2004 Ohio 4856 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
{¶ 3} On July 10, 2001, Williams was indicted on one count of aggravated murder, a violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} Eventually, Williams entered into a plea agreement with the Lucas County Prosecutor's Office, which specified that he would enter pleas of guilty to Count 1, the aggravated murder, and to the aggravated circumstance specification. In exchange, if a three-judge panel determined he was guilty of aggravated murder and the attendant specification, the state agreed that it would dismiss Count 2 and not pursue the death penalty but rather would recommend that Williams should receive life in prison with the possibility of parole after he served 25 years. Williams waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded before a three-judge panel under Crim.R. 11(C)(3)5 and R.C.
{¶ 5} Although the three-judge panel had the statutory option, it did not dismiss the attached specification. After a two day hearing, the panel unanimously found Williams to be guilty of aggravated murder with an aggravated circumstance specification.
{¶ 6} The panel then proceeded to the sentencing and mitigation phase. It considered the plea agreement between the state and Williams, Williams's guilty pleas, the Lucas County Adult Probation Department's pre-sentence report, and the psychological summary of Williams. The panel also considered the aggravating circumstance of which Williams was found guilty and the mitigating factors outlined under R.C.
II. "Defendant-Appellant's conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is therefore a denial of due process."
{¶ 8} Manifest weight of the evidence means that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue more than the other. State v. Thompkins (1997),
{¶ 9} Here, the factfinder was a three-judge panel. Three judges heard the testimony of witnesses, observed their body language, evaluated voice inflections and any gestures, perceived the interplay between witnesses and the examiner, and watched their reactions in the courtroom. Upon appellate review, we are to accord due deference to the credibility determinations made by the factfinder. State v. DeHass (1967),
{¶ 10} Sufficiency of the evidence asks whether the evidence is legally adequate to support a verdict on all elements of an offense. State v. Thompkins (1997),
{¶ 11} Because sufficiency is required to take a case to a jury, a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency. Thus, a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. Lakewood v. Dorton, 8th Dist. No. 81043, 2003-Ohio-1719, at ¶ 32, citing State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), Lorain App. No. 96CA006462.
{¶ 12} Williams pleaded guilty to Count 1, the aggravated murder, and the attached specification, and his plea was accepted by the three-judge panel. Typically, a plea of guilty to a criminal charge waives a defendant's right to challenge sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence. Crim.R. 11(B)(1) states that "[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt." By entering a plea of guilty, a defendant surrenders the right to have the state prove guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Buelow (Jan. 17, 1992), 2d Dist. No. 12739. Therefore, a guilty plea waives any dispute about the adequacy of the evidence. State v. Oliver (May 5, 1988), 8th Dist. No. 53823 And, "[t]he issue of manifest weight is not germane to a plea of guilty as made pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)." State v. Dawson (May 11, 1989), 8th Dist. No. 55463. Normally, by entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives any right to challenge the sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence on appeal. Death cases, however, are different.
{¶ 13} Crim.R. 11(C)(3) requires that "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder in a capital case, a three-judge panel is required to examine witnesses and to hear any other evidence properly presented by the prosecution in order to make a Crim.R. 11 determination as to the guilt of the defendant." State v. Green,
{¶ 15} With respect to the elements in Williams's case, several are undisputed. The prosecution presented a certified copy of Adorra's birth certificate, showing her birth date to be August 8, 2000; therefore, her death on July 1, 2001 occurred when she was almost 11 months old. Williams does not dispute that he was the principal offender in the commission of the offense. The prosecution showed that the injuries which caused Adorra's death occurred in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, thus establishing venue.
{¶ 16} The real issue centers on Williams's mental culpability. Williams argues that the panel could not find that he acted purposely beyond a reasonable doubt. Under R.C.
{¶ 17} After carefully reviewing the record in this matter, especially the testimony of paramedic Kathy McConkey, Lucas County Deputy Coroner Dr. Diane Scala-Barnett, and Williams's own statements at his police interview, we find that the prosecution presented ample evidence for the panel to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams acted purposely.
{¶ 18} Kathy McConkey, a paramedic firefighter and registered nurse who was the first responder, testified that the child was not breathing and did not have a pulse upon the EMS team's arrival. She stated that members of the team attempted to revive Adorra before transporting her to the emergency room, but their efforts were unsuccessful. McConkey testified that there was an obvious bruise on Adorra's left posterior bicep. She reported that Adorra was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the emergency room of St. Vincent's Mercy Medical Center.
{¶ 19} Dr. Scala-Barnett, an expert in forensic pathology and the doctor who performed Adorra's autopsy, also testified before the panel. Upon an external examination of Adorra, she found a total of 18 bruises to the head, all of similar diameter and spacing, grouped together in regions. Dr. Scala-Barnett stated the bruises were consistent with impact by knuckles. She also found two bruises on the back of Adorra's shoulder, and three on her mandible. All the bruises were inflicted at the same time and were relatively recent. At a minimum, there were five separate blunt trauma "impact zones" on Adorra's body.
{¶ 20} Dr. Scala-Barnett testified that upon an internal examination she found the infant had extensive subgaleal hemorrhaging caused by multiple, overlying impacts. Also, she observed a depressed skull fracture. Such fractures are typically caused by impact with a table or counter corner, and because of the elasticity of an infant's bones, considerable force would be needed to cause such a fracture. She also testified that Adorra had patchy subdural hemorrhages on her brain consistent with multiple shaking impact syndrome and that the hemorrhaging on Adorra's optic nerve sheathes is seen only with shaking. Dr. Scala-Barnett testified that Adorra's injuries were consistent with impact forces sustained by "falling out of seven or eighth story windows" or "high velocity motor vehicle accidents." The ultimate cause of Adorra's death was determined to be "craniocerebral injuries caused by multiple shaking impact syndrome." The death was ruled a homicide.
{¶ 21} In his interview with Toledo Police Department detectives, Williams himself confessed to shaking Adorra. During the questioning, he emphasized repeatedly how frustrated he was. Williams talked about how he was frustrated that his mother took custody of his own child for whom he still had to pay child support, and that he had another child on the way with Aleise — all while he was out of work. He described how the baby had been sick, very fussy, and crying a lot. When he was asked by a detective, "Was she crying and she wouldn't stop crying so you shook her?" Williams responded, "Yeah, I mean, it was more or less out of frustration." In addition, he admitted that he knew from parenting classes and from an acquaintance that had shaken and killed a baby how shaking a baby could cause its death.
{¶ 22} When examining the testimony of Ms. McConkey, Dr. Scala-Barnett, and Williams's own statements, we find that the prosecution presented more than enough evidence for the panel to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams acted purposely. The medical evidence describes multiple blunt impacts consistent with grabbing and punching, and hemorrhaging that could only be caused by violent shaking. Adorra also had a skull fracture, which would require considerable force to inflict. Williams's own words admit his frustration at the time of his actions because of the loss of custody of his child, his child support obligations, his girlfriend's pregnancy, and his unemployment. He admitted shaking Adorra even though he acknowledged he knew that such an action could be fatal to the baby. Upon review of all the evidence, the three-judge panel could reasonably find that Williams specifically intended to engage in the conduct that caused Adorra's death.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, Williams's assignments of error are found not well-taken and the verdict of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Williams is ordered to pay to court costs of this appeal as specified under App. R. 24.
Judgment Affirmed.
Knepper, J., Lanzinger, J., Singer, J., concur.
"{¶ b} With respect to aggravated murder committed on and after January 1, 1974, the defendant shall plead separately to the charge and to each specification, if any. A plea of guilty or no contest to the charge waives the defendant's right to a jury trial, and before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest the court shall so advise the defendant and determine that the defendant understands the consequences of the plea.
"{¶ c} * * *
"{¶ d} If the indictment contains one or more specifications, and a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge is accepted, the court may dismiss the specifications and impose sentence accordingly, in the interests of justice.
"{¶ e} If the indictment contains one or more specifications that are not dismissed upon acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge, or if pleas of guilty or no contest to both the charge and one or more specifications are accepted, a court composed of three judges shall: (a) determine whether the offense was aggravated murder or a lesser offense; and (b) if the offense is determined to have been a lesser offense, impose sentence accordingly; or (c) if the offense is determined to have been aggravated murder, proceed as provided by law to determine the presence or absence of the specified aggravating circumstances and of mitigating circumstances, and impose sentence accordingly."