|2Thе Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information on April 8, 2008, charging defendant, Robert Williams, with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 1 in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1. At the February 20, 2009 arraignment, defendant pled not guilty. Following the disposition of some pre-trial motions, the matter proceeded to trial on September 15 and 16, 2009. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the twelve-person jury found defendant guilty as charged. On September 25, 2009, the trial court sentenсed defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for twelve years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals.
FACTS
On February 23, 2008, at approximately 1:48 a.m., Deputy David Chaplain, a fifteen-year veteran of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office, was dispatched to Starrett and Jefferson Highway in reference to a possible fight. As he approached this high crime, high narcotics area, Deрuty Chaplain observed a black female, later identified as April Curtis, leaning into the passenger side window of a white |struck. Thinking that a hand-to-hand drug transaction might be occurring, Deputy Chaplain illuminated the truck with his spotlight. When he did so, Curtis exited the window, and the truck quickly fled the area. Curtis started walking at a brisk pace, continually looking over her shoulder at Deputy Chaplain who was in a marked police unit and dressed in full uniform. She then started jogging toward a black Pontiаc Grand Prix that was parked a couple of houses away from the white truck.
Noticing that the Pontiac’s brake lights were on and were then turned off, the officer shined his spotlight on the Grand Prix. At that time, a black male, later identified as defendant, exited the driver’s side of the vehicle and began running fast toward a nearby carport. When the officer saw this, he exited his car and pursued defendant on foot. Defendant tried to scale a fence, but Deputy Chaplain was able to apprehend him and handcuff him for officer safety.
Deputy Chaplain told Curtis he was going to handcuff her, but she walked to the car. He followed her. As they approached the car, Deputy Chaplain looked through the driver’s side window with a flashlight and saw the butt of a gun wedged between the seats. It was later learned that that gun was fully loaded, and 14there was extra ammunition on the passenger seat. Deputy Chaplain also saw one bag of green vegetable matter and a small baggie of off-white, rock-like objects that appeared to be crack cocaine. 2
Afterward, he attempted to handcuff Curtis; however, as he was trying to do so, she turned and struck him in the neck. A brief strugglе ensued, but the deputy was able to handcuff her. Deputy Chaplain walked Curtis back to the carport and advised her and defendant that they were under arrest. He patted them down and located a set of car keys to the Pontiac in defendant’s front pants pocket. The officers subsequently checked their computer and found that defendant was the registered owner of the Pontiac.
At trial, defendant admitted that the Pontiac was registered in his name; however, he claimed that a friend, with whom he shared the vehicle, had used the car that day. Further, defendant claimed that he was outside the car when the officer approached and did not run from the officer. Defendant denied putting the gun in the car. He stated that he first learned that the drugs and gun were in the car when the officer opened the door.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In his first assigned error, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. On February 26, 2009, defendant filed a motion to suppress contending that the evidence sought to be used against him was illegally and unlawfully obtained and should be suppressed. On July 23, 2009, a hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing, Deputy Chaplain testified about the circumstances surrounding defendant’s stop and the subsequent seizure of the evidence. His testimony at the suppression hearing was almost identical to his [stestimony at trial as set forth in the statement of the facts and, therefore, will not be reiterated herein. After considering the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, the trial judge denied defendant’s motion to suppress without providing reasons. Defendant now challenges this ruling.
On appeal, defendant first contends that he was arrested without probable cause when he was handcuffed. He next asserts that, assuming this was only an investigatory stop, the police lacked reasonable
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit unreasonable seаrches and seizures.
State v. Addison,
In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proof in establishing the admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). The trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is afforded great weight, and it will not be set aside unless the preponderance of the evidence clearly favors suppression. To determine whether the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is correct, the appellate court may consider the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence presented at trial.
State v. Addison,
| fiIn considering defendant’s arguments, we will first address the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.
It is well established that a рolice officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1;
Terry v. Ohio,
The facts upon which an officer bases аn investigatory stop should be evaluated in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident. A reviewing court must take into consideration the totality of the circumstances and give deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer that might elude an untrained person.
State v. Burns,
An officer’s mere unparticular-ized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity is insufficient to establish reasonable grounds to stop a person.
State v. Barney,
In
Illinois v. Wardlow,
In the instant case, at 1:48 a.m., Deputy Chaplain observed a female leaning into the window of a truck in a high crime, high narcotics arеa. Based on his experience, the deputy thought that a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction was occurring. When he illuminated the truck with his spotlight, the truck quickly fled, and the female walked at a brisk pace, then jogged, toward a Pontiac parked nearby. She nervously looked over her shoulder at Deputy Chaplain as she was proceeding toward the Pontiac. The deputy noticed that the brake lights of the Pontiac were on, and then they turned off. When he shined his spotlight at the Pontiac, defendant exited the driver’s seat of the vehicle and ran underneath a nearby carport.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the high crime nature of the area^ the lateness of the hour, the possible drug transaction between the female and the individual in the truck, the female’s flight toward the Pontiac, Rand defendant’s flight away from the Pontiac, we find that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of defendant.
Having found reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop, the next issue to be addressed is whether the subsequent handcuffing of defendant was warranted, and whether the handcuffing elevated the encounter from an investigatory stop to an arrest.
In
State v. Morton,
Inherent in the right of police to conduct a brief investigatory detention is аlso the right to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. There is no question that the use of handcuffs incrementally increases the degree of force that is used in detaining an individual. However, arrest-like features such as the use of drawn weapons and handcuffs may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest. Therefore, when the State seeks to prove that an investigatory detention involving the use of handсuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry stop, the State must show some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimáte purpose of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm. If the added intrusion is not warranted under particular circumstances, a Terry stop may escalate into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause to render it valid.
In the instant case, the record indicates that after defendant exited the Pontiac, he ran underneath a carport and tried to scale a fence. Deputy Chaplain, who was apparently alone at the time, then ran after defendant and was able to appre
Having determined that thе officer lawfully stopped and handcuffed defendant, we further find that the officer was thereafter justified in seizing the evidence from the vehicle. In the instant case, the record reflects that while Deputy Chaplain was dealing with defendant, he observed April Curtis walk to the Pontiac several times and try to open the door, even though he told her to come back by him. When she refused to sit down as directed, the officer told her that he was going to handсuff her. Nonetheless, she proceeded to walk to the car, at which point Deputy Chaplain followed her. As the officer approached the car, he shined his flashlight into the driver’s side window and observed the butt of a gun wedged between the seats. He also saw a bag of green vegetable matter on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle, along with a small baggie of off-white, rock-like objects that appeared to be crack cocaine. After seeing the marijuana, cocaine, and gun in the vehicle, the officer had sufficient probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband so as to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile exception.
See State v. Joseph,
Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that the trial judge did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The arguments raised by defendant in this assigned error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In his second assigned error, defendant challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence of other crimes. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent seeking to introduce evidence that at the same time defendant was in possession of a firearm, he was also in possession of marijuana and counterfeit cocaine. In this | innotice, the State indicated that, pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 404 B(l), it would introduce the evidence fоr the purpose of proving motive, intent, plan, absence of accident, and as conduct constituting an integral part of the act or transaction that was the subject of this proceeding. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the evidence was admissible as res gestae, and further it related to motive and intent. The prosecutor then informed the court that, in connection with this ruling, he was going to call Detective Sergeant Joe Williams as an expert at trial to testify that guns were commonly used in the distribution of drugs.
Defendant now argues that this other crimes evidence, including the testimony of the expert, was improperly admitted at trial and that his conviction should be reversed. Defendant contends that this evidence was unduly prejudicial and served no purpose other than to depict him as a drug dealer. The State responds that the marijuana was admissible as res gestae evidence, since the marijuana possession
Generally, evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by a criminal defendant is not admissible at trial. LSA-C.E. art. 404(B)(1);
State v. Prieur,
One of the factors enumerated in the article must be at issue, have some independent relevance, or be an element of the crime charged, and the probative value of the extraneous evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. The defendant bears the burden to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of the other crimes evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 404(B)(1) will not be disturbed.
State v. Lawson,
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be introduced when it is independently relevant or when it relates to conduct, formerly referred to as res gestae, that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. In
State v. Taylor,
01-1638 (La.1/14/03),
Res gestae events constituting other crimes are deemed admissible because they are so nearly connected to the charged offense that the state could not accurately present its case without reference to them. A close proximity in time and location is required between the charged offense and the other crimes evidence “to insure that ‘the purpose served by admission of other crimes evidence is not to depict defеndant as a bad man, but rather to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’” State v. Colomb, 98-2813, p. 3 (La.10/1/99),747 So.2d 1074 , 1076 (quoting State v. Haarala,398 So.2d 1093 , 1098 (La.1981)). The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is broad and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to what they heard or observed during or after the commission of the crime if a continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances. State v. Huizar,414 So.2d 741 , 748 (La.1982); State v. Kimble,407 So.2d 693 , 698 (La.1981). In addition, as this court recently observed, integral act (res gestae) evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative completeness | ^without which the state’s case would lose its “narrative momentum and cohesiveness, “with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reаch an honest verdict.’ ” Colomb, 747So.2d at 1076 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 ,117 S.Ct. 644 ,136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)).
In a case similar to the instant one,
State v. Colomb,
98-2813 (La.10/1/99),
In the instant case, the narcotics possession was part of a continuing chain of events as the deputy observed the marijuana, counterfeit cocaine, and gun | ^simultaneously in plain view inside defendant’s vehicle. As in
Colomb,
the evidence of defendant’s narcotics possession contemporaneous with the police discovery of the firearm not only provided a narrative completeness to a case which began as a possible narcotics stop, but also formed an integral part of the context facts in which the jurors evaluated the State’s case to determine whether defеndant exercised dominion and control over the weapon. With regard to the expert testimony regarding the packaging and sale of drugs and their association with guns, we note that similar testimony was presented at trial in
State v. Colomb,
Based on the foregoing discussion, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of the other crimes evidence or in the admission of the expert testimony. Accordingly, this assigned error is without merit.
ERROR PATENT DISCUSSION
We have also reviewed the record for еrrors patent in accordance with LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 920;
State v. Oliveaux,
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
Notes
. At trial, the parties stipulated that defendant previously pled guilty to possession of cocaine.
. At trial, the State and the defense stipulated that the green vegetable matter was submitted for analysis at the crime lab, with the result being that the substance was marijuana. The other substance was apparently counterfeit cocaine and was referred to throughout the trial as "bunk.”