Dеcember 11, 1945, Cornelia White, defendant and appellant, was tried and convicted in police court of a misdemeanor under an ordinance of Boise City for allowing a vicious dog to run at large within the city limits. She was adjudged to pay a fine of $10 and costs, or imprisonment in the city jail until the fine and costs were paid, at the rate'of $2 pеr day, not exceeding five days. December 20, 1945, appellant appealed to the District Court of the Third Judiciаl District of the State of Idaho, in and for Ada County, from the judg *311 ment in police court. January 17, 1946, appellant filed a dеmurrer in District Court alleging that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. March 19, 1946, thе demurrer having been argued and taken under advisement, the court overruled the same. April 19, 1946, appellant demanded a jury trial, and on the same date, the demand for a jury trial was denied and the case was tried before the Honorable Charles E. Winstead, District Judge. On said April 19, 1946, the trial judge adjudged appellant guilty as charged in the complaint, аnd sentenced her to pay a fine of $25 and costs. April 20, 1946, appellant appealed to this court from thе judgment of conviction in the District Court.
The Specifications of Error disclose that:
(1) “The Court erred in overruling appellant’s demurrer to the complaint.”
(2) “The Court erred in denying appellant a trial by jury.”
(3) “The Court еrred in adjudging appellant guilty of the offense charged and sentencing her to pay a fine of $25.00 and costs.”
Under thе provisions of Section 49-1109, I.C.A., which deals with the legislative powers of municipal corporations, it is provided that municipal corporations may: “Make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules, regulations, resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state, as may be expedient, in addition to the special powers in this title granted, maintaining the pеace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce, manufacture, and to enforce all ordinances by inflicting fines or penalties for the breach thereof, * *
Specifications 1 and 3 will be considered together. At page 6 of appellant’s brief, it is said: “What the state declares tо be a crime is not a crime under the ordinance and what the ordinance declares to be a crime is not a crime under the state law.” If we understand appellant correctly, she. is attempting to make it appеar that the ordinance does not classify dogs in the same manner as they are classified by the state statute, аnd for that reason there is a conflict between the state statute and the city ordinance. The State doеs not license dogs, although at one time counties, by order of the Board of County Commissioners, were authorized to license them, but that provision was later repealed. Based upon the asserted conflict, appеllant has urged that the ordinance under which the prosecution was had is void. We take it that it is unnecessary, in order to enact a valid ordinance, that the same must correspond in all respects to the matters and things set out and contained in the state statute.
Section 24-2405, I.C.A., has to do with dogs running at large, provides a penalty, and is as follows: “Any person, who, after complaint has been made by any person to the sheriff, who shall serve a copy *312 of said notice upon such person complained of, wilfully or negligently permits any dog owned or possessed or hаrbored by him to be, or run, at large without a competent and responsible attendant or master, within the limits of any city, tоwn, or village or in the vicinity of any farm, pasture, ranch, dwelling-house, or cultivated lands of another, or who wilfully or negligеntly fails, neglects or refuses to keep any such dog securely confined within the limits of his own premises when not under the immediate care and control of a competent and responsible attendant or master, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
In the recent case of State v. Musser,
And the court further observed, in considering an asserted conflict between thе state law and a city ordinance:
“It does not provide that a person may drink intoxicating liquor in a public plаce within the corporate limits of a municipality. The city ordinance prohibits drinking intoxicating liquor in a public plаce. It is, therefore, not in conflict with, nor repugnant to, the statute. * * *
“Therefore, the court did not err in overruling the dеmurrer interposed to the complaint. The complaint stated a public offense under the ordinance, and the court committed no error in the admission of evidence in the course of the trial.”
There is no merit in appellant’s Specifications of Error 1 and 3 to the effect that the ordinance was invalid and because of invаlidity would not support the judgment.
The record in this case discloses that on appeal from the police court to the District Court appellant made request and demand for trial by jury. The request was refused and the trial by jury denied. This wаs error. In the case of State v. Romich,