State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
APPEAL DISMISSED.
KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
The State has appealed the Benton County Circuit Court’s order granting a directed verdict in favor of the Appellee, Steven Carl Williams, based on the circuit court’s findings in a theft-of-services case against Williams. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to
The facts are largely undisputed. On February 7, 2009, Williams was arrested for two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Benton County Circuit Court set Williams’s bail at $75,000. Later that day, Williams contacted Action Bonding, LLC (“Action”). Action’s bail-bond agent, Jeff Smith, went to meet with Williams. Williams completed a portion of the bond paperwork, including an application which stated a premium of $7,570 was due, but the application also indicated that
After a bench trial in the Benton County Circuit Court, on July 26, 2012, the circuit court granted Williams’s motion for directed verdict. From that order, the State brought this appeal. The State appeals on two grounds: (1) the circuit court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the definition of “services” under Arkansas’s theft-of-services statute,
As an initial matter, we must determine whether this is a proper State appeal. First,
Accordingly, where a State appeal fails to present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the law. Williams, 348 Ark. 585, 75 S.W.3d 684. Similarly, where the resolution of the issue on appeal turns on the facts unique to the case or involves a mixed question of law and fact, the appeal is not one requiring interpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramification, and the matter is not appealable by the State. Id. Finally, where an appeal raises an issue of the application, and not interpretation, of a criminal rule or statutory provision, it does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law and is not appealable by the State under Rule 3. Id.
For its first point on appeal, the State asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that,
Williams responds that the circuit court did not err; rather, the circuit court made a finding limited to Williams’s contract with Action.
The circuit court directed a verdict for Williams, finding as follows:
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the bail bond contract (as evidenced by the State’s Exhibits) does not constitute “services” as that term is used in ACA 5-36-104(a)(1), as is made evident from a full reading of the statute as to what is the intended subject matter of the statute.
Additionally, the Court finds that the bail bond contract does not constitute “professional services” as that term is used in ACA 5-36-101(9). . . . .
In this case, the testimony from the State’s witnesses was uncontroverted that the agent for the bonding company secured the release of the Defendant from the jail, despite the fact that no payment had in fact been made by the Defendant prior to or at the time of the custody release. This is so, even though the bail bond documents (State’s Exhibits) reflect that on the day of release, the Defendant had a zero balance due to the bonding company.
Since the bonding company elected to obtain the release of the Defendant, though no payment had been received prior to the release (as required to fall within the definition of a state authorized “bail bond”), the bonding company simply assumed a business risk as to whether or not the Defendant would subsequently honor his oral commitment to pay the required fee for issuance of the bond.
For its second point on appeal, the State asserts that the circuit court erred by finding that, as a matter of law, the requisite fraudulent intent under
The State claims it should be permitted to appeal on this point because the circuit court’s finding held that a future promise to pay for services, under any circumstances, cannot establish the requisite fraudulent intent under
The second grounds for directed verdict is the failure to present sufficient evidence as to the defendant’s state of mind relative to an intent to engage in “deception.” . . . .
The Court concludes that it simply has no proper way to evaluate whether or not there was an intent to deceive on the part of the Defendant at the time he delivered the check. Speculation would be required in order to conclude the State had met its burden of proof at this stage of the proceedings.
It is clear that the circuit court’s determination is specific to Williams’s promise to pay in the future and was a determination made based on the sufficiency of the evidence, not an interpretation of the law as the State claims. The State is not allowed to appeal from a directed verdict acquitting the defendant when the sole issue is the sufficiency of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Dixon, 209 Ark. 155, 189 S.W.2d 787 (1945). “The question of the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a given case constitutes a question of law for the decision of the court, but it cannot become a precedent for application in another case because of the varying state of facts in different cases, and therefore the decision of that, even though it be one of law, is not important in the uniform administration of the criminal law.” Id. at 158, 189 S.W.2d at 789.
Appeal dismissed.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Rebecca Kane, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.
DWSA Law Group, by: Nick Churchill, for appellee.