State v. WilsonState v. Wilson
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Colvin Justice., Boggs, Warren
The State appeals from the grant of defendant Roceam Wilson‘s motion to suppress.1 The State contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the search warrant issued for Wilson‘s cell phones was overbroad and authorized a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In reviewing the trial court‘s grant of the motion to suppress, “we apply the well-established principles that the trial court‘s findings as to disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous and the trial court‘s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 78 (673 SE2d 237) (2009)
The record shows that, on January 28, 2021, Bradly Jordan was shot and killed while performing pest control services at an apartment complex. After conducting an investigation at the crime scene, officers determined that the shooter was a “black male” driving a teal green “[1990]s model Ford Aerostar van” with a missing hubcap. Utilizing a license plate tracking system, officers located a van matching this description a few miles from the incident location. Wilson was listed as the registered owner of the vehicle. Officers conducted a traffic stop on the Ford Aerostar and spoke with Wilson, who was in the driver‘s seat. After answering some questions, Wilson was arrested and officers impounded his vehicle, which was later searched pursuant to a warrant. During that search, officers located, among other things, two cell phones, both of which belonged to Wilson.
One of the lead investigators subsequently sought a second search warrant “for a forensic examination” of the cell phones. The
The magistrate subsequently issued a warrant that authorized a forensic search of Wilson‘s cell phones “to be completed in order to obtain any and all stored electronic information, including but not limited to; user account information, stored phone informаtion, images, text messages, videos, documents, e-mails, internet activity, call logs, contact information, phone information, or any deleted data.” The warrant further included preprinted form language stating that “[t]he foregoing described property, items, articles, instruments, and person(s) to be searched for and seized constitute evidence connected with the foregoing listed crime(s)2 and is/are: (check all that are applicable) (
Wilson challenged the validity of the cell phone seаrch warrant in a pretrial motion to suppress. After a hearing, the trial court granted Wilson‘s motion, finding that the search warrant was “overly broad and authorized a general search of [Wilson‘s] personal effects without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution “require[s] that a search warrant particularly describe the article or articles sought.” Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 164 (3) (415 SE2d 168) (1992) (citations omitted). In addition to requiring that officers have enough guidance to locate and seize only those items the wаrrant authorizes them to seize, see Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 170 (3) (a) (664 SE2d 227) (2008), this particularity requirement also prevents general searches—that “general, exploratory rummaging in a person‘s belongings” by the government that has been rejected since the founding as a violation of “fundamental rights.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (II) (C) (91 SCt 2022, 29 LE2d 564) (1971), holding modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (110 SCt 2301, 110 LE2d 112) (1990); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1) (48 SCt 74, 72 LE 231) (1927) (“General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It is plain that
While the State concedes thаt the warrant “broadly target[s] the data” in Wilson‘s cell phones, the State argues that, when read as a whole, the warrant sufficiently limits the search of the phones to evidence connected with the crimes. We disagree. As the State
The State also contends that the evidence obtained from Wilson‘s cell phones is admissible under the Davis4 good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This good-faith exception applies to “searches conducted [by police officers] in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that is later overruled.” Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 400 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). The State asserts that the search here was lawful under current Georgia precedent, and that if we conclude otherwise, we would be “revising” our precedent. However, the State incorrectly assumes that this Court must overrule Georgia precedent in order to affirm the trial court‘s order. As shown above, well-established legal precedent supports our conclusion that the trial court properly suppressed the cell phone
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J., who concurs in judgment only.
I fully agree that the trial court correctly suppressed evidence derived from the general warrants issued in this case. I write separately to highlight that our cases involving so-called “residual clauses” (i.e., boilerplate language purporting to limit officers to searching and seizing “other items related to the crime [at issue],” Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 185 (2) (d) (664 SE2d 211) (2009)), may be unduly complicating the issue.
“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person‘s belongings. The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (96 SCt 2737, 49 LE2d 627) (1976) (cleaned up) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (91 SCt 2022, 29 LE2d 564) (1971)). In practice, that requirement means that the warrant allows the officer to identify the object of the search or seizure “definitely and with reasonable certainty.” Hourin v. State, 301 Ga. 835, 844 (3) (b) (804 SE2d 388)
But a general, catch-all phrase (a “residual clause“) in the description of places to be searched or things to be seized does not necessarily invalidate an otherwise proper warrant. In Andresen, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that warrants that were otherwise “models of particularity . . . were rendered fatally ‘general’ by the addition . . . of the phrase ‘together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this (time) unknown.‘” 427 U.S. at 480. The petitioner argued that this clause, read in isolation, permitted the search for and seizure of any evidence of any crime. See id. at 479. But the Court read the phrase in context, explaining that “the challenged phrase” — that is, the residual clause — “must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to the crime of false pretenses [alleged in that case].” Id. at 480 (internаl quotation marks omitted). “The warrants, accordingly, did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search
For a time, we correctly applied that holding. See Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 21 (19) (b) (560 SE2d 663) (2002) (the warrant was sufficiently particularized despite using the phrase “‘any other fruits of the crime of murder‘” where those words were preceded by a list of specified items, because “the quoted phrase [was best] understood as limiting the search to items . . . reasonably appearing to be connected to the specific crime delineated in the warrant” and “the nature of the probable evidence“), disapproved on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 706 n.3 (11) (a) (820 SE2d 640) (2018)); Reaves, 284 Ga. at 184-88 (2) (d) (four search warrants specifying certain items followed by different residual clauses covering “‘any other item of evidence,” “any оther item of evidentiary value,” and “any trace evidence” that would show that the named crime had been committed were not impermissible general warrants, and so
But in the last few years, our cases have begun to suggest that an otherwise general warrant might be made particularized by a residual clause. In Rickman v. State, 309 Ga. 38, 42 (2) (842 SE2d 289) (2020), for example, we cited Reaves (our seminal residual clause case) for the proposition that “warrants containing residual clauses limiting the items to be seized to those relevant to the crimes identified are sufficiently particular and do not authorize a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” But when we applied that principle to the faсts in that case, we held that “the warrants [there], read as a whole,” sufficiently “limited the search of the contents of Rickman‘s cell phones to items reasonably appearing to be connected to [the victim‘s] murder.” Id. In other words, we seemed to suggest that the residual clause of the warrant (covering “any
I joined each of these decisions. But upon further consideration, I am concerned that we may have mistaken the import of the relevant principles.
First, the Supreme Court in Andresen held only that an otherwise particularized warrant was not made unconstitutionally general by the presence of residual language — instead, the residual clause had to be read in the light of the language before it. 427 U.S. at 480-482. But the inverse does not follow; the logic of Andresen
And second, we appear to have lost sight of the fact that the
The warrants in Andresen and Reaves, by contrast, featured catch-all language, not a modifying clause. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (“together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this (time) unknown“); Reaves, 284 Ga. at 185 (residual clause covering “‘any other item(s) that tend to lead to probable cause that [a particular] crime has been committed‘“). So it is a different matter to say that the search warrants in cases like Palmer are not “general” because they “list[] classes of items that, as a practical matter, were likely to be found relevant to the shooting . . . and the removal of [the victim‘s body] to the location where it was found.” 310 Ga. at 675 (2) (c). In that context, a phrase like “[items] which are being possessed in Violation of Georgia Law(s)” actually does modify (and perhaps in some marginal sense could limit) the
Our “residual clause” cases, in short, have started to suggest a different proposition than the prinсiple upon which they are based, and applied it to a broader spectrum of language than the principle covers. The Court today properly rejects the State‘s bid to save the warrants here by reference to pre-printed language only distantly resembling a residual clause. But in an appropriate case, we may need to reconsider some of our related precedent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Justice Warren, Justice Bethel, Justice Colvin, and Justice Pinson join in this concurrence.
In Riley, the United States Supreme Court provided clear guidance: “Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (IV). Warrants, of course, require probable cause. See id. at 381 (quoting
I am quite skeptical that the warrant in this case contained sufficient probable cause because it merely stated that a suspect had been arrested, a cell phone was discovered in his vehicle, and in the law enforcement officer‘s general “knowledge, training, and experience investigating violent crimes and homicides, [he was]
We need to talk about cell phones.
In Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (134 SCt 2473, 189 LE2d 430) (2014), the United States Supreme Court took a small step down the road of applying the Fourth Amendment to the modern cell phone. Riley addressed the question whether the police could, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from someone who‘d been arrested. The answer was no: to search a cell phone incident to arrest, you generally need to “get a warrant.” Id. at 403. That holding was important on its own, and it gave needed guidance to both law enforcement and courts. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785 (723 SE2d 924) (2012) (pre-Riley, holding that police could search a cell phone incident to an arrest without a warrant), abrogated by Riley, 573 U.S. 373.
But there is more to Riley. Along the way to its straightforward holding, Riley addressed the nature of modern cell phones and how to view them for purposes of applying the Fourth Amendment. This reasoning was central to Riley‘s holding, and it demands careful
Before Riley, courts (including ours) often applied the Fourth Amendment to cell phones as if they were little different from articles or containers found on or near someone‘s person. See, e.g., Hawkins, 290 Ga. 785; United States v. Finley, 477 F3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Riley, 573 U.S. 373; United States v. Deans, 549 FSupp.2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008), overruled by Riley, 573 U.S. 373. That was why courts would conclude that police could search them withоut a warrant if they were seized incident to an arrest: United States Supreme Court precedent had long allowed such warrantless searches of personal property—like clothes, cigarette packs, wallets, and purses—found on or near an arrestee. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (94 SCt 467, 38 LEd2d 427) (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (89 SCt 2034, 23 LE2d 685) (1969).
Riley rejected this understanding of cell phones. Indeed, the Riley Court supposed treating cell phones like other physical items
Based on all of this, the Court reasoned that the “consequences for privacy” of searching a cell phone are substantial. Unlike a search of a wallet or purse or cigarette pack, searching a cell phone
In light of these unique characteristics of modern cell phones and their “consequences for privacy,” the Court held that police generally need to “get a warrant” to search one. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394, 403. But it is pretty hard to read all of the reasons Riley gave for this holding and come away thinking that the rest of the Fourth Amendment is business as usual when it comes to cell phones. Again, the big premise of Riley was that searching a cell phone is not much at all like searching a pocket or a purse. “Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.” Id. at 396-397 (emphasis added). And as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment “was the founding generation‘s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 403. The issue is apparent. If a cell phоne is a handheld “house” and may hold the sum total of one‘s private “papers” and “effects,” then a search of that device or a seizure of its contents that lacks appropriate restraints
Take the search warrant in this case. As far as I can tell, that warrant allowed the search and seizure of the data from two cell phones on the theory that (1) they were found in the suspect‘s van, and (2) criminals commonly use cell phones to talk about crimes. And the scope of the authorized search and seizure looks unlimited: police could search and seize the entire contents of the phones, with no apparent restrictions on the type or category of data or information that could be seized, or on how any of that data or information could be used. A warrant supрorted by such generic “probable cause” to search someone‘s house and seize the entirety of its contents, with no restrictions on their use, would never fly. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 301 Ga. 617, 619-620 & n.3 (2) (800 SE2d 537) (2017) (warrant that named house and cars to be searched but did not specify items or evidence sought violated particularity requirement); United States v. Travers, 233 F3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (warrant that authorized seizure of all “material reflecting identity” and “anything reflecting potential fraud” violated particularity requirement); State v. Rothman, 779 P2d 1, 3, 9, 10-11 (Haw. 1989) (holding that warrant that authorized the seizure of all items in a home that related to the defendant‘s financials or that tended to show his identity violated particularity requirement and explaining, “If the authorities have only to say ‘I have reason to believe that X has committed a crime based on what Y has told me’ to get authorization to search X‘s home for anything and everything X possesses, then no one‘s papers or possessions are safe“). Yet I suspeсt that such warrants for cell-phone data remain all too common, even in Riley‘s wake.
Of course, part of the reason for that is Riley itself. Riley‘s “get a warrant” holding was more or less a mic drop, and the Court has
Today‘s decision is a start. The Court holds that a warrant to search and seize “any and all” data stored on a cell phone, not even limited to evidence of the crime at issue, with no specificity about how any of the data could be used, violatеs the Fourth Amendment‘s
But there are plenty more questions where that one came from. Stay with particularity for a moment. Some of this Court‘s post-Riley decisions have concluded that warrants with similarly broad
Then there‘s probable cause. I would not be surprised if many warrants to search cell phones are based on a set of facts much like the one here: the police have enough evidence to suspect someone of a crime; they know that person has a cell phone, or they find one in his vicinity or possession; and an officer avers that based on her training and experience, criminals commonly use cell phones to plan or talk about crimes. On its face, it is not crazy to think that a warrant application along these lines could support probable cause. The probable-cause question is a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the magistrate], there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 29-30 (4) (c) (880 SE2d 158) (2022). If the evidence in a given case is good enough to suspect someone of a crime, it may
And yet it is not so easy to square that permissive view of probable cause for cell-phone search warrants with Riley. First return to the cell-phones-as-houses analogy: An officer might also reasonably say that in her experience, criminals often store evidence of their crimes—cash, weapons, drug paraphernalia, аnd more—where they live. Yet “[p]robable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kline, 335 A2d 361, 364 (Pa. Super. 1975). See also Banks v. State, 277 Ga. 543, 546-47 (2) (592 SE2d 668) (2004) (evidence implicating defendant in drug dealing was not sufficient to establish probable
If not—if this generic “criminals use cell phones, too” logic is enough for probable cause to get a warrant to search a suspect‘s cell phone—it is hard to imagine a case in which police cannot get that warrant. As Riley reasoned in declining to apply the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, “[i]t would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 399. But if that‘s enough for probable cause, it would make Riley little more than a paperwork requirement. Maybe, but I am not so sure that Riley‘s holding is so “hollow.” United States v. Morton, 46 F4th 331, 340 (5th Cir. 2022) (Higginson, J., concurring in judgment)
And what about the “plain view” exception? When an officer executing an otherwise valid search warrant finds in plain view incriminating evidence that is outside the scope of the warrant, this exception says he may still seize the evidence without a warrant and use it even to investigate and prosecute other crimes.11 See, e.g., George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, 804-805 (865 SE2d 127) (2021) (explaining that a police officer may seize evidence outside the scope of a search warrant if the evidence is in plain view, the officer has not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from
With these things in mind, I concur in the majority‘s opinion. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs and Justice Warren join in this concurrence.