49 La. Ann. 127 | La. | 1896
The defendant, convicted of shooting with intent to murder, moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that Sec. 792 of the Revised Statutes, under which he was indicted, had been repealed by the Act of the Legislature, No. 59 of 1896. The mofion in arrest of judgment was sustained, and the State appeals.
The Aci of 1896 repeats the language of Sec. 792 in defining the offence of assault with intent to murder, but while the section limits the punishment to two years, the Act of 1896 fixes the maximum imprisonment at twenty years. With this difference, the section and the act are the same constituting the offence. The act is entitled “An Act to Amend and Re-enact See. 792 of the Revised Statutes,” and the repealing clause of the act repeals only laws or parts of laws in conflict with it.
It is familiar that the repeal, pending the prosecution, of the statute on which the conviction is obtained divests all jurisdiction to sentence. Judge Martin’s reason for this conclusion was that the repeal of the statute in such case carried the presumption of a pardon. State vs. Johnson, 12 La. 552. Where the statute is completely effaced by legislation, contemplating and effecting that purpose, it is to be accepted as manifesting the legislative will that the offence denounced by the previous statute shall no longer be deemed a crime. Can it be supposed in this case that the Legislature, by amending and increasing the punishment of assault with intent to murder, intended thereafter that an assault of that character should not be punished at all? If the key to the interpretation of statutes is the intention that prompted the legislation, it must seem difficult to attribute to this Act of 1896 the construction affirmed in the motion of arrest.
When the Legislature, dealing with an offence under a pre-existing statute, has defined the offence in terms the same, or with additions or qualifications not in the original act, the later legislation repealing all laws on the same subject matter, it has been held that the previous statute is completely repealed, and there is no power to sentence under the conviction for an offence committed before the later legislation. State vs. Clay, 12 An. 431; State vs. O’Conner, 13 An. 486. The legislation, in part, at least, the subject of these decisions, was revisory. In other decisions, in respect to legislation of this character, it was held that no purpose to disturb prior legisla