State v. WiggintonState v. Wigginton
Rоger Fredrick Wigginton was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing. On appeal, Wigginton contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence that, Wigginton contends, was obtained as a result of an illegal extension of a traffic stop. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
Late one January night, Idaho State Trooper Michael Lininger observed a vehicle cross over the highway centerline about three times. He also noticed that on straight stretches of the road, the vehicle’s brake lights wоuld come on for no apparent reason. Suspecting that the driver was under the influence, Lininger initiated a traffic stop. As the vehicle pulled onto the shoulder of the road it hit a rock, which flattened a front tire. On making contact with the driver, Wigginton, the trooper noticed that Wigginton’s eyes were bloodshot and that there was an overwhelming odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. When asked about the strong odor, Wigginton’s passenger, Lonna Short, explained that someone had previously spilled a beer on the vehicle’s floorboard and that the odor was enhanced whenever the heater was running. Both Wigginton and Short denied drinking alcohol that night.
Trooper Lininger wanted to conduct field sobriety tests on Wigginton, but was experiencing problems with the headlights of his pаtrol vehicle. Concerned with safety on the dark roadway, he radioed another officer for assistance. Sergeant Guy Cordle of the St. Maries Police Department responded shortly thereafter accompanied by Sadie, a certified drug detеction canine. At some point before Cordle arrived, Lininger was made aware that Cordle had an interest in Wigginton, believing him to be a user and dealer of methamphetamine.
Wigginton was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing,
II.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Wigginton contends that the district court erred in denying the suppression motion because the officers had neither reasonablе suspicion to continue his detention after the field sobriety tests nor probable cause for a search of the vehicle. Wigginton argues that the field sobriety tests dispelled any suspicion that Wigginton was driving under the influence (DUI) or that there was an open contаiner of alcohol in the vehicle and that the drug sniff by Sadie was an unlawful extension of the traffic stop. Wigginton also contends that neither the odor of alcohol nor Sadie’s alleged alert were sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle.
A. Probable Cause for the Search
We first consider whether there was probable cause to search the vehicle for an open container of alcohol after Wigginton passed the sobriety tests. If the officers possessed probable cause to believe thаt Wigginton’s vehicle contained an open container in violation of
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of thе Fourth Amendment, but the State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
State v. Weaver,
A number of jurisdictions have held that the smell of alcohol alone or the smell of alcohol in conjunctiоn with other factors is sufficient for probable cause to search a vehicle for an open container.
See, e.g., State v. Peterson,
We similarly conclude that the facts known to the officers here provided probable cause to search for evidence of an open container offense. Trooper Lininger detected not merely a noticeable odor of alcohol but an “overwhelming” odor coming from the vehicle. Both occupants denied that they had been drinking, and the field sobriety tests confirmed that Wigginton was not under the influence of alcohol. If, as Wigginton and Short claimed, they had not been drinking alcohol, then the source of the odor had to be something within the vehicle. Short’s explanation that the smell was caused by beer that had spilled on an earlier occasion provided a plausible explanation, but the trooper was not obligated to accept her assertion that the spill was not a recent occurrence. Indeed, the fact that Wigginton had just struck a rock when pulling over on the officer’s signal suggested a possibility that alcohol could have spilled from a container during that abrupt stop. Wigginton’s contention that probable cause was eliminated when he passed the field sobriety tests is without merit, for the test results did not dispel the possibility that he or the passenger was in possession of an open container, even if Wigginton had not consumed its contents to the point of intoxication.
Although the suspicion of DUI, which initially motivated the traffic stop, was removed when Wigginton performed satisfactorily on the sobriety test, by that time probable cause for the search had dеveloped. As we have often stated, the justification for the detention of a motorist is not permanently fixed at the moment the traffic stop is initiated. Subsequent observations and events can give rise to legitimate reasons for investigation of criminality differing from that which initially prompted the stop.
State v. Sheldon,
We do not hold that an odor of alcohol that may be coming from occupants rather than from something else within the vehicle alone is sufficient to justify a search under the automobile exception. Here, however, the odor from the vehicle and additional information pointed to the likelihood of an open container in the vehicle. Cumulatively, these facts gave probable cause for a search.
B. Extension of the Stop by Use of the Drug Dog
Wigginton also argues that the approximately two-minute delay in initiating the search for an open container while Officer Cordle walked Sadie around the ear constituted an unlawful extension of the traffic stop and that this unjustified prolonging of the detention requires suppression of evidence found in the ear.
Thе United States Supreme Court has held that an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”
Florida v. Royer,
We conclude, however, thаt even if Wigginton’s roadside detention was unlawfully lengthened by use of the drug dog, that illegality does not require suppression because this brief extension of the traffic stop did not in any way lead to or facilitate the discovery of the challenged evidence. The exclusionary rule requires the exclusion of evidence only if there is a factual nexus between the illegal conduct of state agents and the evidence sought to be suppressed.
State v. Babb,
Application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is аppropriate only as to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States,468 U.S. 796 , 815,104 S.Ct. 3380 , 3390-91,82 L.Ed.2d 599 , 615 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States,371 U.S. 471 ,83 S.Ct. 407 ,9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Bainbridge,117 Idaho 245 , 249,787 P.2d 231 , 235 (1990); State v. Hoak,107 Idaho 742 , 749,692 P.2d 1174 , 1181 (1984). The test is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or insteаd by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun,371 U.S. at 488 ,83 S.Ct. at 417 ,9 L.Ed.2d at 455 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, p. 221 (1959)).
Id.
at 98,
In Wigginton’s case, the requisite factual nexus has not been established. Before the drug dog was employed to sniff the car, the officers already possessed probable cause to search for an open container, and Trooper Lininger had already announced his intention to conduct the search. The interlude with the drug dog only briefly delayed an already justified search, and it cannot be said that the challenged evidence would not have come to light if that delay had not occurred. Therefore even assuming that the delay for use of the drug dog was unlawful, no basis has been shown to suppress the evidence found in Wigginton’s vehicle. 2
Accordingly, the order of the district court denying Wigginton’s motion to suppress evidence is affirmed.
Notes
. A drug dog sniff is not itself a search and therefore may be conducted during a traffic stop without suspicion of drug activity so long as the employment of the drug dog does not extend the duration of the stop.
Illinois v. Caballes,
. Because evidence indicating an open container violation justified the search, we need not address Wigginton's arguments challenging the foundation for the evidence of the drug dog alert and the sufficiency of that evidence to demonstrate probable cause to search for drugs.