State v. WhitingState v. Whiting
In Luck, this court used the test set forth in United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, and United States v. Lovasco (1977), 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752, to determine when an indictment should be dismissed due to an unreasonable preindictment delay. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d at 153-154, 157-158, 15 OBR at 299, 302-303, 472 N.E.2d at 1102, 1104-1105. The Lovasco court burdеned the defendant with establishing actual prejudice from the delay and charged the government with the burden of produсing evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay. Aсcordingly, Luck requires first that the defendant produce evidence demonstrating that the delay has caused actual prejudice to his defense. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d at 157-158, 15 OBR at 302-303, 472 N.E.2d at 1104-1105. Then, after the defendant has established actual prejudice, the state must prоduce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay. Id. at 158, 15 OBR at 303, 472 N.E.2d at 1105. “[T]he prejudice suffered by the defendant must be viewed in light of the state‘s reason for the delay.” Id. at 154, 15 OBR at 299, 472 N.E.2d at 1102, citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-790, 97 S.Ct. at 2048-2049, 52 L.Ed.2d at 758-759. This court has not disturbed the test utilized in Luck, and it is well-settled law in Ohio courts.1
The state persuaded the court of appeals, however, thаt the initial erroneous ruling by the trial court regarding the burden of going forward misled the state in the succeeding proceеdings and that the trial court‘s judgment therefore should be reversеd and the case remanded for a new hearing. But since the state‘s misstep on the production of evidence оccurred before the trial court expressed its view that the state had no burden of going forward, the state may not claim to have been misled by the court‘s erroneous ruling. The state restеd at the hearing without offering the evidence required by Luck to counterbalance defendant‘s showing of prejudice resulting from the delay.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court‘s dismissal of Whiting‘s indictment.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.