State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hudson
OPINION
HUDSON, Justice.Appellant was charged in separate indictments with aggravated robbery and burglary of a habitation. Thе indictments were dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA).
While he was incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Marianna, Florida, appellant was indiсted by a grand jury of this state. Pursuant to a formal request by the State of Texas, the federal government transferred appellant to the Brazoria County Jail. Appellant arrived on September 8, 1994. Four months latеr, on January 6, 1995, the time for commencing trial expired under the terms of IADA A month later, on February 8, 1995, the trial cоurt granted appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictments pursuant to Article 51.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedurе.
The Interstate Agreement on Detain-ers Act is a сompact among member states, the United States, the territories and possessions of the United Statеs, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Bell v. State, 768 S.W.2d 790, 800 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref‘d). The purpоse of the agreement is to encourage the speedy disposition of untried criminal accusations against persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions by temporarily transferring custody оf such prisoners to sovereigns possessing untried criminal charges.
The separation of powers provision of thе Texas Constitution is violated in one of two ways: (1) if one branch of government assumes, or is delegated, a power that is more properly attached to another branch of government, or (2) one branch of government unduly interferes with another branch of government to the extent that it cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers. Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The State claims the legislature has interfered with the powers of the judiciary because the statute compels a trial court to give рrecedence to those eases involving “foreign” defendants. The State also argues the statute unduly interferes with the prosecutor’s discretion. We find neither of these arguments to be persuasive.
The рower and authority of the legislature is plenary. It is limited only by the express or implied restrictions found in or *419arising from the Constitution. Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tеx.Crim.App.1991). After reviewing the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, we perceive no infringement upon Article II, § 1 of the constitution. The statute does not unreasonably interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion, and it provides a far more efficient mechanism for procuring the attendance of foreign prisoners than does a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. In this case, the State’s attorney requested appellant’s transfer from the federal penitentiary. If the State was not preparеd for trial, it should not have submitted the request. If unexpected circumstances prevented the commencement of trial, the State could have petitioned the trial court for an extension of time under the provisions of Article 51.14. The State made no such request, and it does not contend on appeal that it was entitled to an extension for “good cause.”
Neither does the statute unduly infringe upon the аbility of the trial court to control its docket. Engle v. Coker, 820 S.W.2d 247, 251-52 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1991, orig. proceeding). Without the interstаte compact, Texas would have no certainty that it could ever compel a “foreign” рrisoner to stand trial for crimes committed in this state. While IADA may force some courts to give precedence to trials of foreign prisoners, the time limits imposed by the statute are not unreasonable. Without such a statute, the trial of a foreign prisoner might be delayed for decades.
Courts, prosecutors, and criminal defendants all have important interests that are served by IADA First, an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not abrogated merely because he is incarcerated by another sovereign. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 381-83, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). Second, a speedy trial enhances the chances of ascertaining the truth and heightens the dеterrent effect of any punishment imposed against the defendant. Third, the statute promotes the prosecutor’s ability to bring fugitives to justice. The State’s point of error is overruled.
The trial court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.