620 N.E.2d 171 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1993
The state appeals from the trial court's order which suspended the driver's license of the defendant-appellee, Jennifer Ann Williams, but granted her occupational driving privileges in violation of that part of the Financial Responsibility Act codified in R.C.
Although Williams did not enter an appearance in this appeal, during the ex parte argument, we sua sponte questioned the City Prosecutor's authority to pursue an appeal by right under R.C.
The state or a municipality did not originally enjoy a right of appeal from an order or judgment in a criminal case. To balance this disparity between the rights of the accused and the accuser, the General Assembly enacted R.C.
"(A) A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter or [of] right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case * * * which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or information, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized property or grants post conviction relief pursuant to sections
In his written response, following notice of our intention to consider this issue and the opportunity to brief it, the prosecutor contends that, notwithstanding the criminal nature of the proceedings below, the state's appeal addresses only that part of the trial court's order concerning the Financial Responsibility Act, a civil statute imposing civil penalties. Thus, the prosecutor argues, the restrictions contained in R.C.
The state's argument invokes two inquiries: (1) is the suspension of driving privileges for failure to maintain proof of financial responsibility covering the operation of a motor vehicle at the time of the offense under the Financial Responsibility Act a criminal penalty, and (2) is the appeal in this case an appeal from a "decision of a trial court in a criminal case" as contemplated by R.C.
Drawing upon the rule in United States v. One Assortment of89 Firearms (1984),
In the application of the Casalicchio analysis to the Financial Responsibility Act, it is clear, under the first tier, that the legislature expressly designated the penalties as civil. See, e.g., R.C.
The second inquiry, as we have noted, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the penalties imposed by the Financial Responsibility Act are civil or criminal in nature. Rather, the second inquiry tests the method that the prosecutor chose to bring this appeal. That issue, simply put, is whether this appeal is an appeal from a "decision of the trial court in a criminal case" for the purposes of triggering the application of R.C.
The Financial Responsibility Act describes the proceedings taken under it as "special, summary statutory proceedings." R.C.
Although the Financial Responsibility Act contains certain hybrid elements and is, in reality, a special statutory proceeding engrafted onto a criminal proceeding, we hold that, when application of the Act arises under R.C.
Under R.C.
Appeal dismissed.
SHANNON, P.J., and KLUSMEIER, J., concur. *547