*1 934A.2d 38 Maryland STATE D. Arvel WILLIAMS. Term, 39, Sept. No. Maryland. Appeals of Court 19, 2007. Oct. *2 Holcomb, L. Atty. Steven Asst. General (Douglas F. Gan- sler, Baltimore) General, brief, Atty. on for Appellant. (Law Sansone, Baltimore; of Lisa J. Office
Lisa J. Sansone Baltimore) Brown, P.A., Brown, A. A. Warren Warren brief, Appellee. for C.J., RAKER, HARRELL, BELL, before
Argued (Retired, WILNER, GREENE, BATTAGLIA, ALAN M. (Retired, CATHELL, and DALE R. Assigned), Specially Assigned), JJ. Specially WILNER, Retired, Assigned. Specially Judge,
ALAN M. con- for violations of the appellee prosecution In this laws, Court the Circuit dangerous substance trolled as evidence suppressing entered an order County Harford from marijuana appellee’s seized cocaine suspected order was based on traffic following pretextual under appellee’s rights violated finding seizure *3 Acting to the U.S. Constitution. Fourth Amendment the 12-302(c) Code, & Proc. § of the Cts. Jud. Maryland under cer- Article, granted that decision. We appealed the State Appeals in of Special the Court proceedings tiorari before 12, 2007, affirming the and, filed an Order September on explain now the basis Court. We order of Circuit our Order.
BACKGROUND entirely came from stop regarding The facts motion to hearing appellee’s at the on presented evidence evidence, fairly and the inferences We take suppress. it, who appellee, most favorable to light deducible from the ultimate determining question the motion. In prevailed on and the appellee by stop effected of whether seizure under the rights of his car violated his subsequent search however, Amendment, make our own inde we must Fourth the law and appraisal by reviewing pendent constitutional State, 319 Md. the facts of the case. Riddick v. applying it to State, 1239, (1990); 180, 183, Dashiell v. 571 A.2d (2003). 93-94, Md. 821 A.2d Deputy Sheriff County Harford was made stop The While at May 12:40 a.m. on Wood at about earlier, an hour coming duty to his precinct prior station for a black be on the lookout was advised to Deputy Wood number plate license specific with a Mercury Marquis Grand CDS,” to stop carrying was “possibly the vehicle because The of that a violation. basis the car if he observed us, argued has not but the State in the record before is not justify a ground to any independent to provide that it sufficed 1-95, the car so noticed driving south on Wood While driver, was not appellee, The in front of him. described car followed the any traffic laws. Wood apparently violating so, and, at the highway when it exited for a half mile or stayed prior behind it. Just to Md. Route Wood ramp that he had dispatcher radioed his exiting highway, Wood a K-9 response He received a from sight. suspect Appellee the communication. monitoring officer who was light, point for a red at which ramp at the end of the stopped At appellee’s. was about ten to twelve feet behind Wood’s car K-9 that he intended to informed the point, Wood car, and, made his turn when shortly appellee after stop green, turned he did so. Wood Deputy from the record that appear It does not until reason to the car any legitimate believed that he had light. at the traffic ramp, the end of the exit they approached said, he intersection, point, well lit. At that Wood car was darker of appellee’s concluded that the rear window *4 because, that conclusion based than “normal.” He came to Office and with Sheriffs “training experience his to see made,” he have been able should stops [he had] traffic lit, that he was unable to so well but into the car with area testimony regard in that was: do so. His vehicle, you would be able to in a normal “Q. normally, So window, you’re saying? that what the rear through see A. Yes. window, case,
Q. you So this when looked at rear you through? could see No, I could not.”
A. added).
(Emphasis tint” “appeared stated that the vehicle to have that Wood “after-market,” i.e., had been after the car applied statutory knew of a re- was manufactured and sold. Wood below, tinting that after-market must quirement, discussed through to be transmitted allow at least 35% of that he had issued about twelve previously window and stated violations, tinting acknowledged orders for but he repair any specific training respect he never received had Rather, feels it’s too tinting. he claimed “[i]f That, dark, order.” they stop repair can the car issue said, “if in their applied: he was the standard he dark, the vehicle.” you own feels it’s too then can opinion me- Wood noted that there were instruments—tint Deputy statutory ters—that could measure whether a tint exceeds the limit, use, he was never trained their did not know how but them, and did not have one. He concluded that the to use car had for no appellee’s rear window excessive Confirming than it dark to me.” his “appeared reason other acknowledged direct he on cross-examination that testimony, appeared determine whether the window purport he did not tinted, whether it than illegally only to be but was “other what have appear, normal windows would car that did not added). tinting.” (Emphasis empha- kind He after-market sized that standard several times: dark,
“Q. Okay, my point you say appeared but is: When words, tints, in relationship just is that in to other other dark, appeared period? window, sir,
A. darker than a normal without Appeared tinting.
Q. Okay, get straight. and so let me this Your reason for stopping may may was not that it have been—the tint illegal, appeared been but the window darker than— *5 window, Iwhy That’s sir. was tint on A. I knew there the vehicle.” stopped added).
(Emphasis tags “any kind of did not observe that he also stated Wood He at time. the window stickers” on inspection for repair order that, is issued person when explained “a sticker compliance, checked for tint and has it window know, the saying you on the window usually placed acknowl- was done.” Wood was done or the test certification a repair attached after a sticker would be that such edged order is issued. stop car, appellee that the Wood advised
Upon stopping repair that he would be issued for a tint violation and was a license and warrant to his car to do order. Wood returned and no a valid license the check revealed check. When order. At that warrants, equipment repair an prepared Wood arrived, and, dog when the alerted the K-9 officer point, cocaine and CDS, Suspected was searched. appellee’s vehicle found, arrested. appellee was was marijuana order, later, equipment repair days Four faced with Safety Police Automotive took the car to the State appellee Division, did allow found that the windows Enforcement which would legal were therefore light transmittance and 35% to that effect laws. A certificate pass Maryland inspection testified, without contra- Appellee in evidence. placed at the diction, in the same condition that the windows were at the time of the they time of as were inspection evidence, suppres- hearing argument, and after On this repair suppressing a distinction between sion court drew former, the court the CDS. As to the suppressing order and on, you after-market put “[i]f declared essence, out.” In the court make him have it checked go can judgment officer’s] that “it’s his accepted [the notion to the respect him With go he can make to State Police.” CDS, however, “public the issue as one of regarded the court anything else to namely, you can’t find policy,” “[w]hen for, him because stop should be able to [you not] dark, when, fact, too tinting appears the window it’s added). explained: The court (Emphasis too dark.” me, of, you your “To it comes down to a matter take chances *6 you’re if that and it turns out The you right. use basis not gets And then it takes you suppressed. evidence seized line away reasoning. the incentive to use that of Seems to if public policy you’re going me as a matter of use tinting window as a to make a and to do a K-9 stop, basis scan, you right have to be on.” basis, granted suppress, On that the court the motion to and appeal. State filed this
DISCUSSION Tinting Requirements ultimate Fourth Amendment presented hinges The issue largely Maryland governing on the law of vehicle windows, that requires explanation. and some
There are Federal regulations adopted by National Highway Department Traffic Administration of the U.S. (windows) in Transportation governing glazing materials used The regulations adopt motor vehicles. Federal American Z26, which, in pertinent part, requires National Standard windshields and front side windows installed in cars passenger by light automobile manufacturers transmit at least 70% of the § striking them.1 See 49 C.F.R. 571.205 and ANS Z26. The regulation applies only by Federal to the windows installed manufacturer, not to post-manufacture tinting, and it does apply passenger to rear windows cars. windows, The of motor vehicle post-manufacture tinting a film normally through plastic which is done or metallic window, laminate to the interior of the applied regulat- side level, ed at the and the standards from largely vary State Maryland, In post-manufacture tinting State to State. regulation 1. The technical term used in the is "visual transmis- sion." Transpor- 23 of the in and titles statutes found governed Code, with vehicle which deal Maryland Article of the tation jointly by adopted regulations inspection, equipment (MVA) the Automotive Administration the Motor Vehicle (ASED). Police the State Division of Enforcement Safety here, Transp. § 22-101 of not relevant exceptions With any highway driving on from person prohibits Article of title manner violation equipped that is vehicle misdemeanor. See Transp. constitutes a §of 22-101 Violation 27-101(a). Article, § for certain requirements title 22 establishes
Subtitle of § 22- here is special relevance Of equipment. kinds of vehicle vehicles. in motor material governs glazing which safety glass. shatter-proof concerns of that section part first an (i) tinting. excep- With specifically deals Subsection 22406(i)(l)(i) from here, prohibits person § not relevant tion *7 if of the State highway a vehicle on passenger a operating any tinting the vehicle window of affixed to “there is of the after manufacture the window added to materials the through light a transmittance do not allow vehicle that 22-406(i)(2) provides: 35%.” Section window of at least being operated that a vehicle observes police “If a (1) subsection, the officer this of paragraph in of violation and, in to a addition the vehicle the driver of may stop offense, to the issue with the charging the driver citation with order in accordance repair safety equipment driver of this article.” §of 23-105 provisions 23, which in title both pertinent, statutes are Two other 23-104(a) pro- Section of vehicles. inspection with the deals on the every vehicle driven vides, part, in relevant “meeting glazing equipment must have in this State highways jointly by [MVA] established exceeding the standards 23—104(b)(2)requires agen- those Section and the [ASED].” law for with Federal consistent adopt regulations cies to 23- done so. Section have they of and equipment, kind that, 22-406(i)(2), provides § “[i]f 105(a)(1), mirroring being in this State is registered vehicle officer observes that a not meet does apparently any equipment with operated the standards established under this subtitle ...
shall of the vehicle safety driver and issue to him a equipment order.” an repair requires Such order the owner of vehicle equipment corrected necessary as days. within 10 22-406(i)—establishing
Section the 35% transmittance re earlier, enacted in quirement—was years 1995. Four MVA jointly adopted ASED had with regulation dealing post- (Jan. tinting. manufacture 18:2 Md. Register See (Mar. 1991). 1991); 18:6 Md. Register regula That tion, form, substantially same remains in effect. See COMAR 11.14.02.14.2 The regulation, which relates to the inspection program, columns, vehicle is set forth in two one entitled “Procedures” and the other “Reject entitled Vehicle If.”
The “Procedures” column directs inspectors inspect all glass for that is not “tinting incorporated into the glazing” and cars, passenger states type tinting “[t]his added (1) if only acceptable” it meets six requirements: it is not (2) reflective; red, (3) color; it is not yellow, or amber in conjunction “when used in safety glazing light (4) transmittance is at least percent”; “a label provided by x material inches containing manufacturer^ l-lk the manufacturer’s name and the percentage transmit- tance is permanently installed the ... lower left of rear (5) outside”; windows when viewed from the “the label is (6) materials”; installed between the tinting glazing “the vehicle is with an equipped outside rearview mirror on each Consistently, “Reject side.” Vehicle If’ column *8 inspector reject directs the to a if “[t]inting vehicle is not 22-406(i) enacting § 2. subject The bill was the of considerable debate. Legislation dealing post-manufacture tinting had been before the Assembly General initially prohibit- in 1994. The 1995 bill would have post-manufacture tinting altogether. ed It was amended first to allow tinting permit only ultimately for that would transmittance but 30% noted, impose amended requirement. to a transmittance 35% As the requirements vary widely, requiring, in other States some for rear windows, transmittance, passenger car a permitting 50% others a total blockage light. proce- as noted the glazing except into the incorporated law.” permitted by and as federal dures regula- and the MVA-ASED amalgam The of these statutes (1) provid- tinting permissible is post-manufacture tion is that and the other light at 35% transmittance ed that it allows least require- the regulation, including forth in the conditions set percentage the transmittance stating ment a label that glass to window between permanently attached (2) satisfied, if material, police are but is not in being highway vehicle driven on that observes a may stop the requirements, compliance with those offense and a a citation for the traffic vehicle and issue both order. repair vehicle equipment Appropriate Standard
The
commonly
here
referred
at
was what
stop
The
issue
clear,
that
really disputed,
as
It is
to
a Whren
a tinting
he
to be
violation
used what
believed
Deputy Wood
backup
to allow a
K-9
pretext
as a
order
stop
In
the car for
CDS.
suspected
officer time to arrive and scan
States,
517 U.S.
S.Ct.
Whren v. United
(1996),
found
Supreme
Court
no Constitutional
L.Ed.2d 89
stop, provided the officer has
impediment
pretextual
to such a
which
upon
to believe
the traffic violation
sufficient cause
fact,
is, in
has occurred.
based
stop
Prouse,
648, 653-54, 99
Delaware
440 U.S.
S.Ct.
Citing
(1979),
1391, 1396, 59
the Whren Court
L.Ed.2d
of an
temporary
that even the
detention
individ-
acknowledged
a “seizure” of
during
stop
ual
of an automobile constitutes
purposes
Amendment
an
person
Fourth
it
subject
requirement
is therefore
stop
automobile
not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances.
Court
matter,
general
the decision to
also confirmed that “[a]s
probable
an automobile
reasonable where
Whren,
has
cause
believe that a traffic violation
occurred.”
809-810,
at
Although is one, correctness, valid court, is a suppression of absolute justify a as to what will imprecision there to be some seems cause to probable needs stop—whether traffic only a committed or that a traffic offense has been believe is suspicion that such the articulable Terry v. Ohio reasonable Court, Courts, Court and this Supreme the including case. in the context of both of those standards have mentioned courts that have prevailing among The view stops. traffic issue, we is that adopt, that and the view that shall resolved articulable minimum standard is reasonable the appropriate suspicion. 648, 1391, Prouse, supra,
In 440 U.S. S.Ct. Delaware v. 660, a 59 L.Ed.2d the Court considered whether by randomly stopping Amendment car violates Fourth checking of driver’s license purpose operator’s for the sole there registration probable and the vehicle “where is neither being that the car is suspicion cause to believe nor reasonable of motor contrary governing operation driven laws its any occupants vehicles or that either the or of is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation 650, 1394, of other law.” at 99 S.Ct. at any applicable Id. added). at 665 (Emphasis L.Ed.2d mentioned
Throughout Opinion, Prouse Court both standards, although accept it seemed to the lesser reasonable applicable articulable standard as the minimum. It suspicion at of a enforce- point permissibility observed one that law ment its intrusion on technique judged by balancing is Fourth governmental rights against legitimate Amendment interests implemented, when standard so “the reasonableness minimum, usually requires, upon at a facts which an measurement capable against intrusion is based be of ‘an standard,’ cause or a objective probable whether this be less at at at 668 test.” Id. 99 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d stringent added). It was the (Emphasis suspicion noted that reasonable applicable roving patrol test Border stops agents. Patrol later, Still it concluded that there “[w]here is not violating cause to believe that driver one of any is of applicable equipment multitude traffic and regulations or other suspicion articulable basis amounting reasonable driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered,” there legitimate upon was no which the basis officer could decide stopping particular whether for a spot driver check would be productive any more than stopping other driver. Id. at added). 99 S.Ct. at at 672 (Emphasis L.Ed.2d holding ultimate the Prouse Court “except was that in those situations in which at there is least articulable and reasonable that a motorist or that an unlicensed automobile is not either registered, the vehicle or an occupant subject law,” otherwise to seizure for violation *11 stopping the vehicle a merely registration to do license or check is under unreasonable the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 668, added). 1401, S.Ct. at 59 99 L.Ed.2d at 673 (Emphasis language suggests used Court that the lesser applied articulable standard is to be to routine traffic stops although, because the Court ultimately found neither probable cause nor it suspicion, articulable was unnecessary to resolve that issue.
Whren,
Prouse,
though relying heavily on
Delaware
spoke only
noted,
in
of probable
terms
cause. As
after
confirming that even a temporary
during
detention
a traffic
stop constitutes a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes
reasonable,
that,
thus must be
the Court iterated
a
“[a]s
matter,
general
an
decision to
automobile
reason-
able where the
have
probable cause to
that
believe
a
Whren,
810,
traffic violation has occurred.”
517
116
U.S. at
1772,
S.Ct. at
689 issue was whether had occurred and the a violation that traffic required. more than that was something 113, 119 142 L.Ed.2d Iowa, U.S. S.Ct. 525 Knowles v. Whren, support lends (1998), after years decided two 492 reason- based on stop may traffic that a routine the notion case, stopped a In that suspicion. able articulable law, the officer could Iowa speeding. car for Under a citation. driver, merely he issued but instead arrested the citation,” however, he proceeded to the aAs “search incident that CDS. It was admitted the car discover to search search; only question cause for the there nowas such a search as permitted law that was whether Iowa Fourth Amend- was under the incident to the citation valid it not. A Court held that was ment. unanimous result, that In the Court noted the “search reaching that the warrant exception requirement incident to arrest” rested, that safety for officer but part, on concerns issuing from citation was much safety threat to officer traffic In regard, formal arising from a arrest. less than 420, 439, McCarty, Berkemer v. U.S. quoting part from (1984), 3138, 3150, the Court 82 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. hand, stop, routine traffic other concluded “[a] more analogous and ‘is to a so-called relatively brief encounter ” Knowles, ... “Terry than to formal arrest.’ U.S. stop” 498. The at 142 L.Ed.2d at Court S.Ct. at safety concern for officer quickly added the caveat that stop, Terry in a traffic under entirely absent passengers could driver and principles, order *12 car, a and any a of driver “perform ‘patdown’ out they may that be armed passengers upon suspicion reasonable ‘Terry passen- of the patdown’ and and “conduct a dangerous,” upon suspicion of a vehicle reasonable that ger compartment immediate control of a may gain an is occupant dangerous 117-18, 488, 142 at at at L.Ed.2d weapon.” Id. 119 S.Ct. in of traffic This has both standards terms Court mentioned 356, 491, State, 369, In 355 735 A.2d 497- stops. Ferris v. Md. Whren, (1999), stop we that a traffic “does citing 98 concluded 690
not violate the initially federal Constitution if the probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a Green, traffic violation.” We iterated that standard State v. (“when 595, 609, 486, (2003) 375 Md. 826 A.2d 494 a police officer has cause believe probable that a driver has broken law, a traffic detain may temporarily”). the driver State, 424, 433, 879, (2001), In Rowe v. 363 Md. 769 A.2d 884 however, though that repeating precept, we added that “[a] traffic may also be stop constitutionally permissible where the ” a that activity afoot,’ has reasonable belief ‘criminal is statement, citing Terry. Immediately following that we cited Delaware v. Prouse for proposition that the Fourth Amendment is violated there probable when is neither cause suspicion nor being reasonable to believe the car is driven unlawfully. chosen,
Most of the courts that have
required,
been
determine which of those standards
a
applies to routine traffic
stop, including Whren
have held
stop,
is
probable cause
ordinarily
that a
required
justified
under the
Fourth Amendment if the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion that
traffic law has been violated. See United
(10th
Callarman,
Cir.2001)
1284,
States v.
F.3d
273
1287
(“While
probable
either
cause or
suspicion
reasonable
is suffi
justify
only
cient to
traffic
stop,
requirement
lesser
reasonable
necessary”);
States v.
United
San
(5th
chez-Pena,
Cir.2003);
Hill,
691 cause is an indication that as reasonable—and stop. for such a the minimum standard This Case then, whether, on the evidence based question, The Wood had a hearing, Deputy at suppression presented appel window of rear suspicion articulable reasonable Transp. tinting permitted by lee’s the level car exceeded 11.14.02.14, 22-406(i), COMAR and §Art. as supplemented § Art. 22-101. recounted Transp. thus violated We also give to evidence, we it did not suffice conclude that suspicion. level of reasonable Deputy Wood that in which a number of out-of-State cases The State cites on the officer’s upheld for violations were based stops observations, benefit of tint meter field visual without the Weaver, Fed.Appx. 145 639 supra, See United States v. tests. (9th Wallace, (11th Cir.2005); 213 1216 States v. F.3d United Cir.2000), denied, 531 U.S. 121 S.Ct. cert. State, (2000); supra, Ga.
L.Ed.2d
Ciak
(Fla.Dist.Ct.
Moore,
(2004);
The which, technology, under tinting, of the current measurement is, rather, may prior well be unfeasible It “normal,” than rear window was darker noting appellee’s darkness of the rear window Deputy comparing Wood was tinting. Obviously, to a a tinted window any window without than going appear any tinting, darker a window without of tinting. at that is the natural effect The especially night; tinting, law a substantial however—substantial permits light striking to block out of the the window. enough 65% State, urged by applied by Deputy test Wood, any would allow officers to *14 window, simply tinted because it darker than an appears window, untinted cannot and that be the test for Fourth Amendment for it purposes, effectively away would strip protection Fourth for or any person driving Amendment own car If ing a with tinted windows. an officer stop chooses to a for a tinting solely violation based on the officer’s visual window, of in observation the that observation has to the be window, of properly context what a tinted compliant with the like. requirement, 35% would look If the officer can credibly difference, articulate that a court could find reasonable articu not suspicion, lable but otherwise.3 Judge Chief and Greene Judge generally Bell concur this that, but when Opinion conducting would hold a pretextual aspects argued may are There two other not case but this which be First, stops tinting only relevant to for violations. the issue here is the validity pretextual stop, repair of equipment the not the or order presented indictment for CDS violations. As in both the Circuit Court, validity stop of depends application Court this on the and, jurisprudence, of Fourth Amendment as to we have conclud- proper suspicion. Appel- ed that standard is reasonable articulable argued higher required Mary- lee has that some standard is under note, however, that, law. justify actually charging land We do a violation, person Maryland requires with a motor vehicle law that the probable person cause to believe that the has committed Code, 26-201(a) Maryland § Transp. the violation. See of the Article. Second, noted, requires, post-manufacture as COMAR11.14.02.14 for label,% inches, tinting, x denoting, among things, that a other \-lk transmittable, percentage light permanently attached to the win- dow, glass between the and the film or laminate. If an officer conclusion, solely stops a car based on a derived from his or her visual window, observations the darkness of the that a tinted window is noncompliant requirement, easy transmission 35% one further, preliminary step, proceeding before check is to the window to (1) present, see if such a label it is if it shows that the window compliant (2) requirement, with the there 35% is no reason to suspect genuine, any suspicion that the is not label that arose from event, likely disappear. visual observation would In obliged apologize would be motorist and allow him her to hand, without leave further detention. On the other if no there is label appears genuine, may justify or the label not to be that alone a citation order, 23-105(a), § § repair a under 22-101 or and some further investigation. cause, rather than stop, the officer must have Whren to believe that suspicion, articulable mere reasonable stop for the exists. offered as the basis violation BATTAGLIA, Judge, which Dissenting by Opinion CATHELL, Judges, join. HARRELL and I dissent. respectfully reasonable articulable majority I with the agree
While well as as Whren support stop would traffic States, L.Ed.2d 116 S.Ct. United U.S. (1996) the traffic at issue disagree that pretextual stop,1 I suspicion. reasonable articulable supported was not hearing was that suppression at the The evidence adduced Wood, patrolling while midnight May Deputy after *15 vehicle. County, in Harford observed Williams’ Interstate 95 to proceeded followed Williams’ as Williams Deputy Wood At the of the exit ramp. exit the Route 152 end 1-95 onto or 12 feet” his car “10 Deputy stopped Wood ramp, lit” the “well car; Wood described Deputy behind Williams’ the illumina- daytime” like because of intersection as “almost lamps. point, Deputy At that tion the street provided car appeared of Williams’ Wood noticed that the back window into not the rear window dark, through and that he could see the car: of about the windows you anything Did notice
[STATE]: the vehicle at that time? I At that time noticed the back window
[DEPUTY WOOD]: to darker than normal. appeared of the vehicle be little Why your did that draw attention? [STATE]: my training experi- Just based on [DEPUTY WOOD]: made, I I’ve stops ence with the Sheriffs Office and traffic transcript, appears suppression that the court did From it pretextual, but found on the basis conclude that the itself was public policy dangerous seized be that the controlled substances should going say to suppressed me,' “any 'Looks a little dark because officer is pull the vehicle over and search it.” noticed that the vehicle appeared to have tint that wasn’t— appeared it after-market. Usually you
[STATE]: when observe vehicle from the rear, in you window, terms whether can through see what’s been your experience you as far as what see? can [DEPUTY WOOD]: Due to fact that that intersection is very lit, area, well there’s multiple lamps just street to my training, knowledge, experience, due I’ve been time, able see into the vehicle. At that I point could not. vehicle, normally, So in a normal you
[STATE]: would be window, able to see through you’re the rear is that what saying?
[DEPUTY WOOD]: Yes. case, inSo this when you [STATE]: looked at the rear window, you through? could see No, I could not. [DEPUTY WOOD]: Deputy Wood also noticed that there were no stickers or indicating labels Williams’ rear window the window compliant Maryland law:2 you tags [STATE]: Did observe kind of or inspection stickers on the window at that time? No, I could not.
[DEPUTY WOOD]: you say inspection stickers, When inspection [STATE]: are stickers issued window tinting? *16 a subject
[DEPUTY WOOD]: When issued a order repair for their they window tint and by it checked out the MVA, the State Police and a sticker usually placed on the know, window saying you the certification done was or the test was done. Williams,
2. State See v. 934 Md. n. A.2d 48 n. 3 (2007) ("COMAR requires, post-manufacture tinting, 11.14.02.14 for label, inches, containing, among things, that a x other the 'k l-k transmittable, percentage light permanently be attached win- dow, laminate.”). glass tinting between film or order is normally repair after happens that So [STATE]: issued? Yes. WOOD]:
[DEPUTY window at you see a sticker on the But didn’t [STATE]: that time? No, I not. did WOOD]:
[DEPUTY an equip- to issue stopped then Williams’ Deputy Wood subsequently window tinting for the repair ment order upon sup- Based dangerous substances. controlled seized granted circuit court Williams’ testimony, the pression hearing Deputy majority states because suppress. motion to normal, darker than the window was testified that Wood law, Deputy’s allowed than that rather than darker suspicion. articulable not establish reasonable testimony did that a vehicle’s testimony courts faced with same Other into the could not see dark and the officer tinting window was satisfy even stop for a sufficient grounds found vehicle standard, In United States that of cause. probable higher (9th Cir.2000), the United States Wallace, 213 F.3d that an the Ninth Circuit concluded Appeals Court of his upon a car based cause to officer had windows, two tinting on the front window testimony “[t]he hours, where the heavy tint during daylight even look into the degree [sic] at a harder occupant inside was law applicable Although the officer misstated vehicle.” percent and failed to mention the 70 window regarding 3Code, of the California Vehicle requirement transmission light established ruled that officer’s observations the Court (1998), 26708(d) provided in Code Section The California Vehicle part: installed, clear, colorless, may transparent af- material [A] windows, fixed, to the immediate applied to the front side located following are right of if the conditions met left and the front seat (2) require- applied glazing with the material meets all The window (49 Safety Standard No. 205 C.F.R. of Federal Motor Vehicle ments 571.205), including specified minimum transmittance of glazing, specified as percent resistance of AS-14 and the abrasion standard. that federal *17 696 “objective, probable
there existed to cause believe that [the] were, fact, windows in violation.” Id. at 1220. See also Harrell, (2d 141, Cir.2001) v. United States 268 F.3d 149 (stating police testimony officer’s that he not could see into back of car because its rear side and windows provided were tinted cause to support traffic stop noting despite testimony the officer’s that he did not violation, the testimony observe a traffic would have led an reasonable objectively police suspect officer to that the win- law). dows were violation of Further, Hanes, in People v. Cal.App.4th Supp. (1997), Cal.Rptr.2d 212 the court concluded that an officer had suspicion articulable reasonable a black car upon based testimony his that the right front window “was ‘so black that it kind matched the of the color car’and that “he was unable to see the occupants of vehicle.” Id. at 213-14.4 Wyatt, See also State So.2d 483 (La.Ct.App.2000) (noting that a traffic stop justified upon police based testimony officer’s car’s windows “were tinted so darkly it impossible car”); that was see inside v. Taylor, State (1996) (conclud App.3d Ohio 683 N.E.2d 369-70 ing testimony that officer’s that window appeared dark,” “exceptionally he such that could see into vehicle even with headlights cruiser shining directly vehicle, on the provided reasonable articulable stop). conduct the traffic
Moreover, the majority fails to Deputy discuss fact that hearing Wood testified at the suppression that he did not see sticker or any label Williams’ rear window. The majority recognizes requires, that “COMAR post-manu- 11.14.02.14 26708(a) (1996), part The California Vehicle Code Section stated in exceptions, person any that with certain "[n]o shall drive motor vehicle installed, affixed, any object placed, displayed, or material or applied upon the windshield or side or rear windows” and that "[n]o person any object placed, shall drive motor vehicle with or material installed, affixed, displayed, applied upon in or the vehicle which through obstructs or reduces driver's clear view the windshield or side windows.” label,\ inches, x containing, among that a l-k tinting, facture *18 transmittable, perma- things, percentage other and the window, glass between attached to nently Williams, 676, v. film or laminate.” State 401 Md. (2007). If an does not observe 48 n. 3 n. 934 A.2d sticker, justify could traffic that alone such a label Williams, 38, 48 934 A.2d n. 692 n. State Md. (2007). Deputy’s only supports in this case The record time of the on the car at the the label was not testimony that testified that he did see sticker Wood stop: Deputy Williams took stop; window at the time Williams’ rear regarding any testimony not offer stand and did window sticker. justify had reasonable articulable
Deputy Wood does, impermis- holding majority as it stop. By traffic his a traffic ability to conduct police’s sibly restricts I and would reverse disagree violations. upon tinting based County. for Harford of the Circuit Court the order me to HARRELL and CATHELL have authorized Judges dissenting join expressed views in this they state opinion.