In this case, we are asked whether
Brady v. Maryland,
The United States Supreme Court, in
Brady,
held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution imposes upon the State a duty and obligation to disclose “evidence favorable to an accused upon request ... where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
The State in the case sub judice essentially presents three arguments, each of which, it maintains, requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. First, it claims that the net cast by Brady does not, in fact, reach evidence beyond the personal knowledge of the individual prosecutor in a case, without regard to the ease with which the prosecutor may have been able, with due diligence, to obtain such evidence from other sources. Second, it claims that, even if Brady applies to such evidence, the State’s failure to disclose it is excused, or negated, by the defendant’s ongoing discovery duty. Third, the State argues that the evidence that was not disclosed in this case was not material, and, therefore, was *199 unlikely to have affected the decision rendered at the trial level; that, in other words, it was “harmless error.” With all these points, we disagree.
A.
Having mandated in
Brady,
that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,”
The respondent, Tony Williams, was charged with, and convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of, the murder of Dana Rochelle Drake, who was fatally shot outside her apartment in northeast Baltimore, and related offenses. Central to the State’s case against the respondent was the testimony of Sean Williams (“S. Williams”), a jailhouse snitch. S. Williams, who had occupied a cell adjacent to the one occupied by the respondent when the respondent was being held on the murder charge at the Baltimore City jail, testified that the respondent admitted committing the murder. According to S. Williams, at that time, the respondent also admitted purchasing the murder weapon. The motive for the crime was, he said, the respondent’s desire to collect the proceeds of the life insurance policy he had taken out on Ms. Drake’s life. S. Williams testified that he reported this information to homicide detectives, including an Officer Massey, who recorded his statement. He stated that he was promised nothing in exchange for the information and, furthermore, had
*200
not asked for anything. Thus, S. Williams maintained that he was getting “nothing” “out of this thing,” and that no one in the State’s Attorney’s Office promised him anything or initiated contact with him about the case. In short, according to S. Williams, his testimony was being given “out of the goodness of his heart” and because he did not like guns and violence. The respondent’s convictions were reversed by the Court of Special Appeals.
Williams v. State,
Although unknown to the prosecuting attorney, S. Williams was, and had been, for at least 10 years, a paid and registered police informant fo. the Baltimore City Police Department, Eastern District Drug Unit, with his own confidential informant number. 2 Moreover, he had cooperated with the State’s Attorney’s Office in a number of cases, involving narcotics, weapons and homicide, leading to numerous arrests. That S. Williams was a confidential informant, with an identification number, and was cooperative in narcotics cases, was known to at least one member of the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office and also, perhaps more extensively, to members of the Baltimore City Police Department.
When the respondent was arrested and charged with the Drake murder, 3 S. Williams had been charged with theft of both a battery and a police cruiser from the Eastern District Police District. Those charges were disposed of in consider *201 ation of S. Williams’s cooperation in drug arrests. His handler, the officer who registered him, so testified. That testimony was confirmed by S. Williams’s attorney in the theft case and by the prosecutor in that case. In fact, the prosecutor testified that it was because of S. Williams’s cooperation in narcotics cases that he “stetted” the cruiser theft charge. For the battery theft charge, he was sentenced to “time served.”
The case folder in the S. Williams’s theft case contained other corroborative evidence. A notice of postponement indicated that the “defense wishes to cooperate [with the Baltimore City Police Department] and others on pending cases.” In addition, the stet noted that it was entered because the “State declines to prosecute.”
Although the prosecuting attorney in the respondent’s case and homicide detective Massey testified that they did not know of S. Williams’s informant status and denied “giving him anything” for his testimony—Massey even indicated that S. Williams never asked for anything in exchange for the information he provided—the case file in an earlier case involving S. Williams suggested that S. Williams had a different mindset, that he wanted, and had actively sought, consideration for his cooperation. S. Williams had earlier been sentenced to twenty-one months and five days for possession of cocaine. There were nine letters in the file, each written by S. Williams to the sentencing judge in that case, informing the sentencing judge that he was an informant for the Baltimore City Police Department and touting his cooperation with his handler, and “the prosecutor.” In those letters, S. Williams asked for leniency in exchange for his cooperation. In four of the letters, his cooperation with homicide officers was emphasized. In the letter postmarked August 12, 1998, mentioning Officer Massey, he told the judge, “I have been very helpful to officers in Homicide since my arrest, I have told them very important things in cases that are to be tryed [sic] soon.” In two subsequent letters, he referenced the respondent’s case, a murder case “which involved a man who killed his fiancee, to obtain a very lump some [sic] of a life insurance,” advising the sentencing judge in one of the letters that he was the “key *202 witness” and informing him in the other that he had just testified. In both letters he mentioned again Officer Massey.
The sentencing judge responded to S. Williams on two occasions, sending copies to “the State’s Attorney’s Office,” rather than to a particular assistant. In one of the responses, the judge told S. Williams to have his attorney contact the detective who registered him “and [to] have [his] attorney or the Detective contact this office to inform the Judge of any help you are giving him.”
Having learned of the preceding facts, the respondent filed a post conviction petition, based on newly discovered evidence. The newly discovered evidence was, he alleged, that the State had failed to disclose impeachment information regarding S. Williams, its primary and star witness, including that he was, and had a record of being, a paid informant. The respondent argued that without this information, his cross-examination of the “jailhouse snitch” at trial was severely and prejudicially weakened.
As indicated, the prosecuting attorney testified that she had not made any “offers of leniencies or provided any benefit to Sean Williams in exchange for his testimony in the Tony Williams case.” Moreover, she denied speaking with the prosecutor who prosecuted S. Williams and, therefore, was aware neither of the charges lodged against him nor of their disposition.
■The post conviction court denied the respondent’s petition for post conviction relief. Perceiving the question to be whether the knowledge possessed by a prosecutor in the General Felony Division of the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is imputed to a homicide prosecutor in the same office, but in a different location and a different division, it answered “no,” concluding that “under Brady and Maryland Rule 4-263(g), the State’s duty did not extend to information held by another prosecutor within the same prosecutor’s office who, at all times, was wholly unconnected to the case at issue.” The court reasoned that, while it “seems fair and appropriate for the State to be required to disclose to defense counsel all *203 exculpatory information in its hands, including all evidence which goes toward impeachment of a State witness, both in its files and the files of the police and of all other agencies who have reported on the ease to the State’s Attorney’s Office and who have participated in the case as a part of the prosecution case,” a rule that would extend the disclosure duty on the prosecution to information possessed by those who neither has ever reported to the prosecution or directly worked on the case would be too broad. “Th[e] Court d[id] not believe such construction would be appropriate, practical or would enhance the administration of justice.”
B.
At the Court of Special Appeals, the respondent conceded that the particular Assistant State’s Attorney in his case had not been aware of S. Williams’s status as an informant. The respondent contended, however, that, under
Brady,
the obligation to disclose information relating to the credibility of a witness extended beyond the knowledge of the particular prosecutor, to all of that prosecutor’s colleagues within the same office. Further, the respondent argued that Maryland Rule 4-263(g) applies to all prosecutors in the same office, whether or not assigned to, or working on, the case. Thus, the respondent argued that, because S. Williams was the State’s critical witness, “[the State] should at the very least be required to perform due diligence within the same prosecutor’s office to verify such claims.”
Williams v. State,
*204 The State, not unexpectedly, agreed with the post conviction court’s more limited reading of Brady and Maryland Rule 4-263(g). The State further contended that S. Williams’s information was not material since his credibility was sufficiently “attacked” on cross-examination.
In deciding this case, the Court of Special Appeals first established that, pursuant to
Giglio,
when the reliability of a State witness is determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, the State’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence falls within
Brady.
*205 “When, as here, there is an obvious basis to suspect the motives and credibility of a proposed witness for the State, it may be incumbent upon the State’s Attorney, in an office with many Assistant State’s Attorneys, to establish a procedure to facilitate compliance with the obligation under Brady to disclose to defense material that includes information ‘casting a shadow on a government witness’s credibility^]’ ”
Williams,
The Court of Special Appeals believed that the State’s Attorney’s Office had been put on notice that S. Williams was seeking a reward in exchange for his testimony and cooperation in homicide and narcotics cases. It adopted the rationale enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bemal-Obeso, that a material lie by an informant about his prior record is exculpatory within the meaning of Brady. In Bernab-Obeso, the court explained:
“By definition, criminal informants are cut from untrustworthy cloth and must be managed and carefully watched by the government and the courts to prevent them from falsely accusing the innocent, from manufacturing evidence against those under suspicion of crime, and from lying under oath in the courtroom.... By its actions, the government can either contribute to or eliminate the problem. Accordingly we expect prosecutors and investigators to take all reasonable measures to safeguard the system against treachery. This responsibility includes the duty as required by Giglio to turn over to the defense in discovery all material information casting a shadow on a government witness’s credibility.”
Having determined that the State failed to discharge its
Brady
obligation to disclose information favorable to the respondent, the intermediate appellate court turned to, and addressed, the materiality of the withheld information. It concluded that “the taint of the
Brady
suppression matters on this record so undermines our confidence in the murder conviction that a new trial is in order.”
We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari,
State v. Williams,
C.
Maryland Rule 4-263(g) clearly mandates, and requires, that the duty to disclose materials and information applies not only to those prosecuting or actively participating in the case, but also to any and all members of the State’s Attorney’s Office, attorneys and staff. Rule 4-263(g) states, in its entirety:
“The obligations of the State’s Attorney under this Rule extend to material and information in the possession of the State’s Attorney and staff members and any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the action and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular action have reported, to the office of the State’s Attorney.”
Md. Rule 4-263(g) (emphasis added).
The canons of rule construction and interpretation are well settled and frequently stated. “To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of construction used to interpret statutes.”
State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella,
In
Strazzella,
“In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further.... Only when the language of the rule is ambiguous is it necessary that we look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.... We are also to give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.... Finally, we seek to give the rule a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. ... ”
(citations omitted).
See Blundon v. Taylor,
Moreover, the rule is read so that “no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.”
Montgomery County v. Buckrnan,
“when the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,’ ... nor may it construe the statute with ‘ “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application.’ ”
Design Kitchen & Baths,
So read, it is clear from the language used by the rule that the obligations of the State’s Attorney to disclose encompasses three groups: the State’s Attorney, his or her staff members, and those who are not either of the foregoing, but who have participated, or are participating, in the case itself, by, for example, participating “in the investigation or evaluation of the action,” regularly reporting to the State’s Attorney’s Office, or, with respect to the case under review, have reported to the State’s Attorney’s Office. This is made clear by the fact that no distinction is drawn between attorneys and staff working on the subject case and those that are not, and by the use of the word “and” to separate the terms “State’s Attorney” and “staff members” from each other and from the remainder of the sentence. In context, the reference to simply “State’s Attorney,” rather than to “Assistant State’s Attorneys,” is to the Office, as an entity, i.e., to all of the attorneys in that office. Similarly, in context, “staff members” must refer to all support personnel, i.e. secretaries, paralegals and other personnel, in the State’s Attorney’s Office. The use of “and,” rather than separating each specific category with a comma, indicates that the group, on either side of the conjunction, stands alone and is not a part of a series connected by a common characteristic.
Aside from the punctuation, the words used to introduce the category of persons who are not a part of the State’s attor *209 ney’s office are not consistent with a series of related persons. “Any others,” followed by the applicable qualifiers, far from denoting a continuing series, introduces additional persons who are covered, but only if they qualify on the bases then subsequently .enumerated, which bases need not be the same as qualified the earlier enumerated categories.
The State argues the contrary, that Maryland Rule 4-263(g) must be construed more narrowly. Focusing on the rule’s last phrase, “any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the action and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular action have reported, to the office of the State’s Attorney,” it submits that these qualifiers apply with equal force to “State’s Attorney” and “staff member,” that this Court intended only those prosecutors and staff members who were, or had been, involved with the case to fall within the rule’s prescription.
This narrow reading is not supported by the language of the rule. For the State’s interpretation to be the correct one, or even plausible, at the very least, a comma, rather than the word “and” would have had to have been inserted between the words “State’s Attorney” and “staff members.” Even then, the words, “any others,” would have to be explained; those words suggest a separateness. By their use, as we have indicated, there is introduced a new category of affected persons, rather than a continuation of a series bound together by a common characteristic. In addition, for the State’s interpretation to be a proper one, the meaning of the words, “State’s Attorney” and “staff members” would have to be expanded by reading them as “Assistant State’s Attorneys” and staff members “working on, or that have worked on,” the particular action. That requires adding words and, thus, giving the Rule a meaning not evident from the words actually used.
We hold that by referring only to the “State’s Attorney and staff members,” without any restriction, and then including “any others,” restricted to those with a direct present or past involvement with the particular action, Rule 4-263(g) draws a *210 distinction between the State’s Attorney’s Office and those outside that Office who are on the prosecution team. The latter category falls within the Brady rule only if those persons have or have had involvement with the action at issue or regularly reports to the State’s Attorney’s Office. No such limitation applies to the attorneys and staff in that Office. As to them, the Brady obligation extends to material and information in their possession. Thus, where, as in the case sub judice, the information regarding S. Williams’s status as an informant was known to another attorney in the State’s Attorney’s Office, the Rule compels its disclosure.
D.
Brady
also mandates that, under the circumstances of this case, the State’s duty and obligation to disclose exculpatory and mitigating material and information extend beyond the individual prosecutor and encompass information known to any prosecutor in the office. Generally,
Brady
violations cover a variety of prosecutorial transgressions involving the breach of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Strickler,
When the core of the State’s argument relies on the testimony of an essential witness, the State has a duty to discover anything, and everything, that concerns that witness’s credibility and, thus, potential for impeachment. The State admits that, under
Giglio,
Essential to the inquiry into whether a Brady violation has occurred is the determination of who has the obligation to disclose and of what that obligation consists. The State’s main contention, disagreeing with the Court of Special Appeals, is that Brady and its progeny do not extend the disclosure obligation to information possessed by all prosecutors working in the same office. We disagree with the State. We hold that the disclosure obligation imposed by Brady does, in fact, apply to information possessed by other prosecutors in the same office.
In
Kyles v. Whitley,
In
Giglio,
defense counsel asked a State’s witness on cross-examination if any promises of leniency had been made, and the witness falsely answered no.
The State acknowledges that the nondisclosure that occurred in Giglio deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Nevertheless, relying on the following excerpt from Giglio,
“We do not ... automatically require a new trial whenever a ‘combing of the prosecutor’s files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict,’ ”
In
In re Sealed Case,
At trial, the defendant sought to discover the identity of the informant, as well as any
Brady
information concerning promises made to this informant.
“We find equally unfounded the argument that any agreements [the informant] may have had in his Superior Court cases ‘don’t have anything to do with this case.’ ... Defendant’s whole point was that [the informant] may have planted the gun in this case in order to ‘work off obligations that arose in those Superior Court cases. Hence, agreements in the other cases have everything to do with this case. Nor does it matter that agreements in other cases may have involved other prosecutors. The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia prosecutes cases in both the federal District Court and the local Superior Court, and the prosecutor is responsible (at a minimum) for all Brady information in the possession of that office.
* * * *
“For a similar reason, we reject as irrelevant the contention that the requested records may have been in the possession of the Metropolitan Police Department, or the FBI or DEA, rather than the U.S. Attorney’s Office. As the Supreme Court held in Kyles, ‘the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.’
... Anticipating Kyles, we specifically held in United States v. Brooks[,296 U.S.App.D.C. 219 ,966 F.2d 1500 (1992)] that prosecutors in this District are responsible for disclosing *214 Brady information contained in MPD files, ‘given the close working relationship between the Washington metropolitan police and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia (who prosecutes both federal and District crimes, in both the federal and Superior courts).’ ... The same is true for files of the FBI and DEA which, like the U.S. Attorney’s Office, are components of the U.S. Department of Justice____”
Some federal courts have held that, in reference to offices and other involved persons
outside
of the prosecutor’s office,
Brady
applies according to one’s participation level.
United States v. Eley,
“It should also be pointed out that the Brady duty affects not only the office of the United States Attorney in Atlanta, but also any other investigative agencies of the Government which have gathered information as part of the case of the prosecution against the accused who seeks disclosure. Thus if the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs or the Federal Bureau of Investigation have participated in the case and have in their possession information which may be favorable to the accused, it must be disclosed to him.... Of course, the prosecutor has no duty to disclose information in the possession of governmental agencies which are not investigative arms of the prosecution and have not participated in the case, even if such information might be helpful to the accused----”
As another example, in
Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
“[T]he effect of the nondisclosure [is not] neutralized because the prosecuting attorney was not shown to have had *215 knowledge of the exculpatory evidence. Failure of the police to reveal such material evidence in their possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the information is purposely, or negligently, withheld. And it makes no difference if the withholding is by officials other than the prosecutor. The police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State’s Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure.... If the police allow the State’s Attorney to produce evidence pointing to guilt without informing him of other evidence in their possession which contradicts this inference, state officers are practicing deception not only on the State’s Attorney but on the court and the defendant. ‘The cruelest lies are often told in silence.’ If the police silence as to the existence of the reports resulted from negligence rather than guile, the deception is no less damaging....”
The main disagreement we have with the State is the State’s attempt, as the post conviction court did, to bring the participation requirement, which plainly applies to actors outside the State’s Attorney’s Office, into the prosecutor’s office itself. The State would require that, in order for Brady to apply, both persons outside of the prosecutor’s office and those within the office must possess some involvement link to the case at hand.
The State suggests that case law from other jurisdictions supports this interpretation. Upon our review of the cases it cites, however, we believe the State’s reliance to be misplaced. The State cites first to three Massachusetts cases:
Commonwealth v. Daye,
In
Daye,
a murder case, the defense argued that the Essex County District Attorney failed to disclose investigatory evidence held by Boston police officers, a separate county, regarding possibly related murders. Despite the arguments made by the defense that the two counties were acting jointly, the Massachusetts court held “[w]e have examined the record and we are satisfied that it does not warrant the conclusion that a joint investigation was conducted.... Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor in this case has access to the Boston police department files.”
Daye, the State contends, stands for the proposition that, for Brady purposes, information possessed by police officers could only be imputed to the prosecutor if the police officers were involved with the case and, thus, under similar logic, individuals within the prosecutor’s office, including other prosecutors within that office, are held to the same standard. We disagree. The circumstances surrounding this case are different than in Daye; in this case, the information was not possessed by someone outside the State’s Attorney’s Office, but, instead, by another prosecutor within the same office. Moreover, the Daye court’s refusal to impute information in the possession of persons acting outside of the prosecutor’s office, and not involved with the case, to those in the office, who were involved, is not inconsistent with our reading of Maryland Rule 4-263(g).
The other two Massachusetts cases, Tucceri and Sleeper, do little to support the State’s position. In Tucceri, the State failed to disclose photographs that were taken of the defendant at the time of his arrest by the Cambridge police department. While acknowledging that new trials should not *217 be granted unless there are substantial reasons for doing so, the Tucceri court agreed that the nondisclosure of the photographs was enough to warrant a new trial, and took the opportunity to comment:
“[P]rosecutors, who are agents of the State and often have access to information that defendants may not have, should be encouraged to disclose exculpatory evidence that in fairness defendants should have for their defense. Of course, a prosecutor cannot always know that a particular piece of evidence is or might be exculpatory. A rule that encourages prosecutors to make pretrial disclosures of obviously or even arguably exculpatory material would not only promote fair trials but would also help avoid the difficulties of post-trial judicial review.”
Tucceri,
Pursuant to this clearly iterated perspective, the separate but limited proposition for which the State cites Tucceri, that “[a] prosecutor’s duty ... extends only to exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s possession or in the possession of the police who participated in the investigation and presentation of the case,” does not require the interpretation that the State gives it. Given the context, the Brady obligation quite clearly and unmistakeably applied to the Cambridge police because they were involved in the defendant’s arrest and investigation. It does not shed any light on the level of involvement in the case required of individual prosecutors in the same office and it certainly does not reject the concept of a prosecutor’s office being an entity. In fact, we read the word, “prosecutor,” as used by the Tucceri court, to refer to the prosecution as an entity, and not as an individual. At best for the State, the term is ambiguous.
In
Sleeper,
another murder case, the State did not disclose that one of its witnesses, a psychiatrist, had a history that included charges of sexual misconduct. Arguing that
Brady
compelled the disclosure of this evidence as impeachment evidence, the defendant moved for a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the psychiatrist who testified for
*218
the State was not a “member of the prosecution team” and, thus, was under no obligation to disclose the information about himself.
Sleeper
provides the State no help. In outlining the boundaries of the State’s
Brady
obligation, the
Sleeper
court cites
Daye
in its description of the “members of the prosecution team,” noting that it includes “members of [the prosecutor’s] staff and ... any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to [the prosecutor’s] office.”
If, theoretically, only a member of the “prosecution team” is compelled to disclose
Brady
evidence, then the concept of the “prosecution team” relies wholly on context. In
Sleeper,
the psychiatrist was not a member of the prosecution team, but prosecutors and members of their staff indubitably are, as are police, when involved in the investigation and preparation of the criminal case being prosecuted. That police should be included in the concept of the “prosecution team” is highlighted in another case that the State improperly relies upon,
State v. Swanson,
In addition, this concept of the “prosecution team” supports this Court’s belief that prosecutors within the same office are not excused from their Brady obligations. The duty, as prescribed by Sleeper, applies to all members of the prosecution staff.
The State cites
People v. Robinson,
presumably, because the Illinois Supreme Court declined to impute knowledge of the investigating officers to other state employees.
“[W]e believe that the imputation of such knowledge to the prosecution requires an individualized focus on the factual circumstances. Among the factors to be considered would be the reasonableness of such imputation, whether the failure to transmit such knowledge up the informational chain was inadvertent or intentional and whether any real prejudice occurred.”
A federal case that the State relies on, United States v. Avellino, further undermines the State’s position.
“The Brady obligation extends only to material evidence ... that is known to the prosecutor.... An individual prosecutor is presumed, however, to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office’s investigation of the case and indeed.‘has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.’ ... Nonetheless, knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor, for the imposition of an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor’s office on the case in question would inappropriately require us to *220 adopt ‘a monolithic view of government’ that would ‘condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.’ ... Thus, in United States v. Locascio[,6 F.3d 924 (2nd Cir. 1993)] ... we refused to impute to the AUSAs prosecuting that action knowledge of reports prepared by FBI agents who were ‘uninvolved in the investigation or trial of the defendants-appellants.’ ... In United States v. Quinn[, 445 F.2d 940 (2nd Cir. 1971)] ... we refused to impute the knowledge of a Florida prosecutor to an AUSA in New York, rejecting as ‘completely untenable [the] position that “knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor.” ’ ”
Avellino,
In each of the cases cited by the State, the individuals or offices sought to be included under the Brady obligation were not members of the prosecutor’s office and qualified, or not, based on participation. Thus, we reject the State’s attempt to extend the holdings of these cases further than they actually reach. These cases cannot be used to import the participation requirement into the prosecutor’s office itself.
We have, in the past, imputed the knowledge of one government official to that official’s entire department, but in some contexts, we might refuse to do so vicariously.
See Gatewood v. State,
In
Carter,
in which a car was stolen and recovered on the same day, but the stolen car report was not also cancelled, the Court of Special Appeals held that the later arrest of an individual driving the reportedly “stolen” car was illegal, explaining, “the police department should have known that [the stolen vehicle report] was erroneous, since police officers had recovered the vehicle and tags originally reported stolen on January 10, 1969.”
This approach towards imputing the knowledge of one police officer to the entire department was further reinforced in
Ott v. State,
“The arresting officer had no actual knowledge that the warrant on which he arrested petitioner was no longer outstanding. In that sense, then, he acted in subjective *222 good faith. Nevertheless, he was chargeable with knowledge of the warrant’s invalidity. Since an officer in the Sheriffs Department had previously served the warrant, that department must have known that it was outdated.”
The policy basis for our decision is simple: imputing the knowledge of any evidence held by one prosecutor to another prosecutor within the same office will, potentially, avoid problems of intentional shielding of information and the existence of artificially created circumstances in which prosecutors can “plausibly deny” having had access to any exculpatory evidence. As noted in Swanson, regarding a prosecutor’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence during a trial as opposed to diligently investigating and disclosing such evidence to defense counsel prior to trial,
“If a prosecutor’s response, T told you as soon as I knew,’ is accepted to permit police withholding of evidence material to guilt or punishment, police would be encouraged to ■withhold such evidence from prosecutors until after trial.”
It is especially important to address and anticipate this potential for abuse when pursuing equality and fairness in criminal trials. “[T]he duties of a prosecutor to administer justice fairly, and particularly concerning requested or obviously exculpatory evidence, go beyond winning convictions.”
Tucceri,
“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
Accordingly, in deciding the coverage area of the Brady obligation, it is proper to consider the State’s Attorney Office as a single entity. As the seeker of truth, the State, as prosecutor, cannot seek to insulate itself from its constitutionally mandated duty by dividing itself into pieces, thus permitting one piece to claim ignorance of the knowledge of the other pieces. Hesitant to allow for a situation in which state officials may claim lack of involvement with a case in order to limit or prevent the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, we can conceive of no reason why individuals in a prosecutor’s office should be treated differently under the Brady standard. By enforcing a consistent standard applicable to all in the State’s Attorney’s Office, we believe that nondisclosures such as the one leading to this appeal will be avoided.
*224
Courts have already held the government accountable for the avoidance of the constitutionally mandated
Brady
duty, whether through action or omission. In
United States v. Osorio,
“Irrespective of the reasonable strategic use defense counsel made of the late disclosed impeachment material, we still confront the disquieting problem of the government’s negligence in meeting its disclosure duties. We have had occasion before to comment on ‘sloppy practice’ in the prosecutor’s office with respect to disclosures concerning the impeachable pasts of cooperating government witnesses.... The negligence here fits that pattern of practice.”
“Neither the individual nor the institutional responsibility of government counsel may be sloughed off so easily.... ‘The government’ is not a congery of independent hermetically sealed compartments; and the prosecutor in the courtroom, the United States Attorney’s Office in which he works, and the FBI are not separate sovereignties. The prosecution of criminal activity is a joint enterprise among all these aspects of ‘the government.’ And in this prosecution, ‘the government’ as _. ch a joint enterprise plainly did not provide known impeachment information about [the key witness] ‘as soon as it became aware of it.’ ”
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, moreover, has held that when the State impedes, through its own lack of diligence, the defendant’s right to exculpatory and impeachment evidence, such a breach of duty is egregious:
*225 “It is wholly unacceptable that the Assistant United States Attorney trying the case was not prompted personally or institutionally to seek from knowledgeable colleagues highly material impeachment information concerning the government’s most significant witness until after defense counsel got wind of it independently and indirectly from another government source.”
In State v. Siano, the Connecticut Supreme Court was critical of the scenario in which the State blatantly could violate its Brady duty without consequence. It articulated the harmful repercussions of allowing that to occur:
“[I]f the state has no responsibility ... to take affirmative steps to gain knowledge of the criminal records of its witnesses, a defendant in many instances would be placed in the anomalous position, as was the defendant here, of having to depend on the witness whom he seeks to impeach for reliable information to accomplish that impeachment.... To force the defendant to rely on the very witness he is endeavoring to impeach for an accurate account of his criminal record is illogical and would be antithetic to what the rule was intended to accomplish____ There is ... an obligation on the part of the state ... to make a reasonable affirmative effort to obtain a record of a state’s witness’ felony convictions and pending misdemeanor and felony charges for disclosure to the defendant. That conclusion requires that a prosecutor is at least obligated to make known to a defendant, at the proper time, information concerning the criminal record of a state’s witness that is known to the prosecutor or is contained in the prosecutor’s *226 own case file, information that can be gained through reasonable inquiry of other prosecutorial personnel in the prosecutor’s office, and information that is reasonably available to the prosecutor through his access to state and federal computerized criminal information systems. Anything less, we believe, would compromise the effectiveness of [the State’s Brady obligation] and in many instances would render it a nullity.”
The State acts as one unit, and as such, declining to make a reasonable inquiry of those in a position to have relevant knowledge is appealable error.
10
It is not good enough to claim that another part of the State failed in its duty, and this failing resulted in the prosecutor being unable to fulfill his or her personal obligation. While investigative agents, for example, may be subject to some sort of punishment for their lack of diligence, “[ultimately, regardless of whether the prosecutor is able to frame and enforce directives to the investigative agencies to respond candidly and fully to disclosure orders, responsibility for failure to meet disclosure obligations will be assessed by the courts against the prosecutor and his office.”
Osorio,
E.
The State claims that “[d]efense counsel, having been provided with Sean Williams’s criminal record, could have chosen to delve into his background in order to obtain additional impeachment information.... The due diligence
*227
burden is the defendant’s, not the State’s.”
11
The State further argues that
Brady
does not relieve a defendant from a duty to investigate, and that, under
Ware,
We are not persuaded. A defendant’s duty to investigate simply does not relieve the State of its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady and Maryland Rule 4-263(g). In Banks v. Dretke, the Supreme Court held, in response to a similar argument:
“The State here ... urges, in effect, that ‘the prosecution can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to ... discover the evidence,’ ... so long as the ‘potential existence’ of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might have been detected ... A rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.”
*228
The
Banks
Court held firm that there is a presumption by courts, litigants, and juries that the State will refrain from using improper methods in order to secure convictions, and that burdens plainly resting on the State will be “faithfully observed.”
Furthermore, the authority cited by the State, Ware, only addresses information that could have been ascertained by defendant’s counsel from public records, and, even in that instance, does not fully relieve the State of its duty:
“Merely because evidence is available through public records, however, does not necessarily mean that it is available to the accused for purposes of determining whether the Brady rule applies.... Even when the exculpatory information can be found in public records, the necessary inquiry is whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence.... Furthermore, the existence of evidence in the public record does not suffice to relieve the State of its duty to disclose material, favorable evidence to the defense unless a reasonable defendant would have looked to that public record in the exercise of due diligence.”
This case presents a more restrictive setting. Here, the undisclosed information of S. Williams’s status as a paid informant could have come only from the State’s Attorney’s Office or the police. Where exculpatory or mitigating evidence is accessible only through the State, or with its cooperation, it simply cannot be that the defense must engage in a futile attempt to gather
Brady
information. “As a general rule, the omissions of defense counsel (a) do not relieve the
*229
prosecution of its obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and (b) may provide the defendant with an independent claim of an unconstitutional denial of the effective assistance of counsel.”
Tucce/ri,
F.
Lastly, the State contends that, even if
Brady
information was illegally withheld, that information was not material to the respondent’s case. Again, we disagree. The analysis of the Court of Special Appeals is both on point and correct. Evidence is material under
Brady
when “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict.”
Kyles,
The Court of Special Appeals relied primarily on
Conyers v. State,
*230 “While there was circumstantial evidence adduced during the guilt/innocence portion of the trial that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Petitioner was a participant in her murder, it is less apparent that, absent belief of [the government witness’s] testimony, the evidence would have been sufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the principal. If [the government witness’s] testimony is to be believed, there are no inferences that need be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, either at trial or sentencing, in order to conclude that Petitioner was involved, or the shooter, in both murders.”
Conyers,
The Court of Special Appeals, in relying on
Conyers,
acknowledged that the State produced some circumstantial evidence implicating the respondent; however, it was convinced that it was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that is, absent the S. Williams’s, the key witness’, testimony. Accordingly, it held “that the taint of the
Brady
suppression matters on this record so undermines our confidence in the murder conviction that a new trial is in order.”
Williams,
In its brief, the State cites
Kyles
for the proposition that the mere fact that a prosecutor knows of favorable exculpatory evidence unknown to the defense is not, without more, a
Brady
violation.
In
Kyles,
the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
State v. Kyles,
“While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumulative effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of discretion, it must also be understood as imposing a corresponding burden. On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of ‘reasonable probability’ is reached. This in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.
*232 But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith, see Brady,373 U.S. at 87 ,83 S.Ct. 1194 ), the prosecution’s responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.”
The State suggests that Agurs illustrates the Supreme Court’s previous rejection of the notion that a prosecutor must disclose anything, and everything, that might influence a jury, commenting:
“If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.... Whether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery might be desirable, the Constitution does not demand that much.”
“The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed____[I]f the verdict is already of questiona *233 ble validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create reasonable doubt.”
Finally, the State refers to the post conviction court’s finding that the respondent’s cross-examination of S. Williams was “nothing short of superb,” and that the witness had been sufficiently attacked. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this rationale, as do we. Relying again on Conyers, the Court of Special Appeals pointed out:
“Appellant’s trial counsel cross-examined Williams about his criminal record and his testimony in another homicide case. Nevertheless, counsel had no direct evidence with which to cross-examine Williams as to his receipt of benefits for the information he had provided to police. For these reasons, we cannot say that, if the jury had been informed of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding Williams’s status as a paid police informant and his attempts to have Judge Schwait reduce his sentence because of his cooperation with the police, there would be neither a substantial possibility nor a reasonable probability ‘that the outcome would have been different.’ ”
Williams,
We agree. The caliber of the defense counsel’s performance in cross-examining the critical State’s witness has little, if any, bearing on materiality. We certainly are not inclined to make the test of materiality of undisclosed evidence depend on the capability or actual performance of opposing counsel in conducting cross-examination of an adverse witness. This case addresses the duty of the State, a duty that is not discharged no matter how well a defendant’s counsel handles his client’s defense and how expertly he or she endeavors to neutralize damaging evidence. “In gauging the nondisclosure in terms of due process, the focus must be on the essential fairness of the procedure and not on the astuteness of either counsel.”
Barbee,
*234 While it may be true that the adequacy of cross-examination may invite speculation as to whether the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome of the case, such speculation does not affect the ultimate question, that of the materiality of such evidence, and it certainly does not affect the duty that the State has to discharge the obligation imposed upon it by Brady.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Notes
. Maryland Rule 4-263(g) provides:
"(g) Obligations of State's Attorney. The obligations of the State’s Attorney under this Rule extend to material and information in the possession or control of the State’s Attorney and staff members and any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the action and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular action have reported, to the office of the State’s Attorney.”
. The officer who registered S. Williams as a confidential paid informant testified that because the identities of confidential informants were not centrally computerized, S. Williams’s status as a police informant, while known to some, was not known to all police officers in the Eastern District
. The Court of Special Appeals' opinion states that the charges against respondent were lodged in the Spring of 1998. The respondent maintains, on the other hand, that the charges were brought in the latter part of 1997. Since the murder was alleged to have been committed in February, 1998, the respondent was charged in the Spring of 1998 and is alleged to have made the admissions to S. Williams while in the Baltimore City jail on the murder charge and S. Williams reported them to Officer Massey in March, 1998, it is likely that the respondent's version is more accurate.
. The correct standard is "reasonable possibility,” a standard articulated by this Court in
Dorsey v. State
to determine whether improperly admitted evidence contributed to a conviction applies.
. We note that the original quote from
Daye
reads: "... members of his staff and
of
any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to his office.” It is curious that the
Sleeper
court decided to omit the second “of,” in its quote, as this omission, we believe, materially changes the meaning of the phrase.
. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also rejected the notion that exculpatory information that was in the hands of the Metropolitan Police Department, the FBI, or DEA, rather than the U.S. Attorney’s Office, somehow absolved the State of its duty.
In re Sealed Case,
. The court in
United States v. Osorio, 929
F.2d 753 (1st Cir.1991), commented that, regarding
Brady
disclosure, "[i]t is good strategy. No properly prepared trial lawyer should permit himself to be surprised by the vulnerability of his witness, particularly when that vulnerability is well known by his colleagues. To do so needlessly hands a strategic advantage to one's adversary. And it is not merely sloppy personal practice; it implicates the procedures of the entire office for responding to discovery ordered by the court.”
Osorio,
. Some courts have treated the State like a corporation, finding the imputation of collective knowledge on its individual employees and agents when assessing individual employees and agents to be applicable in the State context.
See, e.g., Osorio,
. Although the respondent urges this Court to hold that the State waived its argument that a defendant has a duty to investigate, we note that certiorari was properly granted on the issue, and, thus, we have the authority to address it. The State included the issue in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, without, it must be noted, excepting that issue. Moreover, the respondent did not raise, by way of cross-petition, whether the duty to investigate issue had been waived. By not himself contesting the issue and its waiver status in a cross-petition, the respondent has not preserved the issue of waiver for our review.
See Holbrook v. State,
"(b) In Court of Appeals—Additional limitations.
"(1) Prior Appellate Decision. Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.”
. Again, as we highlighted in supra, n. 4, the correct standard is “reasonable possibility” under Dorsey.
. The undisclosed evidence included eyewitness statements, statements given by an informant who was never called to testify, and a computer print-out of license numbers of cars parked at the crime scene on the night of the murder. The latter did not include the license number of the petitioner’s car.
