State v. WilliamsonState v. Williamson
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Williamson ("Williamson"), appeals the trial court's denial of his postconviction application for DNA testing. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} In 2001, Williamson was convicted of 12 counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} On November 23, 2016, Williamson filed an application for DNA testing pursuant to
{¶ 4} On October 12, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying Williamson's application. The trial court
{¶ 5} Williamson filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and has assigned six assignments of error for our review:
I. The dispositive opinion factual finding that "the physical cup itself and samples from the floor are unavailable for DNA testing at this point" was not made in accordance with statutory requirements and therefore fails.
II. The dispositive trial court legal conclusion that "the trial of (Neiswonger's1 or) another person's DNA (in or on the cup or immediate flooring) would have * * * not * * * completely * * * exonerated (the) appellant (with an) exclusion result," established a standard for the requirement (as to DNA aрplication rejection) or 2953.74(B)(4) contrary to Ohio law and thus fails.
III. The dispositive opinion mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law that "the cup and floor relate to only one incident (out of the victim's allegations that the appellant raped her in forty-plus incidents) thus (even if sоme other person's, and not the appellant's DNA, was found in or on the cup or in the immediate flooring, that) "evidence would not exonerate Williamson for all 12 counts with an exclusion result and thus the requirements of 2953.71(C)(4) as defined by 2953.71(L) were not met" misstates the law as to 2953.74(C)(4) and thus fails.
IV. The opinion and order erroneously ignores Williamson's application made pursuant toR.C. 2953.74(B) .
V. The opinion and order erroneously fails to analyze the requirements of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions impacted inR.C. 2953.71 - 2953.81, mandating the DNA testing requested.
VI. TheR.C. 2953.71 - 2953.81 statutory scheme is unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clаuses of the 14th Amendment; and under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Ohio Constitution.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 6} Assignments of error one through five will be combined for review because they discuss the same issue: Williamson claims that the trial court erred in denying his application for DNA testing.
{¶ 7} Postconviction DNA testing for eligible inmates is addressed in
{¶ 8}
(1) the court determines pursuant to section 2953.75 of the Revised Code that biological material was collected from the crime scene or the victim of the offense for which the inmate is an eligible inmate and is requesting DNA testing and that the parent sample of that biological material against which a sample from the inmate can be compared still exists at that point in time.
{¶ 9} In this case, the state reported that no parent sample existed, and submitted a report in accordance with
{¶ 10} Therefore, no parent sample existed on which a DNA test could be рerformed and the court denied Williamson's application on that finding, pursuant to
{¶ 11} Further, the results of the requested DNA material would not be "outcome determinative."
{¶ 12} In State v. Madden , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-172,
{¶ 14} Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williamson's applicatiоn for DNA testing. The first through fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 15} In the sixth assignment of error, Williamson claims that
{¶ 16} All statutes are presumed constitutional. State v. Thompkins ,
{¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no substantive due process right to obtain evidence for DNA testing in a postconviction setting. Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne ,
{¶ 18} Williamsоn contends that the terms "exclusion" and "exclusion result" are unconstitutionally vague in relation to the term "outcome determinative."
{¶ 19} In order to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, "the statute must be written so that a person of common intelligence is able to determine what сonduct is prohibited, and secondly, the statute must provide sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." State v. Baumgartner , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 89190, 91027, and 91028,
{¶ 20} "The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not require statutes to be drafted with scientific precision." (Citation omitted.) Perez v. Cleveland ,
a result of DNA testing that scientifically precludes or forecloses the subject offender as a contributor of biological material recoverеd from the crime scene or victim in question, in relation to the offense for which the offender is an eligible offender and for which the sentence of death or prison term was imposed upon the offender.
"Outcome determinative" means that
had the results of DNA testing of the subject offender been presented at the trial of the subject offender and been found relevant and admissible with respect to the felony offense for which the offender is an eligible offender and is requesting the DNA testing, and had those results been analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the offender's case as described in division (D) ofsection 2953.74 of the Revised Code, there is a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the offender guilty of that offense * * *.
{¶ 22} In State v. Waire , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040782,
{¶ 23} Thus, in reading the terms "exclusion," "exclusion result," and "outcome determinative," we find that the statute contains ascertainable standards, provides sufficient notice of what the terms apply to, and contains sufficient guidelines to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
{¶ 24} In light of the above, the terms "exclusion" and "exclusion result" in relation to the term "outcome determinative" are not unconstitutionally vague.
{¶ 25} Williamson also claims that the trial court's application of
{¶ 26} Although Williamson's argument is again difficult to understand, he appears to claim that he was denied equal protection because DNA testing should be allowed on "all available admissible evidence related to the inmate's case," whether that evidence wаs collected at the time of the crime or not.
{¶ 27} Postconviction relief is strictly a statutory right, not a constitutional right. Widmer at ¶ 142. We fail to see how Williamson, as an offender who seeks to compare physical items that are not, and were likely never, in the state's custody or control, is similarly situated to the offenders listed in
{¶ 28} The Equal Protection Clausе "does not require things which are different in fact * * * to be treated in law as though they were the same." GTE N., Inc. v. Zaino ,
{¶ 29} We find that Williamson's claims are without merit.
{¶ 30} The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 31} The trial court did not err in denying Williamson's application for DNA testing and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR
Notes
Neiswongеr was a homeless person Williamson alleged committed the rapes.