State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Horowitz
Defendants, husband and wife, were charged by information filed October 3, 1968, with the crime of manslaughter for negligently failing to supply their 17-month child with necessary medical attention, as a result of which he died on September 12, 1968. Upon entry of findings, conclusions and judgment of guilty, sentences were imposed on April 22, 1969. Defendants appeal.
The defendant husband, Walter Williams, is a 24-year-old full-blooded Sheshont Indian with a sixth-grade education. His sole occupation is that of laborer. The defendant wife, Bernice Williams, is a 20-year-old part Indian with an 11th grade education. At the time of the marriage, the wife had two children, the younger of whom was ‘a 14-month son. Both parents worked and the children were cared for by the 85-year-old mother of the defendant husband. The defendant husband assumed parental responsibility with the defendant wife to provide clothing, care and medical attention for the child. Both defendants possessed a great deal of love and affection for the defendant wife’s young son.
The court expressly found:
That both defendants were aware that William Joseph
The defendants Walter L. Williams and Bernice J. Williams were negligent in not seeking medical attention for William Joseph Tabafunda.
That as a proximate result of this negligence, William Joseph Tabafunda died.
Findings 5, 6 and 7. From these and other findings, the court concluded that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of manslaughter as charged.
Defendants take no exception to findings but contend that the findings do not support the conclusions that the defendants ‘are guilty of manslaughter as charged. The contentions raise two basic issues, (1) the existence of the duty to furnish medical aid charged by the information to be violated 1 and the seriousness of the breach required; and (2) the issue of proximate cause, i.e., whether defendants were put on notice, in time to save the child’s life, that medical care was required. Because the nature of the duty and the quality or seriousness of the breach are closely interrelated, our discussion of the first issue involved will embrace both matters.
The concept of simple or ordinary negligence describes a failure to exercise the “ordinary caution” necessary to make out the defense of excusable homicide.
In the instant case, defendants contend that the only duty to provide medical care for the infant child is the statutory duty set forth in
Defendants’ contention misconceives the significance of the words “willful . . . misconduct” contained in the conclusions because of defendants’ failure to recognize that “willful” is a phrase of double meaning. The presumption of correctness that attends judgments of the trial court is necessarily predicated upon the subordinate presumption of the correctness of findings and conclusions. To give proper effect to this presumption requires that findings, whether or not containing a conclusion of law, and conclusions of law be reconciled if reasonably possible. Such a reconciliation is entirely possible in the instant case by a proper interpretation of the phrase “willful . . . misconduct.” Since the trial court expressly found that the defendants “had no excuse that the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor,” it is reasonable to conclude that the phrase “willful . . . misconduct,” contained in the conclusion, merely means intentional misconduct. The conclusion, in light of the findings, means merely that the conduct, although not intentional, was without lawful excuse and therefore willful in the second sense.
State v. Russell,
73 Wn.2d 903, 442 P.2d 988 (1968);
State v. McCarty,
76 Wn.2d 328, 456 P.2d 350 (1969);
State v. Ozanne,
75 Wn.2d 546, 452 P.2d 745 (1969). Even if it is assumed that the information charging the crime of manslaughter relied upon ‘a violation of
Furthermore, the significance of the words “willful
We need not, however, rest our decision solely on the above-mentioned grounds. The information charging statutory manslaughter made no mention of and did not purport to restrict itself to the violation of the duty set forth in
In the instant case, however, the defendant husband is not the father of the minor child, nor has he adopted that child. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that he had assumed responsibility with his wife for the care and maintenance of the child, whom he greatly loved. Such assumption of responsibility, characterized in the information as that required of a “guardian and custodian,” is sufficient to impose upon him the duty to furnish necessary medical care.
See State v. Parmenter, supra; White v. McDowell, supra. See generally,
Annot., 10 A.L.R. 1137, 1143 (1921); 39 Am. Jur.
Parent and Child
§ 105 (1942);
State v. Noakes,
70 Vt. 247, 40 A. 249 (1897);
State v. Sandford,
99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1905).
See also
The remaining issue of proximate cause requires consideration of the question of when the duty to furnish medical care became activated. If the duty to furnish such care was not activated until after it was too late to save the life of the child, failure to furnish medical care could not be said to have proximately caused the child’s death. Timeliness in the furnishing of medical care also must be considered in terms of “ordinary caution.” The law does not mandatorily require that a doctor be called for a child at the first sign of any indisposition or illness. The indisposition or illness may appear to be of a minor or very temporary kind, such as a toothache or cold. If one in the exercise of ordinary caution fails to recognize that his child’s symptoms require medical attention, it cannot be said that the failure to obtain such medical attention is a breach of the duty owed. In our opinion, the duty as formulated in
People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903), although involving a statute similar to
We quite agree that the Code does not contemplate the necessity of calling a physician for every trifling complaint with which the child may be afflicted which in most instances may be overcome by the ordinary house
People v. Pierson, supra at 205. Accord, Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 P. 495 (1925).
It remains to apply the law discussed to the facts of the instant case.
Defendants have not assigned error to the findings either on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to prove negligence or proximate cause, or that the state has failed to prove the facts found by failing to apply the required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 358 P.2d 295, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 886, 6 L. Ed. 2d 199, 81 S. Ct. 1043 (1961); United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971). They contended below and on appeal that they are not guilty of the crime charged. Because of the serious, nature of the charge against the parent and stepparent of a well-loved child, and out of our concern for the protection of the constitutional rights of the defendants, we have made an independent examination of the evidence to determine whether it substantially supports the court’s express finding on proximate cause and its implied finding that the duty to furnish medical care became activated in time to prevent death of the child. See State v. Moore, 194 Ore. 232, 241 P.2d 455 (1952).
Dr. Gale Wilson, the autopsy surgeon and chief pathologist for the King County Coroner, testified that the child died because an abscessed tooth had been allowed to develop into an infection of the mouth and cheeks, eventually becoming gangrenous. This condition, accompanied by the child’s inability to eat, brought about malnutrition, lowering the child’s resistance and eventually producing pneumonia, causing the death. Dr. Wilson testified that in his opinion
The testimony concerning the child’s apparent condition during the critical period is not crystal clear, but is sufficient to warrant the following statement of the matter. The defendant husband testified that he noticed the baby was sick about 2 weeks before the baby died. The defendant wife testified that she noticed the baby was ill about a week and a half or 2 weeks before the baby died. The evidence showed that in the critical period the baby was fussy; that he could not keep his food down; and that a cheek started swelling up. The swelling went up and down, but did not disappear. In that same period, the cheek turned “a bluish color like.” The defendants, not realizing that the baby was as ill as it was or that the baby was in danger of dying, attempted to provide some relief to the baby by giving the baby aspirin during the critical period and continued to do so until the night before the baby died. The. defendants thought the swelling would go down and were waiting for it to do so; and defendant husband testified, that from what he had heard, neither doctors nor dentists pull out a tooth “when it’s all swollen up like that.” There was an additional explanation for not calling a doctor given by each defendant. Defendant husband testified that “the way the cheek looked, . . . and that stuff on his hair, they would think we were neglecting him and take him away from us and not give him back.” Defendant wife testified that the defendants were “waiting for the swelling to go down,” and also that they were afraid to
In our opinion, there is sufficient evidence from which the court could find, as it necessarily did, that applying the standard of ordinary caution, i.e., the caution exercisable by a man of reasonable prudence under the same or similar conditions, defendants were sufficiently put on notice concerning the symptoms of the baby’s illness and lack of improvement in the baby’s apparent condition in the period from September 1 to September 5, 1968 to have required them to have obtained medical care for the child. The failure so to do in this case is ordinary or simple negligence, and such negligence is sufficient to support a conviction of statutory manslaughter.
The judgment is affirmed.
Utter and Williams, JJ., concur.
Notes
The information, in charging the violation of the duty owed, alleged:
[T]hey, the said defendants, then and there being the father, mother, guardian and custodian of one William Joseph Tabafunda, and being then and there under the legal duty of providing necessary-food, clothing, care and medical attention to said William Joseph Tabafunds [sic], a minor child under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the age of seventeen (17) months, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect, without lawful excuse, to provide said . . . child . . . with necessary food, clothing, care and medical attention . . .
“In any case other than those specified inRCW 9.48.030 , 9.48.040 and 9.48.050, homicide, not being excusable or justifiable, is manslaughter.”
“Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, with ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent.”