State v. . WilsonState v. . Wilson
“I have known the prisoner ever since I could recollect; think he knew right from wrong when he killed Edge, and always did when I was with him.”
On cross-examination witness said: “I heard no disturbance between prisoner and deceased that day; prisoner did not seem to be mad when he came down toward the turkey, but did seem to be mad when he told deceased not to go to the turkey. The prisoner was pretty drunk. I have seen him drunk a great many times before and seen him cut up when drunk.”
Another witness, after testifying to substantially the same facts, said: “I saw the prisoner before the homicide drink something from a bottle. He seemed to be drunk. I have seen him drunk a few times, and when drunk he generally cuts up, talks loud and sems [seems] to be overbearing. He was hollering and cursing the day of the homicide. I have known him ever since I can recollect. I think at the time of the homicide he knew right from wrong.”
There was much testimony introduced, pro and con, touching the defendant‘s sanity. It appeared that some time prior to the homicide he had received a blow upon the head which had for a considerable time thereafter seriously affected the brain; that when sober he was rational and knew right from wrong, but was easily excited by liquor, and (871) that several of his near relatives were persons of unsound mind.
The counsel for the prisoner submitted in writing to his Honor the following questions for the jury, to wit:
“If the defendant drew his pistol and presented it, not intending to shoot the deceased, but to drive him away by a show of force, and by the careless and negligent handling of the pistol by the defendant it accidently [accidentally] fired and killed the deceased it is but manslaughter; and in investigating this case the jury must consider the want of provocation, the absence of malice, the friendly relations of the defendant and the deceased immediately preceding the act, and the mental and physical condition of the defendant at the time; and while drunkenness is no mitigation for crime, it may be taken into consideration by the jury in this
His Honor declined to give these instructions, but among many other things not excepted to he told the jury that if they believed from the testimony in the case that the prisoner slew the deceased in the manner, with the weapon and under the circumstances testified to by the State‘s witnesses, then there was no evidence for them to consider of an accidental killing, nor was there any evidence before them of any justification or excuse for the killing, and they should find the prisoner guilty of murder or nothing, according as they should find other facts, about which he should afterwards instruct them.
He further told the jury “drunkenness was no excuse or mitigation of crime, though insanity or unsoundness of mind, produced as the secondary effect of long and continued or excessive drinking of spirituous liquors, was, if it so deprived a man of reason that he could not perceive the moral qualities of actions or tell right from wrong, a complete excuse for anything he did, the same as if it had been produced by any other cause or come from the visitation of God. And, (872) further, that if the prisoner was so mentally and physically constituted by nature, or became so constituted by a blow or blows rendered on the head several years before the homicide, that when he drank liquor he lost his reason and became furious and unable to control himself, and knowing this voluntarily drank liquor at the time of the homicide, and by the immediate effects of the liquor became frantic, even to the extent that for the time being he did not know right from wrong, and in this condition slew the deceased without justification or excuse, he would be guilty of murder, and they should so find; but if they found that at the time of the homicide the prisoner, by reason of blows received on the head years before, or from the remote and secondary effects of excessive drinking, or by a hereditary taint, or the visitation of God, was so far of unsound mind that he could not judge of the moral quality of the act which he did, or know whether it was right or wrong, then they should acquit the prisoner.
There was a verdict of guilty of murder, and from the judgment pronounced thereon the defendant appealed. The court very properly declined to give the jury special instructions prayed for by the prisoner, because there was no evidence produced on the trial tending to prove that he slew the deceased by accident, nor was there evidence in any aspect of it that could
The court should never give the jury instructions based upon a state of facts not presented by some reasonable view of the evidence produced on the trial, nor upon a supposed state of facts. Such instructions are not pertinent, and they generally tend to mislead or confuse the jury, more or less. The jury should see the issues, stripped of all redundant and confusing matters, and in as clear a light as practicable. If such impertinent instructions should prejudice the prisoner he would be entitled to a new trial; if they should prejudice the prosecution, there would be no remedy. S. v. Collins, 30 N.C. 407; S. v. Lambert, 93 N.C. 618.
The evidence tended thoroughly to prove that the prisoner was not an insane person, and particularly that he was not insane at the time he slew the deceased, but the court gave him the full benefit of the evidence offered and received, tending — not strongly — to prove insanity. The instructions given the jury in this aspect of the case were very favorable to the prisoner — certainly they were not such as he could justly complain of. Drunkenness and mere drunken excitement and rage constitute no excuse for crime. S. v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457.
Cited: S. v. Kale, 124 N.C. 819; S. v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 617; Irvinv. R. R., 164 N.C. 18.