State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph L. Williams, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18AP-891
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 28, 2023
2023-Ohio-1002
DORRIAN, J.
(C.P.C. No. 17CR-6553) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on March 28, 2023
On brief: [Janet A. Grubb, First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney], and Seth L. Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.
On brief: Kerry M. Donahue, for appellant. Argued: Kerry M. Donahue.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph L. Williams, was convicted of two counts of murder with repeat violent offender specifications. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-891, 2021-Ohio-3491 (“Williams I“). On September 1, 2022, this court granted Williams‘s application for reoрening of his appeal for the limited purpose of allowing review of Williams‘s claims that his right to a speedy trial had been violated and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve the alleged speedy-trial violation for appellate review. State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-891 (Sept. 1, 2022) (memorandum decision). The matter is now before us on reopening. For the following reasons, we confirm our prior judgment affirming the convictions.
{¶ 2} The evidence and testimony presented at trial in this case are described in our prior decision. Williams I at ¶ 2-21. In brief, Williams was involved in an altercation with William Taylor on November 26, 2017. Taylor died the following day due to blunt impact or blunt force injuries to the head. Ultimately, a jury found Williams guilty of two counts of murder for causing Taylor‘s death, and the trial court found Williams guilty of the repeat violent offender specification associated with each count. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced Williams to 15 years to life in prison on the murder conviction, to be served consecutively to 3 years in prison on the repeat violent offender specification.
{¶ 3} Because Williams asserts a violation of his right to a speedy trial in this reopened appeal, we focus on the procedural history of the case from arrest to trial.
{¶ 4} Williams was arrested on November 26, 2017. Initially, he was charged with murder in the Franklin County Municipal Court; that municipal court case was dismissed at the request of the prosecutor after Williams was indicted on two counts of murder with repeat violent offender specifications in Franklin C.P. No. 17CR-6553 on December 6, 2017. The trial court set bond in case No. 17CR-6553 at $800,000 surety and $10,000 recognizance. Williams did not post bond in case No. 17CR-6553 and remained incarcerated until trial began. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Williams, and on December 13, 2017 Williams‘s trial counsel moved for discovery from plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio. The state provided its initial discovery response on Jаnuary 3, 2018.
{¶ 5} On January 5, 2018, Williams was indicted on one count of possession of cocaine in Franklin C.P. No. 18CR-53. That indictment alleged that on or about February 9, 2017 Williams was in possession of less than five grams of cocaine or a substance containing cocaine. Bond was set in case No. 18CR-53 at $5,000 surety and $1,000 recognizance. Williams did not post bond in case No. 18CR-53. Williams eventually pled guilty to the charge in case No. 18CR-53, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 months in prison, to be served concurrently with his sentence in case No. 17CR-6553.
{¶ 6} The trial court entered multiple continuances in case No. 17CR-6553, ultimately setting the trial date for September 10, 2018. At a hearing on August 13, 2018, Williams‘s trial counsel moved to dismiss case No. 17CR-6553, asserting that Williams‘s
{¶ 7} On August 23, 2018, the trial court issued an order denying Williams‘s motion to dismiss. The court concluded Williams waived his speedy-trial rights with respect to one continuance and that another continuance tolled speedy-trial time because the state had a reasonаble basis to request the continuance. Although the court found that beginning trial on September 10, 2018 would not violate Williams‘s right to a speedy trial, it scheduled trial to begin August 27, 2018.
{¶ 8} On August 28, 2018, the trial court entered a final continuance at the request of Williams‘s trial counsel, setting trial for September 10, 2018. Williams did not sign that continuance entry, instead indicating that he objected to the continuance and demanded a speedy trial. Trial commenced on September 10, 2018 and lasted until September 17, 2018.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} In his reopened aрpeal, Williams assigns two errors for our review:1
- I. APPELLANT‘S STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND HIS CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
- II. APPELLANT‘S COUNSEL ON APPEAL CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR NOT RAISING THE SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION.
{¶ 10} Once an appeal has been reopened, the appellant “must establish the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim for ineffective assistance of [appellate] counsel.” State v. Long, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-90, 2022-Ohio-1601, ¶ 26. See also State v. Leyh, 166 Ohio St.3d 365, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 37 (“Under App.R. 26(B), the determination whether appellate counsel was deficient and prejudiced the applicant is to be made after the appeal has been reopened and the parties are аfforded the opportunity to have counsel, transmit the necessary record, and substantively brief the issues.“). Williams‘s first assignment of error addresses the merits of his claim that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial, while his second assignment of error asserts his prior appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that issue.
A. Whether Williams‘s right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 11} The right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the
{¶ 12} Appellate review of a trial court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss based on a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Bias, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-329, 2022-Ohio-4643, ¶ 149. We must give deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to those facts. Id.
1. Whether Williams‘s statutory right to a speedy trial wаs violated
{¶ 13} We begin by addressing whether Williams‘s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Under
{¶ 15} In this case, 288 days elapsed between Williams‘s arrest on November 26, 2017 and the first day of his trial on September 10, 2018. Thus, because more than 270 days passed, Williams has demonstrated a prima facie violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Boyce at ¶ 11. The state argues that several tolling events and waivers reduced the number of days to fewer than 270. By contrast, Williams asserts he never intended to waive his speedy-trial time and that more than 270 days elapsed before trial even if certain tolling events are considered.
a. Tolling and waiver of statutory speedy-trial time
{¶ 16} “Two key concepts direct how a court must charge the days when calculating a potential speedy trial violation: waiver and tolling.” Brown at ¶ 28. If a defendant waives speedy-trial rights, the days included in the waiver period do not count toward the deadline for bringing him to trial. Id. Tolling occurs by operation of law under
{¶ 17} An exhaustive list of events and circumstances that toll statutory speedy-trial time is set forth in
{¶ 18} Williams was arrested on November 26, 2017. When computing time under the speedy-trial statute, we do not include the date of arrest. State v. Kadunc, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-920, 2016-Ohio-4637, ¶ 10. Therefore, our count begins with November 27, 2017. From November 27 to December 13, 2017, 17 days elapsed that are chargeable toward the statе.
{¶ 19} On December 13, 2017, Williams moved for discovery from the state. The state filed its initial response 21 days later, on January 3, 2018. “A [defendant‘s] discovery request tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable amount of time necessary to allow the state to respond to the request.” State v. Belville, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-3879, ¶ 21. There is nothing to indicate the state failed to respond to Williams‘s discovery request within a reasonable time. Moreover, in his reply brief on appeal, Williams concedes his speedy-trial time was tolled until the state‘s initial discovery response. Thus, the 21 days that passed between December 14, 2017 and January 3, 2018 are chargeable toward Williams and are not included in calculating his speedy-trial time. Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 20} Williams‘s speedy-trial time resumed on January 4, 2018 and continued until January 17, 2018; those 14 days are chargeable toward the state. On January 17, 2018, the trial court entered a continuance at the request of both parties reassigning the trial date to February 14, 2018 (“the January 17th continuance“). Williams waived his right to a speedy trial under the January 17th continuance. Accordingly, the 28 days from January 18 to February 14, 2018 are chargeable toward Williams and are not included in his speedy-trial time.
{¶ 21} On February 14, 2018, the trial court entered a continuance at the state‘s request, reassigning the trial date to May 21, 2018 (“the February 14th continuance“). Williams objected to the February 14th continuance and the language in the continuance entry waiving Williams‘s right to a speedy trial was struck out. The 96 days that elapsed under the February 14th continuance are chargeable toward the state and are included in calculating Williams‘s speedy-trial time.
{¶ 22} The trial court entered another continuance at the state‘s request on May 3, 2018, reassigning the trial date to July 9, 2018 (“the May 3rd continuance“). The parties
{¶ 23} On July 2, 2018, the trial court entered another continuance at the state‘s request, reassigning the trial date to September 10, 2018 (“the July 2nd continuance“). The parties also dispute the effect of the July 2nd continuance. Williams clearly objected to the July 2nd continuance and the language in the continuance entry waiving his right to a speedy trial was struck out. At the August 13, 2018 hearing, the prosecutor asserted the July 2nd continuance was necessary to investigate the possibility that Williams might have been involved in the death of a witness. Williams‘s trial counsel argued there was no reasonable basis to believe Williams was involved in the witness‘s death and speedy-trial time should not be tolled for the period under the July 2nd continuance. In its decision denying Williams‘s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded Williams‘s speedy-trial time during this period was tolled under
{¶ 25} Based on the various waiver and tolling events described above, we conclude that 225 of the 288 calendar days that elapsed between November 27, 2017 and September 10, 2018 are chargeable toward the state for purposes of calculating Williams‘s speedy-trial time.
b. Three-for-one counting when a defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail
{¶ 26} When determining the 270-day period within which a defendant must be brought to trial on a felony charge, “each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall bе counted as three days.”
{¶ 27} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the triple-count provision under
{¶ 28} Here, the event that formed the basis for the drug possession charge in case No. 18CR-53 occurred before the altercation that resulted in the murder charges in case No. 17CR-6553. Thus, while the state may have had knowledge of the facts supporting the indictment in case No. 18CR-53 at the time of the indictment in case No. 17CR-6553, the charge in case No. 18CR-53 did not “arise from the same facts” as the charges in case No.
{¶ 29} As explained above, the 17-day period from November 27, 2017 until Williams filed his discovery request on December 13, 2017 was chargeable to the state. The triple-count provision of
c. Summary of Williams‘s statutory speedy-trial time
{¶ 30} Pursuant to our independent calculation, considering the various waivers and tolling events, and triple counting of time pursuant to
| Beginning date | End date | Calendar days elapsed | Speedy-trial time elapsed |
|---|---|---|---|
| November 27, 2017 | December 13, 2017 | 17 | 51 |
| December 14, 2017 | January 3, 2018 | 21 | 0 |
| January 4, 2018 | January 5, 2018 | 2 | 6 |
| January 6, 2018 | January 17, 2018 | 12 | 12 |
| January 18, 2018 | February 14, 2018 | 28 | 0 |
| February 15, 2018 | May 21, 2018 | 96 | 96 |
| May 22, 2018 | July 9, 2018 | 49 | 49 |
| July 10, 2018 | August 27, 2018 | 49 | 49 |
| August 28, 2018 | September 10, 2018 | 14 | 0 |
| Total | 288 | 263 |
{¶ 31} Because fewer than 270 days elapsed between Williams‘s arrest and the first day of his trial, his statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss on that basis.
2. Whether Williams‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 32} We also consider whether Williams‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. “[E]ven if statutory timetables are complied with, ‘constitutional guarantees may be broader than statutory provisions in some circumstances.’ ” Columbus v. LaMarca, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-440, 2015-Ohio-4467, ¶ 15, quoting Sellers, 2009-Ohio-2231, at ¶ 12. When analyzing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, we undertake a two-step inquiry. First, we consider whether the defendant has established that the delay was presumptively prejudicial. Smith, 2021-Ohio-1936, at ¶ 38. Second, if a presumptively prejudicial delay exists, we apply a four-factor balancing test examining: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant‘s timely assertion оf his speedy-trial right, and
{¶ 33} “Generally, delay is presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year.” Smith at ¶ 38. As explained above, in this case the total delay between arrest and trial was 288 days (approximately 9 and 1/2 month), and only 225 calendar days (approximately 7 and 1/2 month) of that time was chargeable to the state. This court and other Ohio appellate districts have previously held that similar delays are not presumptively prejudicial. See State v. Graham, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-636, 2019-Ohio-2020, ¶ 58 (delay of 9 months between indictment and plea was not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Webb, 4th Dist. No. 01CA32, 2002-Ohio-3552, ¶ 26 (delay of “just over [6] months” was not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Pinson, 4th Dist. No. 00CA2713 (Mar. 16, 2001) (6 and 1/2 month delay “does not come close to approaching [the] threshold for presuming prejudice“); State v. Johnson, 13 Ohio App.3d 271, 271-72 (8th Dist.1984) (9-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial). Because Williams has not demonstrated a presumptively prejudicial delay, we need not reach the second step of the analysis. Kadunc at ¶ 23.
{¶ 34} Williams has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss on that basis.
{¶ 35} Because Williams has failed to establish a violation of his statutory or constitutional rights to a speedy trial, we overrule his first assignment of error.
B. Whether Williams‘s prior appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to argue a speedy-trial violation on direct appeal
{¶ 36} In his second assignment of error, Williams asserts his prior appellate counsеl was ineffective during the initial direct appeal for not presenting an assignment of error asserting a violation of his right to a speedy trial. An appellate attorney has wide latitude in deciding which issues and arguments will be most effective on appeal and is not required to argue meritless assignments of error. State v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-226, 2007-Ohio-1594, ¶ 3. As explained above, we conclude that Williams‘s right to a speedy trial was not violated. Therefore, Williams‘s prior appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1032, 2010-Ohio-786, ¶ 18 (concluding appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a meritless claim).
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Williams‘s two assignments of error and, pursuant to
Judgment confirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and BOGGS, JJ., concur.