State v. WilsonState v. Wilson
In each of these cases, the trial court ordered the prosecutor to produce a key State witness for a pretrial interview with the defense. Despite each prosecutor‘s best efforts, neither was able to do so before the court-imposed deadline and the trial judge dismissed each case pursuant to
FACTS
Wilson/Irons. On March 14, 2000, three high school boys, including Jacob Paul, were smoking in the woods behind their school when three men approached. One man allegedly separated Paul from the group and forced him to surrender $20 by holding a hard object, which he claimed to be a gun, to the side of Paul‘s head. The remaining men searched the other boys’ pockets. As the boys left the scene, the men threatened to shoot them if they told anyone about the incident. Paul later identified Ricky Ray Wilson and Rhett Butler Irons from photo montages. Wilson was charged with robbery in the second degree while Irons was charged with attempted robbery in the second degree.
At an omnibus hearing on May 12, 2000, the State reported that the victims’ parents were resisting pretrial interviews, but to date all interviews had been scheduled. On May 18, the defense moved to dismiss, complaining that Paul remained uncooperative and arguing that Wilson was now forced to choose between his speedy trial rights and the right to have adequately prepared counsel. Irons also joined the motion, but his speedy trial expiration would not occur for an additional 30 days because he was not in custody while awaiting trial.
The State explained that Paul‘s mother had refused access to her son, despite several attempts to convince her to allow an interview. A detective had been assigned to visit the Paul family but had not yet reported back. The judge denied the motion to dismiss but set an interview deadline at the close of business on May 22 and agreed to revisit the issue at the time of trial.1
At a May 24 hearing,2 the State conceded that no interview had been accomplished, but offered to issue a material witness warrant. When asked why such a warrant had not been sought earlier, the prosecutor stated that his supervisor had just approved this course of action. The State also suggested releasing Wilson, adding time to his speedy trial clock and giving the State more time to convince the Paul family to consent to the interview. Noting that the prosecutor had
The prosecutor and a police officer managed to track down Paul at 12:45 p.m. Paul was home alone and insisted that the interview occur there. The prosecutor called the defense attorneys on their cell phones at 1:00 p.m. He requested that they travel to Paul‘s home in Shoreline or conduct the interview by phone. Both declined.
At the 1:30 p.m. hearing, the State argued that it had produced the witness. The defense moved to dismiss, explaining that an inperson interview was important3 and one could not drive to Shoreline, conduct an interview, and return to Seattle in the available 45 minutes. Although the defense did not blame the prosecutor, the witness had impeded the investigation from the beginning. In response, the State explained that Paul had been under the misapprehension that the defendants would be present at the interview and he was afraid to attend an interview outside of his home. The State asserted that other alternatives could have been arranged.
The judge dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to
The State appealed and Division One of the Court of Appeals reversed. State v. Wilson, 108 Wash.App. 774, 31 P.3d 43 (2001). The court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss based on “the prosecutor‘s failure to fulfill [a] promise to assist defense counsel with discovery, the trial court should consider whether the ... failure ... is excusable, and whether [he] could have legally compelled or accomplished the act.” Id. at 779, 31 P.3d 43. The court reasoned that the State could not compel the witness to talk to anyone outside of court and the prosecutor here had taken reasonable steps to arrange the interview before and after the court ordered him to do so. Id. at 779-80, 31 P.3d 43. Finally, defense counsels’ refusal to conduct the interview on May 24 was unreasonable because a slight delay in the afternoon hearing would have been immaterial and, in light of the short deadline, the defense should have been ready to interview Paul at a moment‘s notice. Id. at 780, 31 P.3d 43. Therefore, even though the State had agreed to arrange the interview, its failure was not due to misconduct; instead the fault rested with the witness. Id. at 780-81, 31 P.3d 43.
Taylor. Demetrius Taylor was charged with theft in the second degree for shoplifting 14 rings and 18 bracelets from a Nordstrom store. Shawn Seise, a store loss prevention agent, witnessed the crime.
In October 2000, defense investigator Cooper contacted Seise by phone and Seise left a message in return. Apparently, Cooper did not return Seise‘s call until January when she left three messages for Seise from January 10 to 19, 2001.4 On February 9, the defense first informed the State that it was having difficulty contacting Seise. That day, the prosecutor left a message instructing Seise to contact Cooper. On February 13, Cooper again left a message for Seise. On February 20, the State was notified on the record that Seise had not yet been interviewed. The prosecutor explained that Seise
On February 23, the prosecutor left another message for Seise and assigned a detective to visit him while she was on vacation. During the week of February 26, the detective attempted to contact Seise several times. On February 27, Seise left a message for the prosecutor, indicating that he would call Cooper. He also left a message for Cooper on February 27 or 28. On February 28, the Nisqually earthquake occurred and the courthouse was closed until March 3. On March 5 the prosecutor returned from vacation and left a message for Seise. On March 6 she received a return call from Seise but did not speak with him. That afternoon, the defense advised the prosecutor that Seise had not contacted them. When the prosecutor got in touch with Seise, he reported that he had indeed left a message for Cooper the previous week. He had also called Cooper but had gotten only voice mail on March 6. Cooper stated that she received messages from Seise on February 28 and March 6 at 5:00 p.m.
On March 7, the date of speedy trial expiration, the defense moved to dismiss. The State reported that Seise was taking a final exam that morning but he would be at the courthouse, available for interview, at 2:00 p.m. The court held the matter over until 1:30 p.m., but then dismissed. The judge relied on the extent of the difficulties experienced and the missed deadline of March 2, but expressed no finding of prejudice. Seise was indeed present at the prosecutor‘s office for interview at 2:00 p.m.
The State appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, Division One of the Court of Appeals reversed because Seise‘s conduct could not be attributed to the State, the State had acted with due diligence, and the defense had failed to establish misconduct. State v. Taylor, No. 48522-9-1, noted at 111 Wash.App. 1039, 2002 WL 974640, at *3-4 (2002). Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it dismissed the case. Id. at *3.
ISSUE
Was the trial court‘s dismissal in each case proper under
ANALYSIS
At issue is whether the trial court in each case abused its discretion when it found that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to produce the witness for pretrial interview.
The court, in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused‘s right to a fair trial. The court shall set forth its reasons in a written order.5
To support
First, we must determine whether the prosecutors in theses cases committed
In 1990, Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court‘s finding of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Sherman, 59 Wash.App. 763, 801 P.2d 274 (1990). The Sherman court found that the State had agreed to undertake production of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records of one of its witnesses, as reflected on the omnibus order, but the State failed to produce the records by the court-imposed deadline even though the State was given several weeks to comply. Id. at 765-66, 768, 801 P.2d 274. Although the records were not in the State‘s possession, they were available to the State‘s chief witness, who failed to find them in his files. Id. at 769, 801 P.2d 274. The State did not follow up to ensure that the records would be available in time for trial and copies were not requested from IRS until long after the court-imposed deadline. Id. Furthermore, the State waited until after the trial date to seek reconsideration of the order obligating it to produce the records in the first place. Id. at 768, 801 P.2d 274. The Sherman court held that such mismanagement amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.6 Id.
In contrast, in Blackwell, this court held that a prosecutor‘s failure to produce personnel records did not amount to misconduct, In that case, the trial court ordered the State to produce the service records and personnel files of two Tacoma police officers. 120 Wash.2d at 825, 845 P.2d 1017. The State objected, arguing that “the prosecutor did not have access to or control over the documents,” and the City Attorney‘s office had already denied access to the records. Id. This court held that the prosecutor had acted reasonably: he attempted to obtain the records, advised both the court and defense counsel of his efforts, and suggested that the court issue a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 825, 832, 845 P.2d 1017. Thus, “[t]here was no showing of `game playing‘, mismanagement, or other governmental misconduct on he part of the State that prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 832, 845 P.2d 1017.
We hold that in both of the caseg at hand the prosecutor acted at least as diligently as the Blackwell prosecutor when attempting to the interviews. Neither prosecutor engaged in unfair gamesmanship and each took reasonable steps to comply the court order.
The Wilson Prosecutor was given only two business days after the court order to meet the court-imposed deadline (May 19 and 22), unlike the Sherman prosecutor who had severaI weeks to produce the IRS records. See Sherman, 59 Wash.App. at 765, 801 P.2d 274. The Wilson prosecutor did not ignore his obligation. He attempted to contact the witness and assigned a detective to contact the witness‘s family. Finally, on May 24, the the prosecutor did what he could to track down the witness for a last-minute interview before 1:30 PM Given these efforts, we find that the Wilson prosecutor did not engage in unfair gamesmanship, nor did he egregiously neglect his obligation.
In Taylor, the defense waited until Februagement 2001, to inform the prosecutor on the record that Seise still had not been inter-In viewed. Thereafter, the prosecutor called Seise at least once every day and arranged for a detective to contact him while she was on vacation. Furthermore, between the omnibus
The defense argues that the State in each case should have taken steps to arrange a court-ordered deposition or issue a material witness warrant as soon as it became clear that the witness was uncooperative. However, we hold that the State‘s failure to take this step in each case did not amount to egregious misconduct. In Taylor, Mr. Seise gave the prosecutor every indication that he was very busy, yet cooperative, and he never expressed unwillingness to submit to a defense interview. In Wilson, the prosecutor was left with less than three business days after the hearing on May 18 to produce the witness for an interview. We believe that the failure to seek a deposition in such a short time period did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
Finally, dismissal under
For all of these reasons we hold that the prosecutors in these cases acted reasonably and their conduct did not amount to misconduct. Furthermore, the trial judge should have considered intermediate alternatives before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of dismissal.
Because no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, we need not reach the issue of whether the defendants suffered prejudice affecting their right to a fair trial. However, we recognize that “the defendant‘s right to compulsory process includes the right to interview a witness in advance of trial.” State v. Burn, 87 Wash.2d 175, 181, 550 P.2d 507 (1976). Furthermore, to force a defendant to choose between the right to a speedy trial and the right to adequately prepared counsel because an interview has not occurred by the speedy trial expiration does materially affect a defendant‘s right to a fair trial such that prejudice results. See Michielli, 132 Wash.2d at 240, 937 P.2d 587 (citing State v. Price, 94 Wash.2d 810, 814, 620 P.2d 994 (1980)).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals in each of these cases on the grounds that the prosecutors did not commit governmental misconduct warranting the extraordinary remedy of dismissal.
WE CONCUR: ALEXANDER, C.J., JOHNSON, MADSEN, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS, SMITH, J. Pro Tern.
The question posed is whether the trial court abused its discretion under
The court, in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused‘s right to a fair trial. “Governmental misconduct” can be simple prosecutorial mismanagement. State v. Blackwell, 120 Wash.2d 822, 831, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993). We review a trial court‘s dismissal under
CrR 8.3(b) for manifest abuse of discretion, and will reverse only when the dismissal is “`manifestly unreasonable,^ or is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.‘” State v. Miehielli, 132 Wash.2d 229, 240, 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Blackwell, 120 Wash.2d at 830, 845 P.2d 1017). But these dismissals were supported by evidence of misconduct which prejudiced the defendants’ right to a fair trial. The dismissals were therefore neither manifestly unreasonable nor exercised on untenable grounds.
The majority argues the trial court abused its discretion claiming there was insufficient misconduct to justify dismissal as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals characterized the misconduct as breaking a promise to the defense to secure a meeting with its witnesses due to the witnesses‘s intransigence and excused the misconduct by claiming the prosecution lacked power to legally compel the witnesses to appear for a meeting in any event. State v. Wilson, 108 Wash.App. 774, 780-81, 31 P.3d 43 (2001), review granted, 146 Wash.2d 1008, 52 P.3d 520 (2002); State v. Taylor, noted at 111 Wash.App. 1039, 2002 WL 974640, *3 (Wash.Ct.App. May 13, 2002), review granted, 146 Wash.2d 1021, 52 P.3d 521 (2002). In fact, however, the prosecution in each case not only failed to keep its promise to arrange the meetings, it violated a court order which required it to do so.
The majority does not mischaracterize the claims, as did the Court of Appeals, but argues prosecutors made their best efforts to comply with the orders and therefore should not be faulted. Majority at 658. But the record shows the prosecutors had the actual power to produce these witnesses and, in failing to do so, did not make their “best efforts” to comply.
In Wilson the prosecutor informed the judge that he had failed to arrange the interview by the specific date ordered by the court but that now the prosecutor was willing to take additional steps to avoid dismissal, including a personal visit to the witness‘s home and/or seeking to obtain a material witness warrant. 3 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 5. The judge asked why a material witness warrant had not been sought earlier, and the prosecutor answered that he had just received authorization from his supervisor. 3 RP at 9. No specific reason was given why the prosecutor had not previously attempted to visit the witness at his home other than that the prosecutor was on vacation part of this time. 2 RP at 10. Similarly the material witness warrant was not obtained because the prosecutor‘s supervisor did not timely authorize it. Thus, it cannot be maintained that the prosecution did in fact make its best effort to comply with the court order or that it lacked power to compel a meeting with its witness in each case.
Similarly, the trial court in Taylor ordered an interview take place by March 2, 2001; however, the interview was not arranged by the deadline, and still had not been arranged as of the hearing on March 7, 2001 (though the prosecution asserted that the witness would finally be available at 2:00 P.M. that day). RP at 6. Again the record does not show any attempt by the prosecution to produce the witness by a material witness warrant or by other means beyond a few phone calls.
The majority contends the misconduct of the prosecution was not sufficiently “egregious” to justify dismissal under
The majority simply declines to consider whether this misconduct prejudiced the defendants. Clearly it did. The prosecution first assumed the burden to arrange interviews with its intransigent witnesses, inviting reliance by the defense and the court. Later, when the court ordered the prosecution to arrange the interviews, the defense was again induced to rely on the promise backed up by a court order. As a result the interview which was necessary for defense trial preparation had not been arranged in advance of trial. The right to adequate trial preparation includes the right to conduct a full investigation of the facts, including the right to interview witnesses in advance of trial. State v. Burri, 87 Wash.2d 175, 180-81, 550 P.2d 507 (1976). To pursue belated interviews would have forced the defense to seek further delay of the trial itself should any follow-up appear necessary. A forced choice between the right to a speedy trial and the right to adequate trial preparation prejudices the right to a fair trial. Michielli, 132 Wash.2d at 240, 937 P.2d 587 (citing State v. Price, 94 Wash.2d 810, 814, 620 P.2d 994 (1980)).
I would therefore reverse the court of appeals in each case, affirm the trial court, and dismiss.