State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- J.H. Coleman, Dreier, Villanueva
The opinion of the court was delivered by VILLANUEVA, J.A.D.1
The State appeals, pursuant to leave granted, from the trial court‘s vacation of a jury verdict convicting defendant of drug offenses and permitting the defendant, over the State‘s objection,
The Essex County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant David Williams (defendant) and codefendant Tonya Tisdale with third degree conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws of the State of New Jersey, contrary to
On November 1, 1993, the trial judge conducted a plea disposition conference. Both defendants rejected the plea recommendation рroffered by the State and elected to go to trial. The court imposed a plea cut-off date as of November 1, 1993.
Trial commenced on January 5, 1994. Prior to the selection of a jury, pretrial hearings were held on defendant Williams’ motion to suppress and on the admissibility of an out-of-court identification of the defendant. The court denied these motions.
Subsequently, on the same day, defendant requested that he be permitted to accept the plea offer previously made by the State which he rejected on Novembеr 1, 1993. The court denied defendant‘s request based on the imposition of the plea cut-off date of November 1, 1993, and stated that the court had no authority to approve any pleas after that date. Jury selection began immediately.
On January 11, 1994, a jury acquitted co-dеfendant Tonya Tisdale of all charges; defendant was found guilty of count two,
On January 20, 1994, the State moved for an extended term of imprisonment for the defendant as a persistent offender, pursuant to R. 3:21-4(e),
On March 22, 1994, after oral argument, the court ordered defendant‘s judgment of conviction vacated and granted defendant leave to plead to the original pretrial plea offer. The trial court stayed the order until April 1, 1994, and deferred the motion by defense counsel and defendant for a new trial. On March 24, 1994, the court denied the State‘s motion for reconsideration.
On March 30, 1994, we granted leave to appeal, denied the State‘s motion for summary rеversal and stayed the trial court‘s order of March 22, 1994.
I.
Although the procedural framework of this case involves a local “plea cut-off” rule3, this appeal does not turn on whether a plea cut-off rule, either in general or as allegedly applied here, is a valid exercise of judicial authority. This is because a plea cut-off
The plea bargain system is founded on the “`mutuality of advantage’ it affords to both the defendant and the State.” State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 361, 403 A.2d 889 (1979) (citations omitted). Defendant obtains the benefit of reduced penal exposure while the State is provided with the certainty of somе punishment and the conservation of limited resources. State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420, 558 A.2d 1303 (1989).
This contractually-based principle necessarily requires that both parties to the bargain voluntarily agree to its term. A bargain cannot be imposed upon a defendant and, by the same token, a defendant hаs no legal entitlement to compel a plea offer or a plea bargain; the decision whether to engage in such bargaining rests with the prosecutor. See e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 n. 5 (1984); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 43 (1977); United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244, 250 (8th Cir.1993); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1403, 128 L.Ed.2d 75 (1994); see also State v. Brockington, 140 N.J. Super. 422, 427, 356 A.2d 430 (App.Div.,) certif. den. 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1077, cert. den. 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 357, 50 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).
There is no evidence in the record of the necessary meeting of the minds essential to a negotiatеd plea. See e.g., State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 321-22, 294 A.2d 57 (1972); see also State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 442-46, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989); State v. Taylor, supra, 80 N.J. at 361-64, 403 A.2d 889; State v. Jones, 66 N.J. 524, 525-26, 333 A.2d 529 (1975). To the contrary, defendant rejected the plea offer.
While the State and the defendant are, therefore, free to engage in plea negotiations, the court‘s role is a different one. The court has the power to ultimately accept and enforce an agreement reached between the parties. This normally involves determining that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered, is supported by a factual basis, and is entered in the interests of justice. See generally, R. 3:9-3; State v. Bilse, 244 N.J. Super. 20, 26, 581 A.2d 518 (Law Div. 1990).
What the trial court clearly may not do, however, is рarticipate in plea negotiations. R. 3:9-3(a); State v. Warren, supra, 115 N.J. at 441, 558 A.2d 1312; State v. Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 422, 558 A.2d 1303. Even under the 1989 amendments to R. 3:9-3(c) the court is not to participate in plea bargaining. Those amendments only allow the judge on the request of both parties tentatively to indicate the sentence he or she would impose; “[t]he amendments do not otherwise authorize the judge
Because a judge may not participate in plea negotiations, a judge may not tender a plea offer, especially over the objection of the prosecutor. Various courts have observed that such action imрroperly assumes the executive or prosecutorial power and, therefore, violates the doctrine of separation of powers. See Com. v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 574 N.E.2d 974, 975-76 (1991) (trial court‘s acceptance of plea to lesser included offense over prosecutor‘s objection violated state constitutional separation of powers provision and “effectively usurped the decision-making authority constitutionally allocated to the executive branch.“); People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69, 533 P.2d 193, 197 (1975) (plea bargain could not be executed without prosecutor‘s аgreement and court lacks authority to substitute itself for prosecution); People v. Mikhail, 13 Cal. App.4th 846, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 641, 646 (1993) (based on separation of powers doctrine, it is solely the function of executive branch to engage in plea negotiations); People v. Harmon, 181 A.D.2d 34, 586 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (1992) (without prosecutor‘s consent, trial court cannot aсcept guilty plea to less than entire indictment); Com. v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Ky. 1992) (court may not enter into plea agreement with the defendant without consent of prosecution); State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 832 P.2d 1176, 1186 (1992), denial of post-conviction relief aff‘d. 255 Kan. 101, 872 P.2d 748 (1994) (plea bargaining lies within the discretion of the prosecutor); State v. Dawson, 203 Ga. App. 854, 419 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1992) (plea bargaining is in the exclusive province of prosecutor).
Regardless of the existence of a plea cut-off order or whether the court acted properly in enforcing the plea cut-off when the trial began, a plea could not have been entered herein because there was no offеr for the defendant to accept. This case is factually distinguishable from State v. Bowen, 269 N.J. Super. 203, 634 A.2d 1371 (App.Div. 1993), where the State made a new plea offer after a pretrial hearing.
II.
Defendant‘s argument that the trial court abused its discretion rests primarily on his contention that the trial court acted improperly in implementing a plea cut-off before the motion to suppress was heard and decided. At this posture of the case, the trial court had no discretion to exercise, and therefore could not have abused its discretion. Even if the State had renewed the same offer it had made before trial proceedings had begun, the court acted well within its аuthority in enforcing a plea cut-off.
On June 23, 1994, the Supreme Court approved local implementation of court-imposed plea cut-offs, and on December 10, 1993, Essex County Assignment Judge Burrell Ives Humphreys approved the plea cut-off policy which had been in effеct in Essex County since January 1993.
Here, the plea cut-off occurred only after the defendant was fully advised of his options and clearly expressed his desire to go to trial. Moreover, the defendant did not seek to plead guilty until the very last minute. He waited until the State was rеady for trial and defendant‘s motions to suppress and to declare an
In deciding that he had abused his discretion in rejecting the defendant‘s last-minute effort to change positions and to obtain the benefit of a long-expired plea offer, the trial judge focused solely on certain language in the Criminal Division Operating Standards. In particular, the court relied on the language of Standard III5 providing that a plea cut-off should be implemented only after “necessary motions” are decided. The trial court reasoned that since the motion to suppress had not been decided, it was improper to employ the plea cut-off because a motion to suppress is a “necessary motion.”
We need not pass upon this argument regarding implementation of the plea cut-off because we have already determined that there was no valid plea offer to accept and no plea agreement was agreed upon betweеn the defendant and the State.
III.
The court‘s order vacating a valid jury verdict to allow the defendant to enter into an expired plea offer is contrary to public policy and the sound administration of justice and constituted a miscarriage of justice. A jury‘s verdict should not be treated so lightly nor set aside for such specious reasons as those advanced
Here, no legitimate purpose was sеrved by setting aside the jury verdict and allowing the defendant to enter into a plea bargain after the trial on the pretext that there was still an outstanding plea. See Barnes v. State, 489 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (disapproving post-verdict plea bargaining as not serving the function of plea bargaining).
With the defendant having bеen fairly tried, the State should not find itself saddled with an unwanted plea bargain rejected by the defendant two months before trial.
Reversed and remanded for sentencing.