*1 equal amount and an additional wages and lost payment creates substantive When a statute damages. in liquidated right, of that infringement remedy right provides statutory remedy. Campbell limited to plaintiff (Ct. 1990). We hold Bi-Lo, App. S.E. 301 S.C. law by federal as well right when the is created this applies remedy to his Therefore, Dockins is limited state law. Act. Labor Standards Fair have a valid claim under it Dockins appears Since remand prejudice, Act has not articulated Ingles leave grant court with instructions this action to the trial 15(a). P. S.C.R. Civ. complaint. Dockins amend allow Affirmed and remanded. Finney Chandler, JJ.,
Gregory, Harwell, C.J., and concur. WILSON, STATE, Appellant. Respondent v. James William 19)
(413 S.E. Supreme Court *2 Bruch, I. David of S.C. Appellate Defense, Office of Columbia, Belser, and David Asheville, N.C., appellant. G. for Atty. Medloch, T. Gen. Travis Deputy Atty. Gen. Don- Chief Zelenha, J. IV, ald Columbia, Jones, W. Sol. Townes Greenwood, respondent. for 6, 1992. Decided Jan. 26, 1990;
Heard Sept. 4, 1992. Den. Feb.
Reh.
Toal, Justice: is appeal we address in this issue which primary who or is pleads a of death a defendant whether sentence ill,” is as that verdict defined “guilty but found Pun- violates the Cruel and Unusual statute, South Carolina Eighth Amendment of United Clause ishment question in a fashion, Stated different States Constitution. person, under what acting answer here whether offense, to commit an impulse” to an “irresistible amounts constitutionally be sentenced to death for the commission Eighth hold that the Amendment does not of that offense. We sentence, and we therefore affirm. bar such
FACTS *3 26,1988, the of Jamie Wilson drove morning September On .22 caliber, and stole her grandmother’s his maternal house to then to dis- Wilson drove an Abbeville nine-shot revolver. rifle hollow-point some .22 purchased long count store and already Wilson discarded the bullets loaded ammunition. weapon with more destructive gun, and reloaded to the proceeded bullets. Wilson next Oakland hollow-point where Elementary Greenwood, parked School he his school, to the cafe- finding way He entered the his Maverick. It was at right where he stood for a moment. teria, quietly Next, out many pulled time for of the children. Wilson lunch began shooting, picking victims, and his both chil- pistol adults, at a of and random. Witnesses observed look dren and Wilson’sface. rage masking hatred gun empty. fired until his was He then went into a Wilson weapon, restroom and reloaded the after which he a entered again. fire After his a opened emptying classroom and gun gun second Wilson threw down and time, stepped outside a A teacher spotted window. him and told him through to his up, still with hands which Wilson did. The police remain took into custody. arrived and Wilson then created and damage The terror inflicted Wilson on was and an considerable, entire September nation was had shocked, the unthinkable occurred. One female first teacher was shot once in the grade shoulder and once in the left hand, with the bullet traveling through her hand and into boy her throat. A young slumped forward onto a cafeteria pistol table after Wilson aimed boy’s at the temple fired, hitting the Two boy girls, both age little head. eight, screamed; were shot dead. Children fled; children chil- dren under their desks; hid other children were shot.
Altogether, Wilson was indicted murder, for two counts of nine counts of assault and battery kill, with intent to and one illegally count of carrying firearm. Wilson pled “guilty but (GBMI) mental ill” substantially to all of charges, and his plea was accepted. He sentenced to twenty years, each sentence to be served of consecutively, each counts eight and battery kill; assault with intent years, to ten consecu- tive, for assault and battery nature; high aggravated and five years, consecutive, for illegally carrying a firearm. Wilson elected to have the penalty phase of his capital murder charges tried trial without a judge jury. The trial judge affirmatively found the existence of two statutory aggravat- (1) ing circumstances: murder wherein or persons two more (2) are murdered pursuant scheme; one act or and murder aof child or years age eleven judge under. The trial also found the statutory existence of four circum- mitigating (1) stances: defendant has significant history no of prior vio- (2) lent crime conviction; the murder was committed under (3) the influence of disturbance; mental emotional capacity appreciate criminality his conduct or to conform his requirements conduct thé of law was sub- stantially impaired; age or mentality of the defen- dant at the time of the crime. Wilson was then sentenced death for each the two murders. now appeals *4 death sentence.
LAW/ANALYSIS several for arguments makes reversal of his sen- (1) intend, tence: the state did legislature not and therefore does not permit, punishment execution as for a defendant found “guilty mentally pursuant but ill” to S.C. Code Ann. 17-24-20(A)(1989 (2) § Supp.); Cum. the execution a of GBMI defendant, as that verdict is defined by South Carolina statute, the prohibí- violates Cruel and Unusual Punishment (3) Amendment; sentence is exces- Wilson’s Eighth
tion of the § 16-3- Code Ann. under S.C. disproportionate sive 25(C)(3) (1989 judge the court Supp.); lower Cum. all circumstances mitigating to take into account failed shall address these sentencing. on We reaching his decision in order. contentions CONSTRUCTION
I. STATUTORY entitled the verdict that, creating Wilson contends did legislature ill,” the South Carolina mentally but “guilty Wilson makes potential punishment. death be a not intent that §Ann. 17-24- the of S.C. Code language primarily reference (1989 statutory This support argument. Supp.) Cum. a It pro- of GBMI defendant. sentencing deals with section vides: ill” de- the “guilty
If a is returned of but verdict judge provided the trial as fendant must be sentenced found however: guilty, law a defendant
(A) defendant in- upon the the imposed If sentence defendant, defendant cludes the incarceration facility designated by Depart- must first be taken a treatment and retained there ment of Corrections for the defen- opinion facility the staff at until in to the may safely general population dant be moved serve the remainder of Corrections to Department his sentence.
(B) sentence, includes a probationary If sentence and restrictions judge may impose those conditions considers judge on the release of com- necessary for the of the defendant and safety munity.
It provision is Wilson’s that since there is no position gives specific guidance which to a lower court which death, defendant to a sentences GBMI such sentence con contemplated by legislature. reject not this with portion refuses read force that tention. Wilson mandatory crystal-clear phrased the statute ill’ terms, viz., ‘guilty mentally is returned of but verdict “[i]f for a provided by must be sentenced ... as law the defendant *5 added). found . . .” guilty (emphasis defendant The punish- ment one for found of murder is set in guilty forth S.C. Code (1976) §Ann. 16-3-20 as who person “[a] follows: is convicted guilty of or to murder be pleads punished by must death byor added). for life. .. .“ imprisonment (emphasis Hence, we hold plain that the of the language clearly GBMI statute for allows a death sentence in an appropriate case. The fact that leg- islature does not for provide special guidance or a specific pro- be cedure to used in cases where a GBMI defendant is sen- not tenced to does from a logical mean that standpoint no may death sentence be handed down, as Wilson In- urges. stead, means, it we simply hold, that the legislature did not provide see fit to lower courts with any special guidance or in such procedure an instance. ignore We decline to the clear in language statute favor reading. of Wilson’s strained Beyond § plain language 17-24-70, however, there exist other why reasons we are convinced that legislature intended that a sentence of death be for possible First, certain GBMI defendants. per are 17-24-20(C) (1989 § that suaded Supp.),1 Cum. which provides but ‘guilty mentally “[t]he verdict ill’ may be rendered only during phase trial which guilt determines or inno cence and is not a be verdict rendered form of added) the penalty phase,” (emphasis indicative a legisla tive intent that a bifurcated case capital may be for necessary some We interpret GBMI defendants. this language to pro hibit juries judges treating as anything ordinary other “guilty” than defendant for purposes of ren sentencing their verdict. dering it
Secondly, is well established that the en- purposes (1) actment of GBMI statutes nationwide are: reduce persons being number of re- completely relieved criminal sponsibility condition; due to their mental to insure ill defendants receive treatment while incarcer- § Wil South Carolina Code Ann. 17-24-20 was amended after the date of sentencing clarify proof. son’s crime and the allocation of burden of Act (eff. 93,1989 17,1989). amendment, Aug. No. S.C. Acts 226 As a of this result evidentiary hearing prior providing acceptance for an of a subsection 17-24-20(C) 17-24-20(D). § § plea Also, of GBMI was renumbered from sub (B) (C) section the statute at the time of numbered Wilson’s sen tencing. on in amendments no substantive effect the issues case. volved this *6 generally, See Anno society’s. as for their benefit as well
ated Validity and Con III” Statutes: Mentally But tation, “Guilty Smith, v. struction, (1989); People 702, 777-780 71 A.L.R. 4th (2d) (1984); 101 (3d) 310, 465 Dec. N.E. 805, 80 Ill. App. 124 Ill. (2d) (1985); N.W. 297 Ramsey, v. 500, 422 Mich. 375 People (2d) Trill, A. 1106 v. Pa. 543 Commonwealth Super. 549, (1988). statutes were a GBMI Hence, general proposition, as who could the field defendants part to narrow created the de culpability insanity a via successfully claim lack to pro here to use the verdict as a shield Wilson seeks fense. in a fundamental contrary which is punishment, tect him from pun as a mechanism to enable the state to to its creation way of defendants. larger group ish and treat a intent arguments concerning legislative similar Lastly, very jurisdictions, courts other have been rejected Crews, See, e.g., People holdings persuasive. find those de (1988), cert. Ill. 19 Ill.Dec. 522 N.E. nied, L. 3260, 106 S. Ct. Ed. leg reasons, above we hold that
Accordingly, for all to sentenced that GBMI defendants be islature intended appropriate death in cases.
II. UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CRUEL AND if in legislature even argues that, Wilson next certain be an sentence for optional tended that death so because defendants, GBMI he not be sentenced Cruel and Unusual proscription against of the constitutional punishment.2 as Carolina,
In South the GBMI verdict is defined follows: if, ill” at the time of “guilty A is but defendant he had constituting offense, of the act commission or wrong recog- to from to capacity distinguish right 17-24- wrong his as as defined in Section being nize act lacked 10(A),3 of mental disease or defect he but because Amend. VIII. U.S. Const. (1989 17-24-10(A) Supp.) § is Car Cum. South South Carolina Code Ann. insanity provides: It olina’s defense. (A) that, prosecution for the time is an affirmative defense to a a crime at It offense, defendant, as a re- constituting of the commission act distinguish defect, capacity or or lacked the to moral sult of mental disease particular act right legal wrong recognize or to legal moral or morally legally wrong. charged as to conform capacity sufficient his conduct the require- ments of the law. 17-24-20(A) (1989 § Supp.). Code Ann. Cum. Wilson
S.C. out, having accepted been points guilty plea pursuant that it statute, established, is an unreviewable fact that he unable control behavior on 1988. September could differently, say Stated one that Wilson was in fact act- impulse” under an “irresistible to commit the ing enumerated fall day. By then, acts of violence on that definition contends Wilson, GBMI defendant less than a culpable defendant could actions. Further, contends, who control his is, definition, lacking GBMI so culpability be unexecutable. While we agree defendant, that a GBMI *7 law, South has in Carolina essence found to have been impulse acted under an irresistible time of crime, at the agreement with Wilson ends at our that Wilson’s point. argu- concerning simply ments mark. culpability miss the ruling, In order to our into the explain digression law of insanity necessary. is South Carolina has chosen its insan- commonly defense what is known ity M’Naghten test, as the (The the “right or test. in wrong” test is set forward foot- It three, was in supra). spawned England, note Case, M’Naghten’s Eng. Rep. 8 718 M’Naghten shot Prime private secretary, the Minister’s the secre- mistaking tary Minister, for the Prime and was based on an in- acquitted sanity outcry defense. The at the acquittal eventually led to the formulation of the aforementioned for It insanity. test is not conceded that Wilson was term “insane,” as that is defined our South by M’Naghten rejected test. Carolina the has so- impulse” insanity called “irresistible test as an defense. states, observes,
In several he would be found inno- of all cent criminal since those incorporate behavior states the into their impulse irresistible test insanity defense. This test essentially the court to engages determine whether the defen- was at time of acting, dant the his alleged behavior, criminal impulse, to an irresistible pursuant or was unable to control If so, himself. the defendant is adjudged insane and held not It responsible for his acts. matters not that that the act he was committing wrong. knew was We eschew analysis. this
506 is Carolina, insanity power [of to “the key
In South act itself— wrong distinguish right to defendant] legally either or complained morally act of is recognize he must an- exists in a defendant... wrong. power When this Grimes, n. 204, 1, v. 292 S.C. 355 acts.” State swer (2d) (1987) McIntosh, State 539 n. 1 v. 538, (quoting S.E. omitted). (1893)) (emphasis S.C. 17 S.E. culpability this test for vis-a-vis adopting sound reasons for insanity. difficult, if not im
First, impulse very irresistible test is It has been that it accuracy. suggested with possible, apply that an was irresistible rather impossible say impulse is un resisted, between the unsuccessfully distinguish than or that is controlled. impulse controllable not impulse (2d) (2d) White, P. 551, 374 (citing State v. 60 Wash. Woodhouse, Pa. 164 A. Commonwealth (1960)). internal plagued by the irresistible test is
Secondly, impulse validity profession psychiatry. debate over its within the to delete insanity recently The federal defense was amended rea impulse prong.” primary “volitional “A irresistible (federal) altered insanity son that the definition (to test) irresistible Insanity impulse Reform Act delete the upon themselves are unable to psychiatrists agree ” Free meaning an ‘irresistible United States v. impulse.’ 1986) (11th man, (citing Rep. 804F. Cir. S. U.S. Code 226-29, reprinted 98th Sess. Cong. *8 3182, 3408-11). &Cong. Ad. News Gaylin, respected psychoanalyst, Willard has observed: purposes must maintain our distinctions between the and the psychiatry Psychiatry law. purposes individual, restoring directed at him to serves and is health, community, designed The law serves the and is its The law safety. secure its values and preserve It an essential of its citizens. responsibility demands with Aristotle that “what lies our powers assumes do, in our not to do.” powers lies Bonkers, Gaylin, Insanity: Post, Gone June Legal Washington The 20, Cl, (quoted Toensing, 1982 at C5. in diGenova Post- Federal A Time For in the Insanity Change Defense: Era, Hinckley (1983). 721, S. Tex. L.J. 727-78 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a very persuasive opinion, severely criticized the irresistible impulse test: law,
The in its effort to shape a rational social policy, grounded in the broadly shared assumptions of the indi- viduals who make up society, cannot admit that acts an individual carefully plans and carries out to advance his own desire, when he knows those acts will result in the aof human being, will not be punished simply be- cause of the intensity or strangeness that desire. Such proceeds admission imperceptibly to the absurd result that the more strange and brutal the act the more likely the actor is to be relieved of its criminal consequences. Along the psychoanalytic continuum the outrageous [sic] proves the innocence. In an oddly circular fashion the act establishes its cause as mental illness and the mental ill- ness determines the act. Such analysis may be medically useful. It is not legally useful. Weinstein,
Commonwealth v. 106, 499 Pa. 451 A. 116, The difficulty lies in the fact that reasonable people nor- do mally not commit crimes, much less heinous crimes of the kind committed here. Hence, like are, criminals Jamie Wilson of necessity, unreasonable in their actions. They, necessity, have an abnormal desire or compulsion take these criminal actions. This does not mean that they punished. should not be There rarely a need to those punish who are reasonable and rational. penal system Our those developed punish who refuse to act reasonably, and to deter those who can be de- terred from acting unreasonably. very underpinnings our criminal law give would if the way thinking behind the ir- impulse resistible test is carried logical to its extreme. Therefore, South Carolina rejected has the irresistible im- pulse insanity. test As a matter, constitutional this is clearly permissible. Leland v. 343 U.S. Oregon, 790, 72 S. Ct. 96 L. Ed. (1952),4 the United States Supreme recently, Supreme More Court has declined to reconsider its Leland Delaware, decision. See Rivera v. 97 S. Ct. 50 L. Ed. (1976) (defendant’s request to overrule Leland dismissed for want of sub *9 question). stantial federal
508 as entitled, is a matter that a defendant not
Court ruled insanity impulse to an process, due irresistible fundamental test M’Naghten free to adopt and that states are defense, one act- recognize does that for South Carolina not insanity.5 In- culpable.6 is somehow less impulse an irresistible ing under one act- statutory that stead, specifically provides scheme but guilty, “guilty an is ing impulse , under such albeit to this Court authority requires ill.” are aware of no which We satisfied, impulse test, when recognize that the irresistible fact, all au- a lack of culpability. demonstrates conclusively contrary thority of which we are aware indicates to —that insanity, to as it relates to culpability, this state is free define im- under rather than irresistible M’Naghten standard mind, now Wilson’s With this in we turn to pulse standard. precise arguments. principle contends sentence violates and Punishment Clause
Eighth Amendment Cruel Unusual “for the death purposes imposing requires must be penalty punishment [a defendant’s] . . . tailored Florida, guilt.” and moral Enmund v. personal responsibility 801, 3368, L. 1140 3378, 102 S. Ct. 73 Ed. (1982). acting he an irre- He asserts that since under himself, he is sistible and therefore could not control impulse personally culpable enough not receive death sentence. This we request by give contention amounts to Wilson that in the impulse constitutional stature to irresistible test so, reject context. We decline to do penalty earlier, in Wilson’s As South premise argument. stated law, de- just culpable guilty Carolina Wilson is as as other re- Hence, fendant. diminishment in his “personal there is no reasons, For similar we decline sponsibility guilt.”7 moral Wilson’s that no accept argument penological justification sentence We hold that the penological goal exists. defense, jurisdictions completely insanity Some abolished the State v. constitutionally See position permitted. take the that such action Korell, Searcy, (1984); State 213 Mont. 690 P. Idaho P. recognize potential culpability resulting do diminishment mitigating However, existence of the factors this case. the fact that impulse pursuant Wilson acted irresistible not act a bar to the does imposition penalty jury culpa of the death or necessitate that a find him less severely. punish ble and him less six, supra. But see footnote
509 retribution sentence, is served this as, under South Car- olina law, Wilson is completely culpable and responsible for his crimes.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered “Cruel and Unusual” at the time the Bill Rights adopted. Helm, v. Solem 463 U.S. 103 S. 77 Ct. L. (2d) Ed. 637 In Penry Lynaugh, 302, 109 v. 492 U.S. S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 256 the United States Supreme Court was asked whether mentally retarded individ may executed, uals be and observed that the ancient common law forbade the execution of those who were “idiots” and/or “lunatics,” defined as those under “natural at disability” time of the crime to distinguish “between evil.” good and S. Ct. at 2953. The Court stated, prohibi “[t]he common law tion against punishing ‘idiots’ for their crimes and unusual’ punishment to execute persons who are profoundly retarded and wholly lacking the capacity appreciate the wrongful ness of their actions.” 109S. Ct. 2954. at
As can be seen in the context, mental retardation the an- cient concerned, common law was not with “impulsive behav- ior” but with an ability individual’s right know from wrong. is no Similarly, there authority persuades us that a de- fendant adjudged who is sane under the test but M’Naghten who was acting impulse irresistible have would been shielded from death penalty in 1789.8
The Eighth analysis stop Amendment does not with an of the examination intent framers of the Consti tution. “The prohibition against cruel and unusual pun ishments recognizes ‘evolving also decency standards ” that mark the of a progress maturing society.’ Penry, S. Dulles, Ct. at Trap 86, 101, 356 U.S. 78 S. (quoting Ct. (1958)). 590, 598, 2 L. In implementing test, Ed. this objective Court has “lookedto evidence of our society how Wilson, case note that the before us here not involve does whether at execution, may the time of his scheduled in fact be executed. issue of exe Ford v. cuting Supreme the insane is addressed States United Court Wainwright, (1986), S. Ct. 91 L. Ed. wherein prohibits sanity Court execution where a convict does not have the to un being derstand the fact that he is and for executed what reason. The instant case, hand, only on the other involves whether Wilson be sentenced to death, and on his mental focuses health at time of the commission of the crime, of his not at the time future execution date. S. Ct. at 2953. today.” 109 particular punishment
views a jurisdic three only out that connection, points this Delaware, Carolina, Pennsylvania, tions, South though even for a death sentence and allow GBMI statutes at the impulse under an irresistible acting the defendant was States note that the United the crime. We time he committed not the burden reiterated, recently “[i]t Court Supreme approving consensus establish a national state], however, to [a rather, ‘heavy it is the do; have voted to their citizens what national consensus to establish a of [the defendant] burden’ *11 Kentucky, v. in the original). it.” against (emphasis Stanford (1989). L. Ed. 2969, 2977, 106 S. Ct. those, a Of penalty. now have the death Thirty-seven states of constitution- have as a matter adopted, number substantial insanity, and not test for choice, M’Naghten ally permitted have no Furthermore, many test. impulse the irresistible (which included South In these states option. GBMI verdict exists to years), legal impediment no many Carolina for is not insane as defined of a defendant who execution the crime have committed test, but who M’Naghten no informa- compiled Wilson has impulse. an irresistible the more for- It seems to us that tion to these states. relating in affirma- stated tuity expressly that three states only like Wil- can occur in a case tive fashion that a death sentence review this completely In order to son’s is not dispositive. should penalty the death therefore, having all states question, a having of those states reviewed, only have been instead verdict. GBMI proof of carry that has failed to burden
We hold Wilson
a
having
that
states
death
in this
He asserts
seven
regard.
death,
since he
would not allowhim to be sentenced
penalty
of law.
requirements
was unable to conform his conduct to
We are left to
what
ponder
He admits that three states would.
states would do.
remaining twenty-seven
at least
independent
from our
review that
appears
It
to us
(1)
M’Naghten
have:
the strict
de-
fourteen states indeed do
(3)
verdict; and
defense;
no GBMI
insanity
fense or no
Colorado, Florida,
Arizona, California,
death penalty. E.g.
Montana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Idaho,
generally
See
Nebraska, Nevada,
Jersey, Washington.
New
Annotation,
Responsibil-
Modern State
Test Criminal
(1981).
ity
Cases,
absence extensive of all death very study jurisdic- penalty tions, and into taking account the status the above-listed seventeen we are states, unconvinced that Wilson has proven a national against imposition consensus exists death on penalty defendants like him. points
Wilson out that another index “significant objective of contemporary values” regarding given punishment is the sentencing juries. behavior of trial Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181, 2909, 2929, 49 96 S. Ct. L. Ed. brief,
states “[assessing willingness to im juries pose death sentences on defendants found lack the capacity to conform their conduct undeniably to the law is problematic, for the reason revealing only three states —South Car olina, Delaware and such Pennsylvania sentences even —are 27). theoretically possible.” Brief at (Appellant’s p. This state ment is misleading again that it contemplates only the ten penalty states which have GBMI verdicts of some kind. *12 We any consensus, are unable to determine nationwide as we are unable to conclusively discern whether it is “theoretically such a in possible” twenty-seven sentence the other death As penalty above, states. stated death penalty state which has no GBMI verdict has the M’Naghten insanity would a legislative defense as matter allow for a death sen tence to be handed down one who not against conform could his conduct but who knew his wrong. acts were Wilson has thus proven nothing through cursory review the “sen tencing juries” behavior triál nor has he proven national against consensus penalty defendants his type any through objective other evidence. in argues his brief that his violates sentence both
the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. Although his argument the South concerning Carolina Constitution is not properly us it in before because is not embodied ex- ception, we nevertheless reject address it and it as meritless. punish certain against proscription Carolina’s
South Constitu § 15 of the State I, in Article ments is found part: in reads, pertinent provision tion. This nor shall excessive required; not be bail shall Excessive nor un- cruel, corporal, nor nor shall imposed; fines be inflicted---- be punishment usual un- punishments; cruel or unusual clearly bans language This Constitution, which United States ban in the like the textual are for- punishments and unusual” that “cruel literally reads note that the in we verbiage, difference this Despite bidden. “and,” effectively treats Court Supreme States United Tison v. Ari- analysis. Amendment their Eighth an “or” in (1987); 1676,95 L. Ed. zona, 107 S. Ct. 481 U.S. 3368, 73 L. Ed. Florida, 782, 102 S. Ct. 458 U.S. v. Enmund it their constitu- still considers The Court the “nexus between whether obligation judge tional is blameworthiness and the defendant’s punishment imposed of a test of Court’s formulation This is the proportional.”9 analysis this require is cruel. To the punishment whether “or.” read the “and” as cases is to penalty all death “and” rather than “or” disjunctive the use of Thus, importance is of no Constitution in the South Carolina the same analysis employ case, in this since violation that no Having determined both constitutions. is no we also hold there occurred, Amendment Eighth of the there hold, Constitution. of the South Carolina violation that his sentence amounts to show has failed fore, that Wilson punishment.10 Unusual” to “Cruel and Kentucky, Ct. S. case of the recent Stanford White, Kennedy, (1989), (joined Justices Scalia Justice L. Ed. view that the Court should de Rehnquist) articulated the Chief Justice by looking the framers’ Eighth Amendment “cruelty” under the termine of current views held United States by looking the evidence intent majority justices, A punishment is “unusual.” citizens on whether in combination with Justice O’Con- up the four dissenters made Stanford Stanford, continue to a further nor, mandate in the result who concurred viz., analysis. Whether the South Carolina step, proportionality analytical *13 irrelevant, analysis is thus since a proportionality requires Constitution it, requires proportionality treatment and since a proper Eighth Amendment 16-3-25(C)(3) (1989 § mandatory by in this state. See Cum. statute analysis is opinion, III of this Supp.) and Part infra. 10 Court, argument, accepted by if Wilson’s this the result of note that punish and unusual to a defendant of Wilson’s it is cruel that since would be
513 III. DISPROPORTIONATE AND
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE argues Wilson next his that sentence must be over 16-3-25(C)(3) § turned pursuant S.C. Code Ann. (1989Cum. Supp.), obligates this Court to deter mine, prior affirming death, sentence whether the sentence “is or excessive to the im disproportionate penalty posed cases, in similar considering both the crime de and the fendant.” Wilson stresses the “and the defendant.” language in the statute, and asserts that he acting since was under an impulse, irresistible he has less personal culpability there fore fails to up measure to other defendants who have had their death sentences disagree. affirmed. We above,
As mentioned South Carolina has recog- declined to nize the impulse irresistible test as a or defense as a factor dramatically reducing Of culpability. course, insofar as Wil- son’s mental incapacity is in factors, embodied his mitigating culpability potentially By reduced. mental statute, capacity, mental disturbance, capacity control one’s conduct are considered mitigating factors in determining appro- priate sentence for a given defendant in a capital murder case.11All of these factors were mitigating considered 1195-96). trial in judge this case. Tr. {See particular case, this this evidence did mitigating not dis suade the lower court from to death. sentencing Wilson Simi larly, Wilson has failed to us affirming dissuade his sen tence. We have previously affirmed sentences of death for de fendants when the identical mitigating three factors existed See, Middleton, defendant’s favor. v. e.g., State 295 S.C. (2d) 318, denied, 368 S.E. (1988), 457 cert. U.S. S. Bell, Ct. 102 L. (1988); Ed. State 302 S.C. — denied, (1990), —, S.E. cert. U.S. S. Ct. (1990)(See case). 112 Ed. L. Tr. 2147 that Wilson’s status, prisoners present potentially death row could their attack sentences ground they proceeding a new on acting were under an irresistible impulse at time of their crimes. 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (1985), § See S.C. Code Ann. mitigat which recites that a ing exists “[t]he factor when murder was committed while the defendant § under the influence mental or emotional See disturbance.” also 16-3- 20(C)(b)(6), capacity appreciate “[t]he criminality requirements or to conduct conform conduct to the of law was substan tially impaired;” 16-3-20(C)(b)(7), § age mentality “[t]he of the defen dant at the time of the crime.” *14 because
argument disproportionate that his death sentence is therefore re- personal culpability alleged of his diminished easily of his crime He that the heinous nature jected. concedes death sentence has with other cases in which the compares warranted. been found MITIGATING EVIDENCE
IV. FAILURE TO CONSIDER error in the Count a final Wilson claims argument, As court, orders of the lower sentencing and Count virtually provide: are identical and in the 27,1989, sentencing proceeding above-en- April On judge was me as trial was con- by titled action conducted having the evidence jury. Now, ducted without a considered extenuation, and of aggravation, mitigation punish-, offered in arguments having presented ment and also considered the of in this instance of a sentence against imposition therefore, I Wilson, the defendant James William upon beyond have reason- have consideration found given of statutory aggravat- the following able doubt existence wit, ing circumstances, to two more are persons
Murder wherein or murdered one to one scheme or pursuant the defendant act or 16-3-20(C)(a)(8). Section course of conduct. years age murder of a child eleven of under.
The or 16-3-20(C)(a)(9); Section mitigating circumstances, wit, following
and the has no significant history prior The defendant crimi- the use violence involving against nal conviction 16-3-20(C)(b)(l). Section person. another committed The murder was while the defendant of mental or the influence emotional disturbance. 16-3-20(C)(b)(2). Section capacity appreciate The defendant the crimi- or to conform of his conduct his conduct the re- nality substantially law was impaired. Section 16- quirements 3-20(C)(b)(6). mentality of the at the age time 16-3-20(C)(b)(7). Section
crime. any possible I considered other mitigating have also circum- none. found stances and
I have concluded that the defendant James William Wilson should be sentenced to death.
Wilson contends that the lower “I that, court’s statement possible have considered other mitigating circumstances and have none” found us requires to remand his case for re- it sentencing, since is clear from this statement that the lower *15 court failed to consider nonstatutory mitigating factor with cooperating law enforcement. We disagree.
A reasonable reading whole, of the lower court’s order as a with the in challenged portion context, clearly demonstrates that the lower court all considered mitigating evidence Early order, case. in the lower court recites, “having con- extenuation, and sidered the evidence in aggravation, offered mitigation. added). ...” (emphasis Subsequently, the court *16 a executing retributive value of seriously question the may why singled of he has been comprehension who has no
person life.” Ford v. right of his fundamental to stripped out and L. Ed. Wainwright, 2595, S. Ct. 399, 477 U.S. the mentally ill, guilty of but accepting appellant’s plea of the acts that at the time of the commission trial court found distinguish right had the to charged, appellant capacity 17-24-10(A)(1976) but, § in S.C. Code Ann. wrong as defined the lacked suffi- defect, appellant of mental disease or because of to the requirements cient to conform his conduct capacity the law. light personal culpability,
When considered in of appellant’s death in-this case is ex- penalty it obvious that the of becomes with cessive; compared in an absolute sense when both be confirmed this Court. This other death sentences to indeed, according in South Carolina and only the instance has penalty entire nation where the death my research, that mental illness after a factual determination imposed been to conform his con- capacity the offender of sufficient deprived by law. I would find that this required duct to the standard sentence falls squarely within of relief contemplated ambit proportionality review requirement of S.C. Code Ann. 16-3-25(0(3) (1976). §
Society’s “evolving decency” standards of a imposes pre- sumption of against persons execution sufficient ca- lacking pacity conform their conduct of to the standards the law. The natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at one killing who has no capacity come conscience grips with own or deity is still today. supra. valid Ford v. Wainwright,
I share the that, view due to appellant’s illness, mental sentence of death is a opposed by national consensus suffi- cient uniformity and longstanding to render it cruel and un- punishment usual within eighth amend- meaning Oklahoma, ment. 2687, S. Thompson 108 Ct. 101 L. Ed. (Scalia, J., dissenting). eighth analysis amendment applied by the United States Supreme Court assessing constitutionality penalty for rapists, Coker v. Ct. Georgia, U.S. 97 S.
L. (1977), Ed. Enmund v. nontriggermen, Florida, supra, sixteen, and for offenders under the age Oklahoma, Thompson v. supra, clarity establishes with impropriety of appellant’s Though rarity, sentence. a imposi- tion of the death penalty categories for the struck down in Coker, Enmund and Thompson ju- was not alien to American I a risprudence. By contrast, am unable to locate record of imposed death sentence similar to that of circumstances appellant’s guilty when offender entered a but plea mentally ill.
I ill person who, conclude that found be- to be cause mental disease or defect, is unable to comprehend criminality of his conduct or the punishment, understand not subjected should be find of death. I would penalty that under these amounts to circumstances, death sentence *17 cruel and punishment unusual the eighth violation of amendment. upon
Based the record, appellant’s death sentences should be reversed and mandatory life At the imposed. sentences I very least, would remand for record resentencing so the reflect that due consideration the addi- has been accorded tional mitigating circumstance of with appellant’s cooperation law enforcement. notes it has found the “following existence statu- tory aggravating .,” circumstances . . and lists two of them. The court next states that it has considered and found the ex- istence of “the following mitigating .,” circumstances . . and statutory lists four mitigating circumstances. Although court modify failed to the word “mitigating” with the adjec- tive “statutory,” as it did listing before the aggravating cir- order, cumstances its we hold merely the court clearly listing statutory mitigating circumstances, noting and it found only four of them no more. We refuse to accept Wilson’s strained construction of the order.12 Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence death Affirmed. Gregory, C.J., JJ., and Harwell Chandler, concur. J., dissenting separate opinion. Finney, Justice, dissenting: Finney, I respectfully my view, dissent. In of the death imposition upon a penalty mentally defendant found but ill” is “guilty violative the Cruel and Unusual Clause of Punishment 12 argument case, briefing observe that since the oral of this Supreme opinion substantially Court of Delaware has issued which con (Del. 1990) State, forms our here. with views See Sanders v. 585 A. ill,” adjudicated (holding “guilty mentally that a as but in a statu death). ours, tory may scheme similar to be sentenced to .516 I Constitution. the United States Amendment of Eighth reverse. would found person is whether a this Court before question constitutionally be sentenced ill but guilty be himself prevent he was helpless for offenses id, est, impulse.” “irresistible the result of an committing; enact- legislative of the history pertinent My reading As- intent of the General me it was not the ments convinces imposed. a sentence be that such sembly directed, in Clause is Punishment The Cruel and Unusual length their excessive punishments all part, against the offenses greatly disproportioned are severity Florida, Ct. Enmund v. 782, 102 U.S. S. charged. States, Weemsv. United (quoting L. Ed. (1910)). The 544, 550, 54 L. Ed. 349, 371, U.S. 30 S. Ct. assessment mandates an individualized amendment eighth Lynaugh, penalty. Penry of the death the appropriateness L. Ed. 2934, 106 S. Ct. factor which must be consid mitigating Mental illness is a before, than no less today, in death cases. “For penalty ered