Wilmont M. Wills appeals from a jury conviction of second-degree murder.
At approximately 9 а.m. on Sunday, November 5, 1967 the bruised and beaten body of George Love was found in a warehouse area located across the railroad tracks from a “hobo jungle” approximatеly 1 mile from Chelan Falls, Washington. More than 4 months later, on March 25, 1968, the defendant Wilmont M. Wills was charged by information with the murder of George Love. At the same time, by separate information, Edmund Dobbins was also charged with the murder of George Love. Wills and Dobbins were not charged as accomplices. Prior to trial of defendant Wills the murder charge against Dobbins was dismissed and he later testified for the state in the trial of defendant Wills.
*644 Defendant assigns error to the refusal of the trial court to permit cross-examination of the witness Dobbins concerning the murder charge against him, and its dismissal, for the purpose of showing bias, prejudice or interest.
All evidence presented by the state was сircumstantial. It was the theory of the state, and there was substantial evidence from which the jury cоuld find, that George Love died of head wounds inflicted with a piece of two-by-four lumber apprоximately 3 feet in length, and that the assault and resulting death occurred some time after 1:25 a.m. on Sunday, November 5, 1967. Edmund Dobbins testified that in the late afternoon of the day before, he observed the dеfendant Wills assault George Love. This assault took place in the same warehouse arеa where the body of Love was later found, but the state does not contend the death of Mr. Lоve resulted from this assault. Dobbins testified that on that afternoon of November 4 Wills struck Love numerous times with his fists and stomped him three or four times. Dobbins testified that he then said, “Wills, you stomped that old man to deаth”, and Wills responded, “You don’t know George Love like I do, he’s tough, I’ve stomped him a lot of times.”
In viеw of the inclusive nature of the remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the state, the direct testimony of Dobbins as to the hostility exhibited by defendant Wills toward the deceased a few hours preceding the killing was of critical significance to the state’s case. On cross-examination of Dobbins, defense counsel attempted to question Dobbins concerning the murder chargеs against him and the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of those charges. When the state objected to this line of inquiry, defense counsel made a formal offer to prove that Edmund Dobbins was chargеd by information dated March 25, 1968 with the same murder for which the defendant Wills stood charged, and that upоn motion of the prosecuting attorney the murder charge against Dobbins was dismissed prior to the trial of defendant Wills. The purpose of the proposed inquiry was to determine the effect thе dismissal had upon *645 Dobbins’ testimony as a witness for the state. The refusal of the trial court to permit such cross-examination was first announced as being for the reason that only prior convictions could be shown to affect the credibility of a witness, not prior arrests. Before giving his final ruling, howevеr, the trial court also stated that if the witness
was now charged as a co-conspirator in some way or even if the separate charge against two men was still existent, then I would be inclinеd to let you proceed because it would have a bearing on the credibility of the witness and any pressures that might be upon him. I think, however, in view of the fact that he was [is] not under pressure as far as being charged with this crime and can’t be in the future, that I would sustain the objection.
However, as wе read the record, the purpose of the offer of proof was not to attack thе credibility of the witness by showing a prior 'arrest; and the fact that Dobbins was not then charged with the murder of George Love did not foreclose proper inquiry into other areas of likely interest rеsulting from dismissal of the murder charge against him.
The rule is that cross-examination of a witness for the purрose of showing bias, prejudice or interest is a matter of right, but the scope or extent of suсh cross-examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
State v. Robbins,
*646 We have considered defendant’s remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit.
The judgment is reversed and a new trial granted.
Green and Munson, JJ., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied January 8, 1971.
Review denied by Supreme Court February 23, 1971.
Notes
Cf. State v. Tate,