122 N.W. 1111 | N.D. | 1909
Lead Opinion
This is an application for an original writ of certiorari on behalf of the state, the plaintiff, in State v. Duncan J. McGillisv On the return day both parties appeared by counsel, submitted their arguments, and stipulated that .the case might be disposed of on its merits on the moving papers of the Attorney General and the return of the respondent.
On June 1, 1909, the Attorney General filed an information in the district court of Burleigh county charging Duncan J. MeGillis with the crime of knowingly permitting a building owned by him to be used for the purpose of unlawful dealing in intoxicating liquors in violation of law. On the same day he pleaded not guilty to said information. On June 3d the state, by the Attorney General, filed in said district Court a motion for an order changing the place of trial of said action. The motion was based upon the affidavit of the Attorney General, which alleged, in substance that in his opinion the state could not have a fair and impartial trial in Burleigh county. Thait the people of said county were so prejudiced against the prosecution and conviction of offenders against the various statutes of this state prohibiting the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors and unlawful use of buildings for such purpose that said laws have ever since their enactment been openly and notoriously violated by numerous and divers persons in the City of Bismarck and various parts of the county with the knowledge and tacit approval of the people generally and of the peace officers,
There are two questions involved in this case: One, whether Sec. 9931 of the Revised Codes of 1905 is mandatory. Said section reads as follows: “The state’s attorney, on behalf of the state, may also apply in a similar manner for a removal of the action, and the court, being satisfied that it will promote the ends of justice, may order such removal upon the same terms and to the same extent as are provided in this article, and the proceedings on such removal shall be in all respects as above provided.” The other whether the facts presented show that the respondent abused his discretion in refusing to grant the motion for a change of the place of trial. We are convinced that Section 9931, supra, is not mandatory, and that the state is not as a matter of right entitled to a change of the place of trial in a criminal action. In State v. Kent, 4 N. D. 577, 62 N. W. 631, 27 L. R. A. 686, this court, speaking through Judge Corliss, says: “The question whether a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the action is triable must be settled by the judge. It must be made to appear to his satisfaction by affidavit that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in that county. Having no interest in the question,.the law very properly leaves it to him for a decision.” In this case, as in any other case before an appellate court, we cannot go outside of the record and assume the possible existance of other facts than those disclosed by the record in order to sustain or reverse the decision under review. The granting or denying of an application duly made for a change of the place of trial of an action on the ground that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending is a matter within the sound discretion of the court to which the application is made, and its ruling will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. Ross v. Hanchett, 52 Wis. 491, 9 N. W. 624; Giese v. Schultz, 60 Wis. 449, 19 N. W. 447; State v. Hall, 16 S. D. 6, 91 N. W. 325, 65 L. R. A. 151; Territory v. Egan, 3 Dak. 119, 13 N. W. 568; People v Webb, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 179; People v. Baker, 3 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 42; Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220; Com
In People v. Baker, supra, the court says: “There are many palpable reasons why tiñáis in criminal cases should ordinarily be had in the counties where the transactions which gave rise to them occurred, and a change should not be made except for forcible and clearly established causes.” In People v. Peterson, supra, the court says: “It cannot be said but that the question rested within the sound discretion of the trial court to judge and determine the sufficiency of this showing for a change of venue.” The Attorney General made a very strong showing in behalf of the state, yet we cannot say, after a careful review of his affidavit and the return of the respondent, that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion of the state to change the place of trial.
The fact that the defendant, as sheriff, by himself and his deputies, subpoenaed the jury, might be sufficient cause for a challenge to the panel, but is not cause for a change of venue. It follows, therefore, that the application for the writ must be denied and the temporary restraining order dissolved, and it is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). On a somewhat superficial examination of the record and the questions involved' in this application, I was disposed to concur in the majority opinion, but, after giving it more careful attention, I am unable to do so. The record before us contains in full the motion papers, including the affidavit supporting the application of the Attorney .General for a change of the place of trial used in the district court, and it is conceded in the majority opinion that that official made a strong case. It is at least customary to include in or annex to the return a copy of the record made in the lower court. This was not done in this instance. It is unnecessary to consider whether the omission in itself is fatal to the respondent’s case, because it was stipulated on the hearing in this court that we might consider and decide the application for the writ upon the papers before us. The original record, including the affidavits submitted to the district court by the respondent, cannot be considered, because, as indicated, they are not
The order denying .the application of the Attorney General recites that it was entered upon the affidavits of Andrew Miller on behalf of the state, and those of McGillis, Patterson and Dullum, on behalf of the defendant, and malees no reference to the court having considered any other evidence or facts. The return is most carefully and ingeniously drawn, and is in the nature of a special plea. The quotations from the affidavits submitted by the defense in a very large degree evade the issue. As I have previously indicated, they are largely devoted to allegations that the parties named have not at all times for many years been engaged in violations of the law, or that their influence is not the leading influence in the
A statement in the paragraph of the return not heretofore referred to and not mentioned in the majority opinion requires notice. I quote: “That respondents are fully convinced and believe from their observation and knowledge of the situation existing in Burleigh county, N. D., wherein said action of the State of North Dakota v. Duncan McGillis is now pending, that both parties thereto may and will have a fair and impartial trial before the average jury that would be procured in such county.” It is apparent that this statement is intended to bolster up and strengthen the conclusion of the district judge and the order denying the application for a change of the place of trial. It indicates that in reaching his
In conclusion I am satisfied that, if the writ carrying the change should only be granted on an abuse of discretion being shown, the return is inadequate and fails to meet the showing made by the Attorney General on behalf of the state, and that, in any event, on the application of the Attorney General and a case being made, the change should be granted as of course.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The application presented by this case is that this court issue “a supervisory writ requiring the district court of Burleigh county and Honorable W. H. Winchester, as the judge thereof, to certify to this court the records, files, and proceedings in a certain criminal action entitled the State of North Dakota v. Duncan J. McGillis, to the end that said records, files, and proceedings may be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and justice may be done in the premises.” In response to an order to show cause issued from this court the respondents filed a return in which, after a lengthy showing directed entirely to the end that the Attorney General is not entitled to the writ applied for, they “protest that they shall not be required to transmit to this court, or be commanded to do so, all the pleadings, orders, affidavits and records in said action of the State of North Dakota v. Duncan J. McGillis and all the records of proceedings had in the said criminal action, or any of them, and ask thafi said application therefor be disallowed and dismissed.”
In my view the only point presented to this court for decision is that of whether or not upon the application and showing made by the Attorney General the writ of certiorari should issue. The Attorney General does not make specific application for this writ; but it is apparent from his moving papers that the writ of certiorari is the only supervisory writ under which he oan receive any relief
The majority opinion seems to proceed on the theory that an oral stipulation of counsel made on the hearing to the effect that the proceeding may be disposed of on its merits on the showing made dispenses with the necessity for the writ. This stipulation can-have the effect of waiving the writ provided only that it appears the full purpose of the writ is accomplished by the return. It is apparent at a glance that such is not the case. Fragmentary excerpts from the record that was before the district court, together with the 'conclusions of persons interested in the outcome of this proceeding as to what the record contains and the legal construction to be placed on the statutes involved, cannot be said to bring before this court the evidential facts on which the district court acted. Yet the return contains only this as appears from the opinion of judge Spalding.
I regard it as a matter of the highest importance that this •court in deciding any of the very important questions presented upon this proceeding should -have before it the entire record acted upon by the judge of the district court. Further than this, I .believe that without such record this court is without jurisdiction to make any order in any manner affecting the ruling of the judge of the district court, whether he has regularly pursued the authority of such court or not. I can think of no reason deserving of the slightest weight why questions affecting the sovereignty of the state should be disposed of upon an incomplete, mutilated or imperfect record when this court has full power by . the issuance of a prerogative writ to bring the entire record before it.
So far as the question may be properly considered, as to whether or not a judge of the district court is vested with a discretion authorizing him to deny a change of venue in a criminal case when application is made therefor by the Attorney General, as is shown to have been made in this case, I fully concur in the conclusions reached by Judge Spalding. If such discretion is conceded to exist, however, upon the question of whether or not the district court abused its discretion in denying a change of the place of trial in the case of State v. McGillis, I am of the opinion that this court is precluded from taking any action whatever by reason of the fact that it has not before it the showing made to the district court. The application of the Attorney General upon its face discloses a state of facts which unquestionably authorizes this court to issue a writ that will enable it to fully review these interesting and important questions, and in my opinion the writ of certiorari should issue.
NOTE.
Affidavit for change of venue must state facts not conclusions. Ter. v. Egan, 3 Dak. 119, 13 N. W. 568; State v. Chapman, 1 S. D. 418, 47 N. W. 411; see also State v. Palmer, 4 S. D. 546, 57 N. W. 490. A trial does not begin until a jury is impanneled; and a change of venue may be had at any time before then. State v. Kent, 5 N. D. 516, 67 N. W. 1052. Relying on verbal promise of attorney, and allowing time to answer to expiré, precludes change of venue, 8 S. D. 11, 65 N. W. 34. Change of venue in civil action for convenience of witnesses, may be granted on application of one co-defendant the other not objecting. Fletcher v. Church, 11 S. D. 537, 78 N. W. 947. See also Small v. Gilruth, 8 S. D. 287, 66 N. W. 452. Need not send to adjoining county whose courthouse is nearest. Waldron v. Evans, 1 Dak. 11, 46 N. W. 607. Judge not limited to adjoining counties. Murphy v. District Court, 14 N. D. 542, 105 N. W. 738. Duty of selecting place of trial is with the judge in the exercise of a sound discretion. Murphy v. District Court, 14 N. D. 542, 105 N. W. 728; Zinn v. District Court, 17 N. D. 135, 114 N. W. 472. Where discretion is vested in the trial judge his act will be reviewed only for abuse, Murphy v. District Court 14 N. D. 542, 105 N. W. 728. Order for change of venue is appealable. Robertson Lumber Co.