*1
STATE WINDOM, Allen Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 36656. Idaho,
Supreme Court of
Boise, August 2010 Term. 16, 2011.
March
Rehearing Denied June 2011. *2 anxiety
diagnosed suffering from and a major depressive disorder with no prescribed ap- He was features. medications propriate to those counselor conditions. His expressed concern that be Windom so, his condi- psychopath, noted that tion was not treatable. killers, was
Windom fascinated serial psychopaths, schizophrenics. Beginning eighth grade, aspects in the he modeled daily protago- life his the habits of carrying Psycho, nist in the movie American school, specific maintaining a briefcase to routine, hygiene using particular brands hygiene products luggage. kept He day planner within which he wrote about “killing] everyone” “see[ing] how” hu- organs day planner man would taste. The figures contained sketched of naked women ways. being gruesome tortured and killed in relationship had an aggressive Windom buying with his mother. He bullied her into expensive personal hygiene products him the he and accessories knew from American Psycho, occupying and intimidated her into their smallest home’s bedroom. He dominat- remaining spaces ed the He the home. repeatedly told his wanted friends that he his father, mother dead. Windom’s Judith’s ex- husband, testified than one that on more occasion, had expressed she fear that Win- slept. dom would kill her as she Molly Huskey, Appellate J. State Public evening January On the Win- Defender, Boise, for M. appellant. Justin experienced a strong urge dom to kill. He argued. Curtis five times his took normal dose of anti-anxi- Wasden, Attorney ety seeking
Hon. Lawrence G. Gen- He medication. considered out Boise, eral, kill, respondent. for M. Lo- Jessica “bums” to mother feared his argued. Instead, stop rello him. would fashioned Windom by attaching weights
a club several HORTON, a dumbbell. Justice. end of He collected two knives and took the club to Judith’s bedroom. Win- appeals Ethan Windom the district court’s placed dom his hand mouth over his mother’s imposition of a determinate life sentence slept and began while she to beat her second-degree murder of mother. his club. face his arms tired When affirm. We weight, from the knives took one of the throat, repeatedly and stabbed her I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL chest, Eventually and abdomen. convinced BACKGROUND dead, Judith was his Windom removed (Windom) “thought Ethan Windom lived alone with hand from what he her mouth” was (Judith). mother, exposed divorced his Judith Windom and thrust the second knife into her 2006, sixteen-year In late old Windom brain. changed expressed then the home’s answer- his belief that Windom “would message to relate that he and with treatment
ing machine recommenda- regardless unexpectedly left tion” of whether he mother had town were incarcer- *3 ated. family He called a friend deal with issues. stating left her a voicemail that he would imposed The district court a determinate morning meet her as was their normal
not
sentence,
life
the
permis-
maximum sentence
attempted
He then
to hitchhike to
routine.
second-degree
sible for
murder. After the
eventually
father’s house and
walked
Appeals
Idaho Court of
affirmed the sen-
Upon arriving,
told his fa-
there.
tence,
granted
petition
this Court
Windom’s
that someone had attacked Judith and
ther
for review.
that she was dead. After Windom’s father
police,
the
Windom was arrested and
called
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
day,
interrogated. Later
confessed
Upon granting petition
for review
charged
to the murder. He was
as an adult
decision,
Appeals’
of a Court of
this Court
murder,
first-degree
eventually pleading
with
gives serious consideration to the views of
charge
guilty to an amended
of second-de-
Appeals,
directly
the Court of
reviews
gree murder.
Humberger
decision of the trial court.
v.
41,
39,
Humberger,
809,
134 Idaho
995 P.2d
incarcerated,
he was
two mental
'While
(2000).
imposed by
811
Where the sentence
professionals
health
assessed
Windom.
limits,
statutory
a trial court is within
first,
Beaver,
“the
Craig
psycholo-
Dr.
a licensed
appellant
demonstrating
bears the burden of
tentatively
gist,
diagnosed
suffering
him as
it is a
clear abuse of discretion.” State
schizophrenia, paranoid type.
from
Dr. Bea-
Stevens,
139, 148,
217,
146 Idaho
191 P.3d
symptoms ap-
ver observed that Windom’s
(2008).
evaluating
226
When
a claim that the
partial
peared to be
remission as he was
discretion,
trial court has abused its
the se
by
antipsychotic
stabilized
medication ad-
first,
quence
inquiry
of our
whether the
during
ministered
his incarceration. Dr.
correctly perceived
trial court
the issue as
opined
Beaver
that the murder occurred dur-
discretion; second,
one of
whether the trial
break. He noted that re-
court acted within the outer boundaries of its
demonstrates that
individuals
search
with
consistently
legal
discretion and
with the
psychiatric
change and
similar
illnesses
mod-
applicable
specific
standards
choices
ify
they age,
and their risk for future
it;
finally,
available to
whether the trial
“precipitously”
violence diminishes
after
court reached its decision
an exercise of
thirty.
expressed
turn
Dr. Beaver
concern
Ctr.,
Valley Shopping
reason. Sun
Inc. v.
present
that Windom would
a threat of vio-
Co.,
87, 94,
Idaho Power
119 Idaho
803 P.2d
stop regularly
lent
behavior
he were to
(1991).
993, 1000
taking medication.
professional,
The second mental health
Dr.
prevail
In order to
on a claim that a
Estess,
psychiatrist.
discretion,
represents
Michael
is a
He first
sentence
an abuse of
days
light
met Windom few
after his arrest. At
“the defendant
must show
time,
criteria,
governing
Dr. Estess viewed Windom as
sentence
[that the]
“acutely psychotic.”
any
Dr. Estess viewed Win-
excessive under
reasonable view of the
(Charboneau
suffering
evolving paranoid,
dom as
from “an
facts.” State v. Charboneau
II),
497,
(1993)
psychotic,
499,
67,
delusional
Dr.
illness.”
Estess
124 Idaho
861 P.2d
69
opined
Broadhead,
141,
“entirely prod-
(quoting
that the murder was
State v.
120 Idaho
401,
(1991),
inappropriate, disorga-
uct of
814 P.2d
[Windom’s]
overruled on
nized,
Brown,
illogical
psychotic process
grounds by
that was
other
State v.
121 Idaho
(1992)).
Thus,
evolving
beyond
above and
his control.” Dr.
life sentence.
suggest
preceding
discussion
Jackson,
adopted by this Court
purely
the district court’s sentence
makes clear an
P.2d at
at
pros-
product of considerations of Windom’s
considerations of socie
important point: The
and the nature of the
pects for rehabilitation
general
are
deterrence
tal retribution
not the ease.
crime he committed. This is
unique char
the basis of the
not decided on
Rather,
opinion reflects
the structure of this
offender; rather these con
acteristics of the
presented
appeal
on
and the rea-
the issues
decided
the characteris
siderations are
view,
Eubank,
In
soning
by
advanced
the dissent.
our
See
tics of the
offense.3
(“a
re-
sentencing comments
judge has com
the district court’s
whether we with the district court’s Hedge Against Sentence aas Uncer- Although conclusion. reasonable minds tainty “rightness” differ as to the of the district sentencing, justified At the district court court's factual conclusions as to Windom’s by stating the fixed-life term that Ethan will prospects for rehabilitation and whether the always attention, psychiatric need but that it nature of his crime warrants fixed life im- is not certain he will be with treat- prisonment, it is manifest that the district ment. product court’s sentence was the of reason. course, Of no court can absolutely ever be short, our task is not to determine guarantee certain or that someone will not agree imposed; whether we with the sentence re-offend, but a fixed-life sentence “should rather, duty our is to determine whether regarded judicial not hedge against be as a has demonstrated that the district Cross, uncertainty.” State v. 132 Idaho imposition court’s of sentence constituted an (1999). 978 P.2d proper abuse of its under the discretion well-estab- apply imposing standard to a life sentence governing lished standards of review such possibility without parole spelled of out decisions. We conclude Windom has Jackson, in State v. 939 P.2d failed to do so. term, “[A] fixed life with its rigid preclusion parole time, good IV. CONCLUSION regarded should requiring as a sentence judgment We affirm the district court’s high degree certainty perpe- ... that the imposing conviction a determinate life sen- never, life, any trator time in his could be second-degree. tence for murder in the safely 294-95, released.” Id. at 939 P.2d at Eubank, (quoting 1373-74 State v. Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices (Ct.App.1988)). BURDICK and J. JONES concur. applied wrong legal The district court JONES, dissenting. Justice W. by requiring standard high Ethan to show a degree certainty that he could be rehabili- Supreme today The Idaho Court holds that someday. tated The district court instead a child with a serious mental illness can required should have the State to show a penalty receive the maximum criminal avail- high degree certainty that Ethan could adult, punish healthy able to even if the someday. not be rehabilitated That Ethan’s spend child must a lifetime behind bars with- guarantee doctors cannot his eventual reha- parole. out a chance following For the *9 enough justify bilitation is not to a fixed-life reasons, respectfully I dissent. sentence. A. The District Court Abused Its Discre- Majority The asserts that the district court by Using Wrong Legal tion Stan- correctly standard, recognized legal this Impose dard to a Fixed-Life Sentence respectfully disagree. Majority I itself on Ethan which, lengthy excerpt cites a over and
Regarding prospects being again, Ethan’s re- over expressed the district court un- habilitated, certainty the district court its poten- abused dis- over Ethan’s rehabilitative First, Indeed, ways. applied cretion in two it throughout ruling, tial. its the court wrong legal repeatedly imposing standard when it cited its uncer- indicated that it was a much more difficult than about rehabilitated is it was unsure because life sentence fully finding as to a function making such a comply would continue
whether Ethan children continue to mature adult. Since prison from dec- if released with treatment they age, actions are develop as “their stated, “I don’t now. The court ades from ‘irretrievably likely evidence of less to be that health path,” “[m]ental have a clear the actions of depraved character’ than are guarantee that Ethan cannot professionals — ———, Florida, U.S. adults.” Graham compliant or his medications will be 2011, 2026, 130 S.Ct. 176 L.Ed.2d proper under that he will be will work or (2010) Simmons, Roper v. 543 U.S. (quoting asserted The district court also treatment.” 551, 570, L.Ed.2d 125 S.Ct. society requires ... that safety of that “the (2005)). greater that There is a likelihood profes- a mental health he be treated first reformed. a child’s criminal character can be really right it and we can who has sional 2026-27, 176 at-, L.Ed.2d Id. 130 S.Ct. at of that. The second have no assurances Moreover, according to Dr. Bea at 840-43. actually takes medi- thing that he is case, report in this individuals ver’s they actually that that work and cations and mental illness tend to become less serious play with his medications. And I he doesn’t aggressive they age, especially as willing that I’m to trust that.” don’t know enter their thirties. say, gamble went on to “I cannot The court will be or that that Ethan Windom unreasonably that The district court held proper care.” These com- he will receive the rehabilitated, especial- Ethan could never be ments, with the overall tone of the combined ly light predict difficult it is to a of how ruling, that the court’s demonstrate district First, juvenile’s potential for reform. Ethan Eth- resolving uncertainties about court was accepted responsibility for his actions. He him, potential against an’s rehabilitative pled guilty second-degree murder. At to focus on while the correct standard is sentencing, acknowledged that he was proved the State he cannot be reha- whether ill, treatment, mentally that he needed bilitated. murder, and that he was accountable for the sorry he was for what he had done. applied the district court an incor-
Because standard, legal rect it abused its discretion. Second, overwhelming that the evidence is rehabilitated, Byington, See State v. someday safely Ethan could be (1999) (holding that arrest, Shortly in the future. after his Ethan legal apply must the correct district court placed permanent regimen of anti- on a standard). mentally ill sending A court a Ethan’s social worker medications. prison child for the rest of his life without improvement jail observed a marked parole a chance at should be more certain of symptoms following Ethan’s over the months decision. that, time, its Ethan and noted after short requesting
began reporting problems or
Applied
Legal
2. Because It
an Incorrect
necessary.
changes in his treatment when
Standard,
the District Court Did Not
arrested,
being
After
Ethan was examined
Concluding
Exercise Reason in
That
Craig
by Dr. Michael E. Estess and Dr.
W.
Ethan Could Never Be Rehabilitated
personally
Beaver. Dr. Estess
treated Eth-
and,
psychiatrist at the
By failing
the correct
as the in-house
legal
to follow
stan-
Jail,
dard,
unreasonably ignored
County
was disinterested in the
the district court
Ada
Similarly,
staggering body
showing
of evidence
outcome of Ethan’s sentence.
Beaver,
Dr.
is no reason to believe that
good
candidate for rehabilitation.
there
initially
regarding
psychologist
fixed
who was
chosen
Applying our well-settled law
trial,
sentences,
competency
Ethan’s
to stand
life
the court had to find
evaluate
any way. Both Dr. Es-
utterly
potential would be biased in
Ethan so
lacks rehabilitative
*10
prison
in
can rea-
Beaver stated that Ethan would
spent
that
a lifetime
tess and Dr.
Jackson,
good candidate for rehabilitation be-
sonably protect society.
be a
responded
antipsychotic
well to
Finding that a
cause he
at
ment, very good he does have a rehabilita- willingness all on comply reflect at his to potential. average He intelli- tion has with wrongly treatment. The district court gence, family support, and extensive does proof by finding inverted the burden of any significant drug not have or alcohol yet Ethan had not shown that could com- yet I do not abuse issues. see evidence ply receiving with treatment because he was any significant underlying personality dis- injections types rather than other of medi- appro- orders which would interfere with cation. adjustment, which priate includes mental care, if health he were to transition back thoroughly I am confident that life sen- community point into the at some lengthy with a necessary tence fixed term is distant future. here, point some deserves wholly agreed, opining
Dr. Estess that Ethan parole chance to demonstrate to the board “would be with treatment recom- rejoin society. that he fit is to If Ethan mendations whether incarcerated or whether proves incorrigible to be noncompliant or outpatient in a he was an more liberal set of treatment, certainly with the State should circumstances,” and even recom- social However, confine him for the rest of his life. parole probation any point mended “at or likely due to the fact that good Ethan is time.” rehabilitation, candidate for he should receive meaningful opportunity someday to demon- high degree there
The State contends
is a
parole
strate to the
that he can
board
certainty
that Ethan will never be rehabili-
—
Graham,
U.S.-,
safely released.
that, prior
sentencing,
tated.
It notes
to
Dr.
Cf
130 S.Ct. at
(requir-
The district court also noted that Ethan the board to and re- abusing antidepressants quiring supervise parolees). before the it to State law jail receiving thereby impor- murder and that he was entrusts the board with the injections antipsychotics, necessarily determining which tant task of “what is best for supervision pro- society parolee.” direct from medical and the involves rehabilitation of the fessionals, State, rather than a more informal form Heath v.
884 (1971). nature of the considerations “based on the The board of correction 79 state offense,” of a statement for which the Court evaluating only after may grant parole, but authority. legal circumstances, Appeals itself cited no personal which the offender’s 635, 638, (Ct.App. Idaho 759 P.2d psychologi- includes medical specifically 1988). court did not Because the district -223(e). 20-219, § The I.C. cal information. general mention deterrence in its able to better as- will be parole commission bench, only ruling from the I will focus on in his adulthood after decades sess Ethan whether an offender’s individual characteris- medical treatment than the observation relevant to retributive considerations tics are him as could when it sentenced district court sentencing. confi- teenager. This Court should have a carefully parole board will Majority’s approach dence that is The new retributive proper factors and arrive at a departure concepts consider these a direct from basic about retribution, in Ethan’s case. as it is a well-entrenched feature conclusion culpability of American law that moral varies Further, sentencing Ethan as there were severity individual “The with each offender. determining no mechanism for later whether punishment necessarily appropriate society permits he is safe to release back into depends culpability on the of the offender.” unnecessarily impose harsh sen- courts to 304, 319, 122 Virginia, Atkins v. 536 U.S. mag- holding The Court’s therefore tences. 2242, 2251, (2002); S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d by assuming nifies the district court’s error Arizona, 137, 149, Tison v. 481 U.S. see also may resolve uncertain- that the district court 1676, 1683, 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d against future Ethan. ties about distant (1987) (“The heart of the retribution ratio nale that a criminal must be sentence Its Discre- B. The District Court Abused directly personal culpability related Ethan, it Punished a Child tion when offender.”). every the criminal “Not offense Disorder, a with a Full with Mental category pun in a like calls for an identical Adult Sentence may properly be a variation ishment. There quarrel Majority I do not when it with offenders, in sentences as between different maximum asserts that a crime can merit the depending on the indi the circumstances of penalty simply egregious nature. based on its cases____” Small, vidual State v. Majority’s agree I cannot however with the 504, 506, 1336, 1338 690 P.2d A crime unprecedented holding the offender’s in- reprehensible poten is less therefore —and longer dividual characteristics are no rele- tially deserving less of severe retribution —if determining reprehensibility vant to of a personally mitigating the criminal cir has crime. I also cannot see how the district cases, death-penalty cumstances. Even in any finding court exercised reason requires jury judge weigh the law egregious enough Ethan’s offense was aggravating against mitigating factors ones prison merit the maximum sentence available appropriate to determine the sentence. See punish mentally adult. sound Payne, State v. (2008) 19-2515, § (citing stating I.C. 1. An Characteristics Are Rel- juries weighing process of Offender’s “conduct the Reprehensibility evant aggravating mitigating factors to deter Crime mine if sentenced to the defendant should be death”). Majority startling point creates a new law, stating, “The considerations of socie- Punishing part offenders based at least general tal retribution and deterrence are comports personal culpability on their unique not decided on the basis of the char- jus- justice. our natural sense of Retributive offender; acteristics rather these con- “pays” the defendant for tice ensures that “just siderations are decided the characteris- by getting his or des- the crime her (9th (emphasis original). Dictionary tics of the erts.” See Black’s Law offense” ed.2009) nonbinding (defining “just pun- The Court cites Court of deserts” as “the case, Eubank, Appeals propo- person having for the State v. ishment that a deserves crime”). necessarily in- sition and deterrence are committed a This that retribution
885
by
just
reprehensibility
the maximum authorized
law even
not
the
for a
volves
offense,
the offender has
but also whether
healthy
§
adult.
I.C.
18-4004. A maximum
any personal aggravating mitigating
or
char-
only
sentence should be reserved
for the
981,
State,
Taggart v.
957 So.2d
acteristics.
blameworthy
espe-
most
defendants. This is
(Miss.2007).
example,
shooting
For
994
cially
imposing
when
true
a fixed-life sen-
by
cognitively
mature adult of-
committed
by
tence. Because fixed-life sentences
their
greater
retribution than the
fender merits
very
presuppose
nature
that rehabilitation is
by
shooting
same
committed
an adult with
impossible, they
justified
can
where
five-year-old.
cognitive abilities of a
the offender’s conduct has been so horrific
authority
Majority
That the
cites no
to the
society’s
interest in deterrence and ret-
contrary
ubiquitous
how
further illustrates
govern
penalty.
ribution must
There are
principle
this
is.
why
two reasons
Ethan does not deserve the
pertinent
Most
to this case is the fact that
punishment
full adult
of a fixed-life sentence.
youth
offender’s
and an offender’s mental
First,
likely
would not have committed the
reprehensi
capacity are both relevant to how
paranoid schizophrenia,
offense but for his
below,
explained
ble a crime is. As
further
second,
sixteen-year-old
he was a
boy at
notably
capital-
most
this has surfaced
culpability
the time of the murder. The
of a
punishment jurisprudence,
principle
cases,
child who commits a crime
remains the same in all criminal
in
as a result of
cluding determinate-life
sentences.
See mental illness is “twice diminished” over that
(S.D.
Hinger, 600
548
State v.
N.W.2d
healthy
of a
adult.
one of
While
these fac-
1999)(stating that the “most severe” sanction
sentence,
might justify
tors alone
a fixed-life
imprisonment
of life
is reserved for “the
impose
a court should not
such a sentence on
most serious combinations of
offense and
acting voluntarily.
a child who is not
”
background
(emphasis
offender
added)).
held,
Supreme
The U.S.
Court has
culpability
a. Ethan’s
is diminished because
proportional
“Retribution is not
if the law’s
acting voluntarily
he was not
but rather
penalty
imposed
most severe
on one whose
diminished,
culpability
as a result of a
or blameworthiness is
disorder
degree, by
youth
a substantial
reason of
matter,
general
As a
defendants with di-
Simmons,
immaturity.” Roper
v.
capacity
minished mental
are less blamewor-
551, 571,
1183, 1196,
U.S.
125 S.Ct.
thy
people
cognitively
than
who are
intact.
(2005).
L.Ed.2d
The Court
has also
Court,
Supreme
example,
The U.S.
cate-
mentally
simply
found that the
retarded are
gorically
capable
committing
penalty
not
crimes that de
barred the death
for men-
serve the same level of retribution as those
tally
retarded individuals because
are
by fully mentally capable
committed
adults.
“engage
logical reasoning,”
less able to
Atkins,
317-19, 122
536 U.S. at
S.Ct. at
impulses.”
and to “control
Id. at
347-49;
Omoski,
v.
153 L.Ed.2d at
see Allen
2250-51,
S.Ct. at
Ethan
(emphasis
even
his homicidal
Supreme
The U.S.
thoughts
authority figures.
to
According
recently
to
juveniles
Court
stated that “because
School,
High
records from Borah
Ethan’s
culpability they
have lessened
are less de-
psychology teacher referred
serving
punishments.”
Ethan to school
of the most severe
—
Graham,
-,
openly
administrators when he
told his class
U.S.
130 S.Ct. at
“thoughts
had
committing
he
violent
psychiatric
review does not does it
permit) us to conduct our own evaluation of weight given to be each of the
considerations.” course,
Of the district court has wide dis- sentence, imposing
cretion in State v. Cal-
