{¶ 2} In May, 2004, Appellant was indicted on one count of possession of crack cocaine in an amount exceeding five (5) grams but not exceeding ten (10) grams, a third degree felony in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} The Appellant's attorney reached a plea agreement with the State of Ohio. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State would reduce the charge to a fourth degree felony in exchange for an eighteen (18) month prison sentence.
{¶ 4} The Appellant was initially before the court on April 22, 2005 for a change of plea hearing. At that time, the trial court explained the terms of the plea agreement between the Appellant and the State of Ohio. (T. at 2). The court also explained the Appellant's constitutional rights. (T. at 2). Prior to the court's explanation of post-release control, the Appellant indicated that he wanted to proceed with a trial. (T. at 2).
{¶ 5} A few days later, the Appellant changed his mind and again wished to enter a plea. A second change of plea hearing took place on April 27, 2005. At that hearing, the trial court again explained the terms of the plea agreement. The court noted on the record that the State was amending the charge from a third degree felony to a fourth degree felony in exchange for an agreed maximum sentence of eighteen (18) months. (T. at 3). When asked if he had any objections or questions regarding the plea agreement, the Appellant replied "[n]o, sir." (T. at 3).
{¶ 6} The court also explained the constitutional rights which the Appellant would be waiving with his guilty plea. The trial court informed the Appellant that that he had the right to have a trial by jury; that at a trial the prosecutor has the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that at a trial he gets to confront the witnesses against him through cross-examination; that at trial he has the power to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf; and that he cannot be forced to testify against himself at trial. (T. at 4-7). Finally, the trial court informed the Appellant that if he pled guilty, he would be waiving his right to a trial, and would come before the court for sentencing. (T. at 8).
{¶ 7} At the conclusion of this colloquy, the trial court asked the Appellant if there was anything about his constitutional rights that he did not understand. (T. at 8). The Appellant replied "I understood everything you said to me, sir." (Id.). Appellant indicated that he had gone through the eleventh (11th) grade in school, and could read and write. (Id.). When asked if there were any questions in his mind regarding the situation, the Appellant stated that there were not. (Id.).
{¶ 8} Thereafter, the trial court explained the possible maximum sentences. The Appellant was informed that for the fourth degree felony, he faced a maximum sentence of eighteen (18) months in prison. (T. at 9). Appellant was also advised that he could be placed on post-release control for up to five years, and that a violation could send him to prison for up to one half of the time of his sentence. (Id. at 9). Additionally, the trial court informed the Appellant that he faced a maximum fine of up to $5,000.00 and a mandatory driver's license suspension of up to five years. (T. at 10). When asked how he was pleading to the amended charge of possession of cocaine, a fourth degree felony, the Appellant indicated that he wished to plead guilty. (T. at 11).
{¶ 9} In addition to the oral recitation of his rights, the Appellant was given a written admission of guilt/judgment entry. That form stated the rights explained by the court. The form also contained the following notification: "I understand my right to appeal a maximum sentence, my other limited appeal rights and that any appeal by me must be filed within 30 days of my sentence." Admission of Guilt/Judgment Entry, filed April 2, 2005. The Appellant reviewed this document with his attorney, and signed it in the presence of the court. (Id. at 12). After the Appellant signed the entry, the trial court asked him if anyone had said or done anything to force him to make a plea. (Id. at 12). The Appellant responded "[n]o, sir." (Id.). Appellant also indicated that he had come to court with the intention of entering a guilty plea. (Id.). At that point, the trial court accepted the Appellant's plea and found it to be knowing and voluntary.
{¶ 10} Defendant-appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and has set forth the following two errors for our consideration:
{¶ 11} "I. THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO ACCURATELY INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE EFFECT OF HIS GUILTY PLEA.
{¶ 12} "II. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."
{¶ 14} A defendant's guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See State v. Engle (1996),
{¶ 15} In challenging his plea, appellant contends that the trial court failed to inform him that his sentence is not subject to appeal pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 16} A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.
{¶ 17} A sentence is "authorized by law" and, therefore, not subject to review, if it falls within the statutory range of available sentences. See State v. Harris (Dec. 31, 2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-340; State v. Gray, Belmont App. No. 02 BA 26,
{¶ 18} Appellant's sentence does not exceed the statutory range; therefore, it is authorized by law. Additionally, the trial court made sure that appellant understood the plea agreement and that his decision to plea was voluntary. Finally, the trial court imposed the exact sentence contemplated by both parties in the plea agreement.
{¶ 19} Furthermore, in such cases, there is no need to make the findings required under R.C.
{¶ 20} As the court in State v. Atchley, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-841,
{¶ 21} Appellant did not premise his plea on any discussion about his appellate rights. When the trial court asked appellant if he had any questions, appellant did not raise any concerns about his appellate rights. Atchley, supra, at ¶ 13. Similarly, appellant did not indicate that he wanted to appeal any particular issue. It is well-settled that a party may not argue that the party was prejudiced by error which the party induced the trial court to commit. Lentz, supra, at ¶ 12.
{¶ 22} Additionally, a plea agreement is generally "contractual in nature and subject to contract-law standards."State v. Butts (1996),
{¶ 23} It is the duty of the trial court as a trier of fact to determine whether there has been compliance with a plea agreement. State v. Curry (1976),
{¶ 24} The intent of the parties to a contract presumptively resides in the ordinary meaning of the language employed in their agreement. Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co. (1987),
{¶ 25} In order to determine whether a plea agreement has been breached, courts must examine what the parties reasonably understood at the time the defendant entered his guilty plea. SeeUnited States v. Partida-Parra (C.A.9, 1988),
{¶ 26} In the case at bar, the relevant portions of the plea agreement are that the State would "amend this charge from a third-degree felony to a fourth degree felony for an imposition of a maximum 18 months on that charge . . ." (T. at 3). The maximum penalties for a fourth degree felony are a $5,000.00 fine and 18 months incarceration. (T. at 9). A presumption in favor of a prison sentence exists for a felony drug abuse offense involving crack cocaine. R.C.
{¶ 27} In the case at bar, appellant entered into a contract with the State. In exchange for appellant's guilty plea, the State amended the charge from a third degree felony to a fourth degree felony. Further, as part of his consideration for the State's reduced charges, appellant agreed to a sentence of 18 months incarceration. Appellant received what he had bargained for in the case at bar.
{¶ 28} Appellant was not misled by the trial court and counsel's representations concerning his right to appeal upon a plea of guilty. "As an example, a defendant may appeal from a guilty plea if the state did not follow through on the plea bargain. See Santobello v. New York (1971),
{¶ 29} Therefore, defense counsel and the trial court's advice about appellant's appellate rights did not render his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent or unknowing. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err by accepting the guilty plea.
{¶ 30} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶ 32} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis. The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993),
{¶ 33} In determining whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Bradley,
{¶ 34} In order to warrant a reversal, the appellant must additionally show he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. This requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bradley, supra at syllabus paragraph three. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
{¶ 35} The United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held a reviewing court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Bradley at 143, quoting Strickland at 697. Accordingly, we will direct our attention to the second prong of the Strickland test.
{¶ 36} As noted in our disposition of Appellant's First Assignment of Error, supra, Appellant received the benefit of his plea bargain with the State. Defense counsel and the trial court's advice about appellant's appellate rights did not render his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent or unknowing. Accordingly, we do not find appellant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to specifically inform him that he could not appeal the jointly recommend sentence.
{¶ 37} Appellant's Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶ 38} Accordingly, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Gwin, J., Wise, J., and Edwards, J., concur.