the rules, the prosecution‘s opportunity to appeal was limited to specifically appealable orders as defined in
It is apparent from the above discussion that the rules have enlarged the district court‘s appellate jurisdiction. It is also clear that the rules have enlarged the prosecuting authority‘s opportunities to appeal, while at the same time restricting the prosecuting authority‘s appeals initially to the district court rather than to this court. We do not agree with the district court, however, that these particular provisions of the rules violate art. 6, § 3, of the Minnesota Constitution or that this court exceeded its authority under the enabling legislation in implementing the foregoing changes.
The district court stated that the “power to create a substantive right of appeal in the District Court lies only in the Legislature pursuant to Article 6, Sec. 3, Minnesota Constitution.” That section provides:
“The district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and shall have appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.” (Italics supplied.)
The district court ruled that the change in its appellate jurisdiction by court rule rather than by legislative enactment violated the “as prescribed by law” requirement.
Our conclusion is reinforced by subsequent acts of the legislature. As required by
These revisions, to statutes governing district courts, county courts, and county municipal courts, clearly support our conclusion. By L. 1977, c. 432, § 13, the legislature amended
The district court also held that Rule 28, by enlarging the prosecutor‘s opportunity to appeal to any pretrial orders and by restricting those appeals to the district court rather than to the supreme court, violates
The district court aptly noted that we have employed language prohibiting prosecutorial appeals unless expressly authorized by statute. See, e. g., City of St. Paul v. Halvorson, 301 Minn. 48, 221 N.W.2d 535 (1974); City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 301 Minn. 43, 221 N.W.2d 532 (1974). However, a review of the decisions upon which that statement is based, the most recent being State ex rel. King v. Ruegemer, 238 Minn. 440, 57 N.W.2d 153 (1953), persuades us that the reasoning employed in O‘Rourke applies with equal force here.
In Ruegemer the issue was whether a trial court order quashing an indictment could be reviewed in this court upon application of the state for a writ of certiorari. After conceding that the state had no right of appeal, we stated:
“* * * If the question presented here were one of first impression with this court and there were no statutory barrier, we might be inclined to the view that the state should have the right to review by certiorari an order or ruling of the trial court involving a question of law where the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy; but the policy of this court in denying to the state the right to appeal or review in a criminal matter is now of such long standing that if it is changed it should be done by the legislature and not by the courts.” (Italics supplied.) 238 Minn. at 446, 57 N.W.2d at 156.
Cf. In re Appeal of O‘Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 169, 220 N.W.2d 811, 818.
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that we could review prosecutorial appeals independently of any statutory authorization. However, like civil appeals, the legislatively imposed restrictions on prosecutorial appeals were recognized as a matter of policy, based upon comity, and not as a limitation on this court‘s jurisdiction to grant appellate review. It therefore follows that, with the authority given us by the legislature to promulgate the rules, we can direct that prosecutorial appeals first be heard in the district court and that appeals would be from any pretrial order rather than the specifically enumerated grounds of the statute. Viewed in this light the criminal rules do not abridge, enlarge, or modify that right of appeal in a broad sense but merely prescribe a different manner of exercising that right by first requiring a different court to initially hear the appeal. The rules specifically allow the prosecuting authority to petition this court for permission to appeal the district court‘s determination.10 Thus, the rules do not abridge the prosecutor‘s possibilities for appeals to this court.
We are not persuaded that the state‘s right of appeal is a substantive right as that phrase is used in the enabling legislation. As we have pointed out, litigants have no right to appeal to this court; instead, this court has the power to accept or reject appeals. It follows that if the state has any “right” to appeal, it is only because this court has granted such a right by its rules or by comity in accepting legislative enactments creating the same. If the litigant has no right to have an appeal heard in this court, appeals are merely procedural devices by which this court‘s attention is
Defendant argues on appeal that Rule 28 violates an additional substantive right to have the supreme court retain jurisdiction over a prosecutorial appeal for only 6 months.14 Defendant‘s argument is based on
We think the foregoing discussion disposing of the trial court‘s contention that an appeal is a substantive right applies with equal force to defendant‘s argument. Like statutes limiting appeals as of right to stated kinds of orders and judgments, we recognized as a matter of comity the 6-month time limitation in
The trial court originally ordered the disorderly conduct charge dismissed because of unnecessary delay in prosecution. However, because the case must be reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the merits of the state‘s appeal, we do not reach that issue. We do not hesitate to point out, however, that over 2 years have elapsed since defendant‘s arrest, and still no trial has taken place. We are mindful that, while some of the delay may be attributable to defendant‘s failure to appear at trial, the majority of the delay has occurred in the judicial system. Unexplained is the delay between the filing of the state‘s appeal and the hearing before the district court. Under the circumstances of this case it is difficult to conceive how defendant‘s right to a speedy trial has not been violated.
The case is reversed and remanded for determination not inconsistent with this opinion.
OTIS, Justice (dissenting).
I would vacate the decision of the district court, hold that it is not necessary to pass on the constitutional question, and affirm so much of the district court judgment as affirms the county court dismissal. We have no occasion to decide the constitutional question, in my opinion, and it is therefore dictum.
ROGOSHESKE, Justice (dissenting).
While I disagree with the district court‘s conclusion that Rule 28 is constitutionally impermissible and its refusal to review the merits of the county court‘s dismissal of the misdemeanor charge, I find no proper justification for addressing the basis for the district court‘s conclusion, upon a theory neither espoused nor supported by either party before that court, and further in view of subsequent legislative enactments. In my opinion, we should dismiss the appeal to this court as improvidently granted. The effect would be to reinstate the county court‘s dismissal of the misdemeanor charge on the ground that defendant was denied a speedy trial, a disposition surely compelled by this record.
WAHL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully join the dissent of ROGOSHESKE, J.