State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Shea
Thе dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, Vance Williams, has standing to challenge the procedure by which a witness against him has been immunized under
The chief сourt administrator appointed Anthony V. DeMayo, a judge of the Superior Court, to conduct an inquiry pursuant to
The evidеnce Sabia gave, together with other evidence, led to the arrest of the defendant, a Torrington police officer, on charges of possessing cocaine and hindering prosecution. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion seeking to bar the admission into evidence of the opinion testimony of Sabia and оthers that substances they had provided to the defendant or had observed him possess or consume were in fact narcotic substances under our drug laws. During the course of a hearing concerning that motion, Sabia refused to testify and asserted his federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
*206The state’s attorney then mаde a second application for an order directing Sabia to testify under a grant of immunity. In the argument that ensued, the trial court, Moraghan, J., was apprised that it was Judge DeMayo who had acted upon the earlier application for the order directing Sabia to testify during the inquiry he was conducting. The defendant then claimed that a judge conducting an inquiry under
Notwithstanding its order directing Sabia to testify, the trial court, after defense counsel renewed his objection, later suppressed that testimony. The trial court relied on two separate grounds for excluding Sabia’s testimony. First, the trial court determined that a judge who has been appointed for the purpose of an investigation under
The state raises the following issues in challenging the trial court’s exclusion of Sabia’s testimony: (1) whether the immunity statute or considerations of public policy forbid a judge of the Superior Court who is conducting a judicial inquiry from performing the allegedly nondiscretionary act of granting an application for an order to compel a witness to testify before the inquiry; (2) whether, even if there werе error in granting the application to compel testimony during the inquiry, the exclusionary rule would in any event be applicable; (3) whether the defendant has standing to contest the allegedly erroneous grant of immunity to Sabia; and (4) whether our immunity statute requires the state to establish an independent source for immunized testimony. In view of our conclusion that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the admissibility of Sabia’s testimony, we shall not address the state’s first two claims.
I
The trial court acknowledged that a defendant ordinarily lacks standing to challenge a grant of immunity to a witness who testifies against him. United States v. Foster, 478 F.2d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 1973); State v. Melvin, 390 A.2d 1024, 1029 (Me. 1978). The trial court determined, nevertheless, that because the grant of immunity by Judgе DeMayo to Sabia was “clearly illegal” that “this case demanded] an exception to the general rule that one party has no standing to raise another’s rights.” We conclude that the circumstances of this case do not warrant a departure from the general principle that a defendant does not have stаnding to challenge the method by which a witness against him has been immunized.
*208The trial court relied on Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969), for the proposition that a defendant has standing “to complain that his conviction was obtained in a case where the trial judge went outside his judicial province to grant immunity to a witness.” We note initially that Ellis is not binding precedent on this court, in contrast to a decisiоn by the United States Supreme Court. We decline to apply the rationale of Ellis to this case for two reasons. First, subsequent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, while not directly overruling Ellis, have emphasized that the right to be free from testimonial compulsion is a personal one that may not be asserted vicariously. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398-99, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973). Second, the facts in Ellis were quite different from those in the case at bar. In Ellis, the District Court had usurped executive power by acting on its own initiative to grant immunity to a witness. The District Court in Ellis had assumed a role outside the scope of the judicial power. In the present case the state applied for an order directing Sabia to testify under a grant of immunity. The defendant concedes that any judge of the Superior Cоurt except Judge DeMayo could properly have granted immunity to Sabia. We decline in the present circumstances to depart from the general rule that a defendant lacks standing to challenge the procedure by which a witness against him has been immunized. We hold that the defendant does not have standing in this case to challenge whether a judge of the Superior Court who is conducting a judicial inquiry may properly grant an application for an order to compel a witness to testify before the inquiry.
II
The trial court also held that the defendant had standing to challenge the admissibility of Sabia’s compelled *209testimony under
The state argues that the trial court’s interpretation of the last sentence of the statute effectively renders the entire immunity statute unworkable.
In determining the meaning of statutory language, this court must read a statute as a whole. Kyrtatas v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 205 Conn. 694, 699, 535 A.2d 357 (1988); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 546, 534 A.2d 888 (1987); State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 161, 496 A.2d 186 (1985). Moreover, where a statute is capable of two constructions, one that is rational and effective in accomplishing the evident legislative object, and the other leading to “bizarre results” destructive of that purpose, the former should prevail. Simko v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 413, 422-23, 533 A.2d 879 (1987) (Shea, J., dissenting); State v. Parmalee, supra, 165.
If the last sentence of the statute, on which the trial court relied, stood alone, it would literally bar the testimony of any immunized witness, because such evidence must necessarily have been “discovered as a result of or otherwise derived from compelled testimony,” quite apart from any question, such as that raised in this case, of the validity of the immunity grant. Thus, the purpose of the enactment, to enable the state to use testimony otherwise unavailable because of the privilege against self-incrimination, would be entirely defeated. The last sentence would effectively nullify the preceding provisions of the statute, because it would have to be shown that the evidence to be furnished by the immunized witness had been obtained from “a source independent of the compelled testimony or evidence.” Such a self-contradictory result could not have been intended by the legislature.
The immunity created by
The trial court was concerned that the last sentence of
We do not view the last sentence of
There is error, the judgment of dismissal is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with direc*213tion to permit the testimony of the immunized witness in this case.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
“[General Statutes] Sec. 54-47a. compelling testimony op witness, immunity prom prosecution, (a) Whenever in the judgment of the chief state’s attorney, a state’s attorney or the deputy chief state’s attorney, the testimony of any witness or the production of books, papers or other evidence of any witness (1) in any criminal proceeding involving narcotics, arsоn, bribery, gambling, election law violations, felonious crimes of violence or any violation which is an offense under the provisions of title 25, before a court or grand jury of this state or (2) in any investigation conducted by an investigatory grand jury as provided in sections 54-47b to 54-47g, inclusive, is necessary to the public interest, the chief state’s attornеy, the state’s attorney, or the deputy chief state’s attorney, may, with notice to the witness, after the witness has claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, make application to the court for an order directing the witness to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this section.
“(b) Upon the issuance of the order such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers or other evidence in such case or proceeding on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. No such witness may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled to testify or produce evidence, and no testimony or evidence so compelled, and no evidence discovered as a result of or otherwise derived from testimony or evidence so compelled, may be used as evidence against him in any proceeding, except that no witness shall be immune from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving such testimony or producing such evidence. Whenever evidence is objected to as inadmissible because it was discovered as a result of or оtherwise derived from compelled testimony or evidence, the burden shall be upon the person offering the challenged evidence to establish a source independent of the compelled testimony or evidence.”