35 Mo. 229 | Mo. | 1864
delivered the opinion of the court.
At the July term, 1864, of the St. Louis Criminal Court the defendants were indicted for grand larceny, and upon conviction sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of seven
Williams introduced evidence of good character, and from the statement of his own witnesses it appeared that his real name was George D. Catón, Williams being an assumed name. The other defendant also passed under an assumed name. It is insisted by the counsel for the defendants, that the evidence does not disclose a case of larceny, but simply a trespass or breach of trust; that defendants obtained the property in Illinois as bailees, and that the relation of bailee subsisted until the sale in St. Louis, and so subsisting, the offence was not completed in Illinois.
It is well settled that larceny may be committed of goods obtained from the owner by delivery, if it be done animo fu-randi. In Pear’s case, 2 East’s P. C. 685, it was held that the hiring a horse on pretence of taking a journey, but in truth with intent to steal it, and evidencing such felonious intent by selling the horse, was larceny.
In Spencer’s case (Lew. C. C. 197) the prisoner went to the house of the prosecutor and asked him if he let horses out to hire, and if he could have one to go to Stockport, a distance of about seven miles. Prosecutor let him have a mare, and prisoner mounted her and rode away, but in a different direction from Stockport, and the next day offered the
The doctrine of those cases has been fully recognized by our own courts. We do not contend that a bailee who obtains possession without a fraudulent intent, can be charged with larceny by reason of subsequent conversion to his own use; but we hold that if he obtains possession by delivery under a pretence of hiring, but with the actual design of depriving the owner of his property, he is guilty of the crime of stealing.
The question of intention is a question of fact to be deter mined by the jury from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and in the case at bar the question was submitted to the jury in the 3d and 6th instructions given by the court. The jury found against the defendants, and we are at a loss to perceive how they could have found otherwise ; for, in our judgment, it is clear that the larceny was complete in Illinois, and the fact of selling the property in St. Louis only furnished additional evidence of the fraudulent intention of the parties in the original taking. It is stated in the brief of defendants’ counsel, that the facts given in evidence were not controverted by defendants, and as these facts established an undoubted case pf larceny, we see no necessity for criticising the action of the court below in refusing to give the instructions asked by defendants. Whether the crime of larceny committed in one State can be trans_ planted with the goods into another State, so as to become an offence against and punishable in the latter State, is a
The other judges concurring, the judgment of the Criminal Court will be affirmed.