State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Clark
Appellant was convicted in a jury trial of the offense of driving while intoxicated,
According to the evidence, on February 23,1984, Williams was found seated behind the steering wheel of an automobile with the engine running. The car was in a ditch at a point on 1-70 highway in Columbia near Highway 63. When Williams stepped from the сar, he was observed by the ar*126resting officer to stagger. The odor of alcohol was moderate and Williams’ eyes were bloodshot. He was placed undеr arrest, was taken to the police station and a breathalyzer test showed a blood alcohol content of .23%.
Prior to. submission of the case to the jury, thе trial court made certain findings relative to appellant’s status as a previous offender. In particular, based on certified copies of conviсtion records, the court found that appellant had been convicted in the circuit court of Audrain County September 6, 1977 of driving while intoxicated and on July 13, 1983, he had been convicted of a similar charge in the circuit court of Boone County. Based on these two previous convictions, the court found appellant to be a persistent offender within the meaning of
In his first point on appeal, Williams claims the court misconstrued and misapplied the above cited statute in holding that enhancement of punishment for a successive conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated applies to the third such conviction. The statute reads as follows:
“A ‘persistent offender’ is one who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses committed at different times within tеn years of a previous intoxication-related traffic offense conviction” Section 577.023.1(2), RSMo.Supp. 1984.
According to appellant, a defendant becomes subject to felony punishment as a persistent intoxication-related traffic offender only when the current charge is in addition to two or more earlier convictions and a previous offense conviction, all within ten years from the earliest to the latest date. By this reckoning, it is the fourth offense rather than the third which subjеcts the offender to enhanced punishment.
No decision from Missouri appellate courts construing this statute in this particular has been cited by the parties оr found. Two recent cases, however, reach results which are consistent only with the assumption that it is the third offense, rather than the fourth, in the series of intoxication convictions which subjects the offender to felony grade punishment.
In State v. Acton, 665 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. banc 1984), the defendant had two prior intoxication related traffic convictions. The сurrent charge was the third separate offense within ten years. The trial court convicted Acton and sentenced him as a persistent offender under
“Significаntly, the legislative history of recent DWI statutes indicates that at all relevant times a conviction for a third or subsequent offense was punishable as a felony. See § 564.440, repealed 1979;§ 577.010 , amended 1982;§ 577.023, RSMo .1983.” Acton, 665 S.W.2d at 620.
In State v. Newkirk, 677 S.W.2d 905 (Mo.App.1984), the current DWI offense occurred July 31, 1982 and the plea of guilty was entered March 21, 1983. Sentence was not pronounced until November 21, 1983 at which time, the 1983 amendment to
In addition to the inference drawn from thе above cited cases, a further ground exists to construe the language of § 577.023.1(2), RSMo.Supp.1984 as designating the third intoxication offense to be the event which triggers felоny grade punishment. The first rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. A statute is to be given that interpretation which corresponds with the legislative objective and, where necessary, the strict letter of the statute must yield to the manifest intent of the legislature. BCI Corp. v. Charlebois Const. Co., 673 S.W.2d 774, 780 (Mo. banc 1984).
In prior versions of the persistent offеnder punishment statutes related to driving while intoxicated offenses, it has consistently been the policy as declared by the legislature to impose punishment escalation on the occasion of the third offense. The opinion in State v. Acton, supra, includes this same observation. Were appellant’s interpretation of the presеnt statute to be accepted, such would necessarily require the conclusion that by adopting the 1983 act, it was the intention of the legislature to reverse its long standing policy and extend leniency to third offenders. Such a change in policy is not evident from any direct expression by the legislature nor does appеllant cite to the court any legislative history, committee reports or other confirmation that the course of past legislative policy was deliberаtely altered. The only ground for the result advocated by appellant is his argument that the “two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses” and the “prеvious intoxication-related traffic offense” described in the statute are all in the past tense suggesting that they must be offenses which preceded the current сharge.
It must be conceded that the language of the present section is less clear than the provisions of the former enactments and that the interprеtation advocated by appellant is at least arguable. In view of the legislative history, however, and the implied pronouncement by the Supreme Court in State v. Acton, supra, wе conclude, for all the reasons discussed, that the statute does require a third conviction of DWI within ten years to be classified as a felony. Appellant has nо cause to complain that his sentence imposed upon him as a persistent offender exceeded the permissible punishment range.
In his second point, appellant contends that the record introduced to prove his prior DWI conviction under date of September 6, 1977 was not competent evidenсe because the style of the case was State v. Bussis Williams. He says it was not therefore shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he was one and the same person аs the defendant convicted in that case.
The trial court was directed to this discrepancy in first names at the time the exhibit was offered. The exhibit was receivеd and appellant’s objection was overruled because the same document in the certification section referred to the defendant as Bussie. The trial judge was apparently convinced that the discrepancy was a typographical error. We agree and deny the point of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.