State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Lagoa, Gersten, Cope
G.A. Gayoso, for respondent.
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and LAGOA, JJ.1
LAGOA, J.
The State petitions for a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court‘s order excluding evidence of collateral crimes. Because we find that the order departs from the essential requirements of the law and further find that the State lacks an adequate remedy, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court‘s order.2
The defendant, Gerard Williams (“Williams“), was charged by information with three separate cases involving armed robberies: Case No. F04-30278 (robbery date: Septembеr 5, 2004);3 Case No.
Pursuant to
After conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court ruled that the evidence was not admissible. Specifically, the trial court found that the evidence was not relevant because the collаteral crimes were not sufficiently similar to each other and had “no special character or are not so unusual as to point to the defendant.” In its analysis, the trial court applied the similarity rеquirement used in cases in which the State is seeking to prove identity through modus operandi. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the evidence of collateral crimes was not the sole means available to the Stаte to prove identity. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied upon Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and upon federal case law interpreting that rule.
On appeal, the State argues that the order departs from the essential requirements of the law because it excludes relevant evidence that is probative of the defendant‘s identity. We agree. Initially, we find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by applying the incorrect rule of evidence to its analysis. The trial court‘s written order quoted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), presumably intending to apply it by analogy. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), however, has no application in this case. The applicable rule is
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible
when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
This section codifies the general rule of admissibility of similar fact evidence enunciated in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 2000).
We further find that the trial court also departed from the essential requirements of the law by ruling that the collateral crimes evidence was not necessary for the State to prove its case. The State contends that the test for admissibility of such еvidence is relevancy, not necessity. We agree. “Necessity has never been established by [the Florida Supreme] Court as an essential requisite to admissibility.” Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1988). The fact that the State has other evidencе at its disposal to prove the identity of the perpetrator does not bear upon the relevance of the collateral crimes evidence. Generally, any evidence relevant to prove a fact at issue is admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. See Bryan, 533 So. 2d at 747; Dorsett v. State, 944 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Finally, the trial court erred when it applied the similarity requirement, reserved for determining the admissibility of collateral crime evidence, where the State seeks to prove identity through modus operandi, common plan, or scheme. Here, the State did not seek to prove identity by modus operandi but instead sought to prove identity based on evidеnce that the same gun was used in all three robberies. As noted above, when dealing with evidence which tends to reveal the commission of a collateral crime, the test of admissibility is relevance. See Williams, 110 So. 2d at 660 (“[W]e find relevancy to be the test of admissibility. If the proffered evidence is relevant to a material fact in issue, it is admissible even though it points also to a separate crime.“); Dorsett, 944 So. 2d at 1212; Evans v. State, 693 So. 2d 1096, 1100 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (stating that the “case law clearly allows for the introduction of dissimilar collateral crimes where identity is sought to be established by means other than modus operandi or common plan or scheme“).
Because the gun used in all three robberies was shown to be the same one, the only inquiry for the trial court to make was whether such evidence of collateral crimes, which included both physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, was relevant to the issue of the perpetrator‘s identity—not whether the evidence revealed uniquely similar factual situations. See Fernandez v. State, 722 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (evidence of prior shooting was relevant to issues of identity and motive where same gun was used in prior shooting and charged crime); see also Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1984) (finding no error in introduction of evidence of defendant‘s admission to prior shooting as admission was relevant to prove identification as perpetrator of charged crimе where bullets from both crimes were linked by ballistics evidence).
The next inquiry is whether the evidence, although relevant, should be excluded on grounds of unfair prejudice. Under the Evidence Code, “[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Here, the trial court made an alternative finding that the evidence should be excluded as being highly prejudicial and harmful
In concluding that the evidence should be excluded, the trial court relied on State v. Dawson, 766 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We find, however, that this case is not applicable here. In Dawson, the defendant was accused of crimes cоmmitted in two incidents. Nine-millimeter shell casings were found at both crime scenes. The trial court ruled that even if the shell casing evidence was marginally relevant, the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 1109-10.
The Dawson case is not on point. That is so because there is no indication in Dawson that there had been any ballistic testing which would demonstrate that, based on the markings on the shell casings, the identical weapon was used in both crimes. So far as the Dawson opinion indicates, the State sought to link the two prosecutions by showing that nine millimeter shell casings were found at both crime scenes—without demonstrating that the same weapon was used in both crimes. In the present case, by contrast, the ballistics evidence is that the identical weapon was used in all three of the armed robberies.
The trial court also ruled that exclusion under
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court‘s order reрresents a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Moreover, we find that certiorari relief is appropriate in this case as the exclusion of the evidence might significantly impair thе State‘s ability to prosecute the defendant. See Richards, 843 So. 2d at 968 (citing Richardson v. State, 706 So. 2d 1349, 1358 (Fla. 1998)). Lastly, we conclude that the order represents a material injury that may not be remedied on direct appeal if the defendant is acquitted. Sеe Richards, 843 So. 2d at 968.
For the reasons stated, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court‘s order excluding evidence of collateral crimes.
Petition granted.