State v. WhiteState v. White
The State appeals an order suppressing the contents of a cosmetic case containing cocaine found during a body search of Mr. White incident to his arrest. The issue presented is whether the evidence was properly seized incident to a lawful arrest, or alternatively, on the basis of inevitable discovery. We reverse.
On January 10, 1985, Officer Randy Chapman of the Wenatchee Police Department observed a vehicle crossing over the center line and proceeding through a red light without stopping. The officer stopped the vehicle and upon approaching the driver's window detected a strong odor of intoxicants. After failing field sobriety tests, the officer placed Mr. White under arrest for driving while under the influence. While conducting a pat-down search, the officer felt something hard in Mr. White's coat pocket which he first thought was a pocketknife. Officer Chapman reached inside the pocket and pulled out a plastic cosmetic case approximately 4 inches long, IV2 inches wide, and ¥2 inch deep. He opened it and found a small bindle of paper with a white powdery substance inside, a razor blade and a straw. Mr. White was taken to Chelan County Jail and booked on charges of driving while under the influence and possession of a controlled substance.
On January 29 Mr. White was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. He pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the contents of the cosmetic case. This motion was granted. The State appeals.
First, the State contends the court erred when it suppressed the contents of the cosmetic case as it was a search incident to a lawful arrest. We agree.
Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement.
State v. Carner,
A warrantless search in this situation is permissible only to remove any weapons the arrestee might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is arrested.
Mr. White argues that opening the cosmetic case was beyond the scope of the search because the cosmetic case could not possibly contain weapons or evidence of the crime for which he was arrested, DWI. Further, he contends because the officer was in control of the cosmetic case at the time of the search, there was no danger that he would attempt to destroy the evidence. We disagree for two reasons.
First, property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which he was initially apprehended.
State v. Smith,
Second, once arrested there is a diminished expectation of privacy of the person which includes personal possessions closely associated with the person's clothing.
United States v. Monclavo-Cruz,
Unlike searches of the person, United States v. Robinson,414 U. S. 218 (1973); United States v. Edwards,415 U. S. 800 (1974), searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.
In situations where this greater expectation of privacy exists, there must be additional reasons present to warrant the search. Some of those are noted in
Ringer, i.e.,
the necessity of removing weapons or preventing destruction of evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made. Mr. White's reliance on
State v. Ortiz,
Ringer
was not intended to be interpreted in the restrictive manner suggested by Mr. White.
Ringer
did not involve a body search, but rather the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle after he had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. To extend
Ringer,
as Mr. White contends, would allow the police to conduct a search of the
Next, the State contends the evidence would have been discovered in any event pursuant to a lawful inventory of Mr. White's belongings when booked into the Chelan County Jail and thus the earlier discovery should be upheld on the theory of inevitable discovery. Mr. White argues there was no testimony of booking procedures and even if there had been, it is very much an open question of whether the cosmetic case could be separately opened and inventoried as to its contents. Because of our determination the evidence was properly seized at the time of Mr. White's arrest, we need not reach these contentions.
In view of our holding, we reverse and remand for trial.
Munson and McInturff, JJ., concur.
Review denied by Supreme Court October 7, 1986.