State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Coleman J.H., Shebell, Conley
In a joint trial, defendant Craig Williams and co-defendant David DelGado were found guilty of certain criminal offenses associated with the burning of a 1988 black Nissan Maxima automobile owned by defendant Williams. Defendant was found guilty of second-degree aggravated arson, contrary to
In this appeal, defendant Williams raises the following contentions:
I. THE THIRD COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT ACCUSING DEFENDANT OF SETTING A FIRE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING HIS OWN PROPERTY FAILED TO CHARGE CONDUCT CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ARSON; ACCORDINGLY, THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON UNDER THAT COUNT CANNOT STAND.
II. THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT WILLIAMS FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON UNDER COUNT III OF THE INDICTMENT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED
ON THE THEORY THAT A LIEN ON THE AUTO DESTROYED BY FIRE MADE THE AUTO “PROPERTY OF ANOTHER” WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF THE ARSON STATUTE SINCE SUCH A THEORY WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY, WAS NOT PLED IN THE INDICTMENT, AND WAS NOT CHARGED TO THE JURY.
I
The State‘s evidence presented to the jury disclosed that defendant-Williams owned а 1988 Nissan Maxima which was insured. He and co-defendant DelGado were New Jersey State Troopers in 1988 and were assigned to the Flemington barracks. Williams told DelGado that he was looking for someone to burn his Maxima. On September 24, 1988, DelGado contacted a good friend, William Starr,1 and told him that he had a friend who wanted to “get rid of his cаr.” Starr met with DelGado and Williams at DelGado‘s home. Starr discussed the matter with Williams, and Starr agreed to take the car to New York and burn it without removing any of its parts. Starr and Williams agreed upon a price of $300 for burning the car the next day. Williams agreed to drive the car to DelGado‘s house the next morning — September 25, 1988 — and DelGado would сall Starr. DelGado was to collect the $300 from Williams.
Williams dropped the car off at DelGado‘s home the morning of September 25, 1988 as planned and DelGado called Starr to pick up the car. Starr took Tommy McNamara with him to pick up the Maxima. Upon his arrival at DelGado‘s home, Starr found the Maxima parked out front. DelGado gave Starr the keys to the Maxima and Starr told DelGado that he would call him when the job was completed.
Starr and McNamara drove the Maxima to Englishtown where they did some shopping. When they returned from Englishtown, they began to strip the car and stored the parts in
Starr drove the Maxima to a barn located at 4 Woodside Road, East Windsor Township, New Jersey where Starr, Hoag and DeJesus removed the tires, battery and remaining seаts. They filled the car with some debris and threw a match into the car. The ensuing fire burned the car and the barn. The additional parts stripped from the car were taken to McNamara‘s house and placed in the same shed as the previous parts. Starr then notified DelGado that the job had been completed. A few days after thе car was burned on September 25, 1988, DelGado gave Starr $200 for the job, stating that the money came from Williams.
The day after the fire, McNamara read in a newspaper that a car fitting the description of the one he saw Starr driving had been burned, he called Sergeant Robert Shainer of the Trenton Police Department.
A few days after September 26, 1988, Sergeant Charles Felter of the Criminal Investigation Bureau in the Trenton Police Department contacted McNamara and he agreed to cooperate in the arson investigation. In furtherance of that investigation, McNamara contacted Starr and told him he had a friend interested in buying the pаrts stripped from the Maxima. Starr agreed, but called DelGado before the meeting because Starr was suspicious that the meeting might be a “set-up.” DelGado told Starr not to go, but he disregarded that advice. Starr and McNamara went to a prearranged meeting place together and
After the meeting, Starr gave DelGado the pickup‘s license plate number DJB 889 and asked him to look it up in the computer. DelGado used the interstate computer to look up the license plate number but could not get any information as to the identity of the owner. DelGado informed Starr of this fact on October 13, 1988. In the meantime, Starr also decided to cooperate with law enforcement officials on October 12, 1988, when he was made aware that the arson investigation had uncovered his involvement. It turned out that McNamara‘s friend who was supposed to buy the Maxima‘s parts was Investigator Rossi of the Mercer County Prosecutor‘s Office. Starr testified as a key prosecution witness.
II
Williams contends that the allegations in Count III of the indictment failed to charge an offense of aggravated arson and the conviction on that count must be vacated. The essence of this contention is that because Williams could have burned his own car without committing aggravated arson, he could not be guilty of that offense as an accomplice.
Count III charged the following:
The Grand Jurors of the State of New Jersey, for the County of Mercer, upon their oaths present that WILLIAM STARR, NELSON DeJESUS, CRAIG WILLIAMS AND DAVID DELGADO on or about the 25th day of September, 1988, in the Township of East Windsor in the County aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did start a fire or cause an explosion of a 1988 black Nissan Maxima, VIN# JN1HU11P9JT612452, with the purpose of destroying a building or structure of Craig Williams, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1a; 2C:2-6, and against the peace of this State, the Government and dignity of the same. [Emphasis added].
It is agreed that the above count intended to charge aggravated arson pursuant to
A person is guilty оf aggravated arson, a crime of the second degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another‘s: (2) with the purpose of destroying a building or structure of another;
Thus it is plain that Count III when read in conjunction with the applicable statute, charged defendant Williams with accomplice liability for starting a fire in “a 1988 black Nissan Maxima ... with purpose of destroying a building or structure of Craig Williams....” The jury was instructed that the “structure here alleged in [Count III] is a black Nissan Maxima motor vehicle, that of Craig Williams.” Starr testified that he purposely started the fire in the Maxima for the purpose of destroying the car.
Next we must consider the meaning of “structure of another.”
While the Code does not define “actor“,3 the Code mandates that its provisions “shall be construed according to the fair
Here, vicarious criminal liability is sought to be imposed upon defendant Williams on the theory that he is legally accountable for the conduct of Starr because he acted as an accomplice to Starr by soliciting Starr to burn thе Maxima and by aiding, agreeing or attempting to aid Starr in burning the Maxima. Based on the language used in the accomplice liability statute,
Defendant‘s reliance on State v. Boyd, 87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (E. & A. 1915) for the proposition that he could lawfully burn his own car and that he could therefore solicit another person to burn his car without incurring any criminal liability is misplaced. In Boyd the indictment failed tо charge that the destruction, which defendant was accused of encouraging others to commit, was unlawful. Id. at 569, 94 A. 807. The case was decided based upon the insufficiency of the allegations in the indictment which were fatal. Only in dictum did the court observe that it may have been lawful for a person to burn his personal property in 1915 becausе the statute there involved, which was an inciting to riot or destroy property and not an
Boyd did not involve common law or statutory arson. As early as 1846, the arson statutes prohibited an owner from burning one‘s own building or dwelling, State v. Midgeley, 15 N.J. 574, 576-77, 105 A.2d 844 (1954), even if the building was unoccupied after the 1919 amendment to the Crimes Act by L. 1919, c. 106, § 1, p. 257. See
Indeed, when the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code) became effective September 1, 1979, one of the existing arsоn statutes prohibited an owner of a motor vehicle or his agent from maliciously or willfully burning or setting fire with intent to burn a “vehicle, motor vehicle or aircraft, whether it be his own or that of another....”
To be sure,
III
We also reject defendant Williams contention that he could not be criminally liable for Starr‘s conduct. The Code adopted a unilateral approach to accomplice liability. See
A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inсonsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
We perceive no sound reason under the Code or the public policy of this State not to apply
Additionally, the pertinent subsections of
Thus, under the Code, defendant Williams was legally accountable for the conduct of Starr if Williams either purposely solicited Starr to commit the crimе of aggravated arson or if Williams aided or attempted to aid Starr in planning or committing the offense of aggravated arson. Williams acted purposely if it was his “conscious object to engage in conduct of that
We are entirely satisfied that under the State‘s version of the evidence, see State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55, 66, 362 A.2d 1153 (1976), Williams procured and solicited Starr through DelGado to burn the car. A careful reading of the accomplice liability statute as a whole evinces a careful legislative judgment to visit criminal liability upon an accomplice who purposely solicits, procures or aids another in the planning or commission of an offense by the perpetrator. See State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 402, 526 A.2d 1077 (1987). Congruent criminal liability is visited upon the accomplice for purposеly procuring, soliciting or aiding the perpetrator. The Commentary supra, at 59, refers to these as some of the exhaustive descriptions of “the ways in which one may purposely enhance the probability that another will commit a crime.” Our careful study of the law and the appellate record convinces us that defendant Williams was properly convicted under Count III.
IV
In view of our decision that defendant Williams was properly convicted under Count III, it is not necessary to reach the contention under Point II that defendant could not be convicted under Count III based on a lienholder‘s interest in the car. Suffice it to say that we fully agree that because neither the Grand Jury nor the trial jury was ever informed or asked to consider the lienholder‘s interest as the property of another, and because the indictment does not refer to any lienholder‘s interest, defendant could not be convicted based on that theory. See State v. Wein, 80 N.J. 491, 404 A.2d 302 (1979). See also
The judgment of conviction under Count III is affirmed.