1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 19 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1961
These cases are being considered together because they involve identical issues. Each defendant is engaged in the business of servicing television sets. Each defendant has been charged with obtaining money by false pretenses in violation of General Statutes § 53-360, and specifically with charging and receiving payment for television repairs not actually performed or needed.
The defendants were arraigned before the Circuit Court in the fifteenth circuit, sitting in New Britain. After separate hearings, the trial court
The right of appeal is entirely statutory. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Brush, 138 Conn. 370, 372. Hence, this appeal is governed by General Statutes § 51-265, which sets forth the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as follows: “Appeals from any final judgment or action of the circuit court, except small claims matters, which are not appealable, shall be taken to an appellate session of such court within fourteen days after the entry of judgment or of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, whichever is later, and shall be by way of review of errors of law. . . .” In construing this statute, we first hold that the word “final” applies not only to “judgment” but also to “action,” in the phrase “any final judgment or action.” In so holding, we follow Waterbury Blank Book Mfg. Co. v. Hurlburt, 73 Conn. 715, 717, wherein an appeals statute read in part “from all final judgments or decrees,” and the court held that “the judgment or decree in such proceeding must be ‘final.’ ” The fundamental issue, therefore, is whether a finding of probable cause, with subsequent bind-over, constitutes a “final judgment” or “final action” of the Circuit Court.
To resolve this issue, we must first inquire into the legal significance of a hearing in probable cause. Our Supreme Court of Errors has considered the nature of hearings in probable cause on several
From these authorities, the conclusion follows that, in making a finding of probable cause, the court decides only that there is some evidence to support the allegations of the information. When,
Section 51-265 differs from the section concerning appeals to the Supreme Court of Errors (§ 52-263) in that § 51-265 uses the phrase “final judgment or action,” whereas § 52-263 uses only the phrase “final judgment.” The General Assembly undoubtedly used the words “final judgment or action” to establish that, in the Circuit Court, the right to appeal extends (a) to orders and rulings that, technically, are judgments, and (b) to orders and rulings that have the force and effect of a judgment even though they are not, technically, judgments. Although orders or rulings of the latter type have been classified as “final judgments” for the purpose of determining whether an appeal lies from them to the Supreme Court of Errors (Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 14), the use of the additional word “action” makes it clear beyond challenge that Circuit Court “final” orders and rulings are subject to appeal even if they fall outside the conventional scope of the word “judgment.”
Because the trial court’s order binding over these defendants is not “final,” it is immaterial whether we classify the order as a “judgment” of the Circuit Court or as “action” of the Circuit Court. The order is neither a “final judgment” nor a “final action.” It follows, therefore, that no appeal lies from the order binding over the accused. “Where there is no judgment or ruling from which an ap
The appeal is dismissed.